BOSTON, MASS.
HERALD TRAVELER

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S - 260,961
DEC 13 1971

NBC News White Paper to Explore 'Vietnam Hindsight' in Television Special

Cable Authorizing Diem Overthrow Never Fully Discussed

By ELEANOR ROBERTS

One of the most crucial telegrams of the Vietnam war*—a cable authorizing the overthrow of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem — was sent without full consultation between President Kennedy and his advisors and without the knowledge of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

President Kennedy, furthermore, was "very upset" when he discovered that two of his cabinet members — Secretary of Defense Robert A. McNamara and CIA director John McCone — doubted the wisdom of the cable.

"It would be putting it too strongly to say that he thought something had been put over on him," says Kennedy historian Arthur Schlesinger, "but he thought something had gone out as a governmental judgment which had not been fully and adequately discussed."

*(Many observers agree that Diem's assassination set off a swift breakdown of political stability in South Vietnam, which in turn led to a deepening U.S. commitment to prevent a collapse of the government and a takeover by the Communists.)

THIS VIEW will be among many disturbing insights to be disclosed later this month in a special, two-part NBC News White Paper called "Vietnam Hindsight."

The first part, "How It Began," will be shown Tuesday, Dec. 21, at 8:30 p.m. (EST). The second part, "The Death of Diem," will be aired the following night, Wednesday, Dec. 22, at 10 p.m. (EST), on Ch. 4.

The programs will feature key Kennedy administration figures and South Vietnamese generals who will give their versions of events and decisions during the fateful 34-month period of 1961-63 when U. S. involvement began to gather momentum.

Among the views to be presented are the following:

- President Diem did not want American troops in Vietnam because he thought the South Vietnamese should win their own battles and because he did not want to be called a puppet of the United States.
- President Kennedy wanted Diem out of power, but the news of Diem's assassination shook him.
- The Kennedy Administration sent the first major influx of U. S. combat troops into Vietnam — some 6,000 troops — on the pretext of helping with flood damage in the Mekong River delta area, even though U. S. officials knew then the troops might be forced to join the fight if the situation worsened.
- President Kennedy stood firm in Vietnam because he feared that a U. S. pullout would lead to strong isolationist sentiment at home and to a general U. S. pullback around the world that, in turn, might invite international [illegible] pansion by Red China and the Soviet Union.

Concerning the ill-fated telegram, the program reveals that Ambassador Lodge learned that a group of Vietnamese generals were plotting to topple Diem, and he cabled the information to Washington.

THE MESSAGE arrived on a Saturday. President Kennedy was in Hyannisport, Secretary McNamara was on vacation, Secretary of State Dean Rusk was in New York, and CIA Director John McCone was on his honeymoon.

The reply to Lodge's message was drafted in the home of George Ball, acting Secretary of State, who considered the Diem regime "distasteful."

According to General Maxwell Taylor, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who favored supporting Diem until a better alternative was in sight, the reply "authorized, in fact directed Lodge to inform senior Vietnamese officials and senior generals of the disenchantment of our government with Diem and with his brother, and indicated that we would we happy to have a replacement."

Curiously, the telegram was sent to Saigon without the knowledge of Secretary McNamara or the Joint Chiefs.

Ball says he called President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk and read them the cable's contents. "We decided to go ahead with the cable," Ball says.

BALL EXPLAINS that President Kennedy [illegible] coup because he felt Diem "was demeaning the United States by permitting actions to be taken in the name of his government that were so distasteful."

Ball also called Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatrick at his Maryland home. "Even though I was somewhat unhappy about the thrust of the cable," Gilpatrick says, "I did clear it for the Defense Department."

The following Monday there were second thoughts in Washington.

Roger Hilsman, then head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence, says: "McNamara and McCone returned, and because they had not personally approved of it (the cable) were in a position where they could raise objections . . . raise doubts, which they did.

"So, there was a meeting that Monday, it was again thoroughly discussed and Kennedy ended up by saying the cable had just arrived in Saigon on Sunday, no actions had been taken, it is not too late to remit, to call it back.

"HE WENT around the table and asked each of them, 'Do you want to withdraw the cable?' And nobody said he did, so the cable stood."

The United States, says Ambassador Lodge, was thus launched on a course from which "there was no respectable turning back."

November 22 1971 / 50 cents

Newsw



CHARLOTTE, N.C.
OBSERVER

M - 174,906
S - 204,225
28 Oct. 1971

34A THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER Thurs., Oct. 28, 1971

Smathers Won't Run For Arms Advisory Committee

WASHINGTON—The White House informed a number of senators and staff workers Tuesday that former U.S. Sen. George A. Smathers, D-Fla., was voluntarily withdrawing his name from nomination for a seat on the 15-member General Advisory Committee of the U.S. Arms control and disarmament agency.

The action follows a series of articles in Newsday that detailed how Smathers, while still in the Senate, attempted to preserve a large defense contract for a firm which later named him to its board of directors and allowed him to purchase stock then worth $455,000 for only $29,000.

Sources said Tuesday night that the action will not become official until the White House sends a letter to the Senate formally withdrawing its nomination of Smathers, who at one time was the third ranking Democrat in the Senate.

Smathers could not be reached for comment, and the White House refused to respond to questions about the withdrawal of the nomination.

A number of sources, however, verified that the White House had made calls Tuesday morning to inform some members of the Foreign Relations Committee that Smathers would withdraw his name. All of the sources said that no reason was given for the action, and that no other name was mentioned as a substitute.

Nominations to the advisory committee are usually given pro forma approval by the Foreign Relations Committee, but one member said that it was likely that hearings would have been held on the Smathers nomination because of the Newsday series. The committee was originally expected to consider the nominations Tuesday, but postponed any action because of other work and now is not expected to consider them until next week at the earliest.

Nominated along with Smathers were Gen. Earle J. Wheeler, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; John A. McCone, former director of the Central Intelligence AGency; and Robert Ellsworth, former ambassador to NATO.

According to the White House announcement of the nomination, the job of the members of the advisory committee is to advise "the President, secretary of state and the disarmament director respecting matters affecting arms control, disarmament and world peace."

WASHINGTON POST
2 OCT 1971

Congress Responds To Tonkin Incident

This is the fourth of 15 excerpts from former President Johnson's book, "The Vantage Point," an account of his presidency, to be published shortly.

"CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE VIETNAM 1964-1965"

In August 1964 an unexpected crisis developed, one that threatened for a time to change the nature of the war in Vietnam. During the early hours of Sunday morning, August 2, a high-priority message came in reporting that North Vietnamese torpedo boats had attacked the destroyer USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin.

The Maddox was on what we called the De Soto patrol. One purpose was to spot evidence of Hanoi's continuing infiltration of men and war supplies into South Vietnam by sea. Another was to gather electronic intelligence.

Another form of naval activity, not connected with our patrol, was going on in the area. During 1964 the South Vietnamese navy made small-scale strikes against installations along the North Vietnamese coast. The purpose was to interfere with Hanoi's continuing program of sending men and supplies into the South by sea. Senators and Representatives designated to oversee our intelligence operations were fully briefed on these South Vietnamese activities, and on our supporting role, in January 1964, again in May, twice in June, and again in early August. Secretary McNamara described the operations, codenamed 34-A, in a closed session with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 3, 1964.

One 34-A attack occurred on July 30. At the time, the destroyer Maddox had not started its patrol and was 120 miles away. A second South Vietnamese attack took place the night of August 3 when the De Soto patrol was at least 70 miles away. It was later alleged that our destroyers were supporting the South Vietnamese naval action. The fact is our De Soto commanders did not even know where or when the 34-A attacks would occur.

Two days later the North Vietnamese struck again at our destroyers, this time at night (midmorning Washington time) on August 4. A few minutes after nine o'clock I had a call from McNamara. He informed me that our intelligence people had intercepted a



message that strongly indicated the North Vietnamese were preparing another attack on our ships in the Tonkin Gulf. Soon we received messages from the destroyer Maddox that its radar and that of the USS C. Turner Joy had spotted vessels they believed to be hostile. The enemy ships appeared to be preparing an ambush. The Maddox and C. Turner Joy had changed course to avoid contact, but they then sent word that the enemy vessels were closing in at high speed. Within an hour the destroyers advised that they were being attacked by torpedoes and were firing on the enemy PT boats. As messages flowed in from Pacific Command Headquarters, McNamara passed along the key facts to me.

We had scheduled a noon meeting of the National Security Council to discuss the situation in Cyprus, and several key advisers had assembled for that session.

I closed the NSC meeting and asked Rusk, McNamara, Vance, McCone, and Bundy to join me for lunch. The unanimous view of those advisers was that we could not ignore this second provocation and that the attack required retaliation. I agreed. We decided on air strikes against North Vietnamese PT boats and their bases plus a strike on one oil depot.

During the afternoon additional intelligence reports flowed in. We intercepted a message from one of the attacking North Vietnamese boats in which it boasted of having fired at two "enemy airplanes" and claimed to have damaged one. The North Vietnamese skipper reported that his unit had "sacrificed two comrades." Our experts said this meant either two enemy boats or two men in the attack group. Another message to North Vietnamese PT boat headquarters boasted: "Enemy vessel perhaps wounded." Clearly the North Vietnamese knew they were attacking us.

Action reports continued to arrive from our destroyers, and from the Pacific Command. A few were ambiguous. One from the destroyer Maddox questioned whether the many reports of enemy torpedo firings were all valid.

I instructed McNamara to investigate these reports and obtain clarification. He immediately got in touch with Admiral U. S. G. Sharp Jr., the Commander in Chief, Pacific, and the Admiral in turn made contact with the De Soto patrol. McNamara and his civilian and military specialist went over all the evidence in specific detail. We wanted to be absolutely certain that our ships had actually been attacked before we retaliated.

Admiral Sharp called McNamara to report that after checking all the reports and evidence, he had no doubt whatsoever that an attack had taken place. McNamara and his associates reached the same firm conclusion. Detailed studies made after the incident confirmed this judgment.

I summoned the National Security Council for another meeting at 6:15 p.m. to discuss in detail the incident and our plans for a sharp but limited response. About seven o'clock I met with the congressional leadership in the White House for the same purpose. I told them that I believed a congressional resolution of support for our entire position in Southeast Asia was necessary and would strengthen our hand. I said that we might be forced to further action, and that I did not "want to go in unless Congress goes in with me."

I was determined, from the time I became President, to seek the fullest support of Congress for any major action that I took, whether in foreign affairs or in the domestic field.

Concerning Vietnam, I repeatedly told Secretaries Rusk and McNamara that I never wanted to receive any recommendation for action we might have to take unless it was accompanied by a proposal for assuring the backing of Congress.

Because of this, it became routine for all contingency plans to include suggestions for informing Congress and winning its support. As we considered the possibility of having to expand our efforts in Vietnam, proposals for seeking a congressional resolution became part of the normal contingency

continued

WASHINGTON POST
20 OCT 1971

STAT

LBJ Adds Some Facts, Omits Others

By Chalmers M. Roberts

Additions and omissions mark former President Johnson's account of the 1964-65 escalation of the Vietnam war, it is evident from the excerpts from his book published today.

Probably the single most disputed issue in Mr. Johnson's conduct of the war was the alleged Aug. 4, 1964, attack in the Tonkin Gulf by North Vietnamese boats on two American destroyers, the Maddox and Turner Joy. Mr. Johnson declared then, and reaffirms in his book, that the evidence of the attack was conclusive. As a result he sought and got the Tonkin Gulf Resolution from Congress. . .

But his critics contend the attack either never took place or even if something did occur Mr. Johnson blew it up out of all proportion because he already was determined to strike North Vietnam from the air. At least three books have now been written about the affair and the thrust of each has been on the critical side.

American intercepts of North Vietnamese messages were heavily relied upon at the time to prove that the attack took place. Their texts, however, have never been made public though Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara in 1968 did summarize them for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and show the texts to the senators in private. Now the former President quotes from two of the messages and concludes that "clearly the North Vietnamese knew they were attacking us."

The quotes will not satisfy the doubters. Why did not Mr. Johnson reveal the complete texts, they will ask? And why not, indeed. Cryptographic protection is the usual answer but it is not convincing, given the nature of current procedures at the time. Mr. Johnson thus would seem only to have reopened the argument.

In this installment of his memoirs the former President discusses four of the first five major Vietnam decisions. The Tonkin retaliation was one of them; the Johns Hopkins speech another; the policy of reprisal by air another. The fifth "and by far the hardest" was sending ground troops to Vietnam to join the battle.

As the former President describes all these decisions, each was reached with great soul searching. Yet, read as a whole in hindsight, there was an inevitable progression from one to the other, especially from Rolling Thunder, the air campaign against the North, to the shipment of massive numbers of troops to the South.

As he so often did while in office, Mr. Johnson saw his actions as steps logically following the policies of his two predecessors, Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. Omitted from today's excerpts are descriptions of Gen. Eisenhower's personal encouragement to Mr. Johnson.)

The air war simply was not enough; only ground forces could save South Vietnam. In March, 1965, Gen. William Westmoreland's request for the first two Marine battalions was granted. Then on April 1 came the big decision to beef up the manpower though the Army forces still were described as "logistic and support." It would be only a matter of time, however, until combat forces would have to go as such.

Mr. Johnson's account of the April 1 decision lists three steps as "among the specific military actions I approved." But the Pentagon papers made public something the former President totally skips: his instructions to avoid telling the American public about the major steps he was taking. This was contained in the National Security Action Memorandum 328, over the signature of McGeorge Bundy, to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the head of the CIA detailing Mr. Johnson's "decisions."

It was this memorandum which contained the statement that "the President desires" that "premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions" on the key new military steps. "The President's desire," the memo concluded, "is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy."

If this decision then was to be painted as "wholly consistent with existing policy" how can it now be "by far the hardest" of five decisions Mr. Johnson had then taken about the war? Herein lies part of the credibility gap that plagued him in office and which today's installment fails to dispel.

STAT

MIAMI HERALD
19 OCTOBER 1971

STAT

Viet Problem Befell Johnson Quick

This is the third of 12 articles excerpted from Lyndon Johnson's book, "The Vantage Point."

VANTAGE POINT
LBJ's own story

By Lyndon Baines Johnson

President Kennedy believed in our nation's commitment to the security of Southeast Asia, a commitment made in the SEATO Treaty and strengthened by his predecessor, President Eisenhower. President Kennedy had explained on many occasions the reasons he took this position. By late 1963 he had sent approximately 16,000 American troops to South Vietnam to make good our SEATO pledge.

My first exposure to details of the problem of Vietnam came forty-eight hours after I had taken the oath of office. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge had flown to Washington a few days earlier for scheduled conferences with President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other administration officials.

I sent for him and asked him to give me a firsthand account of recent events. I wanted his estimate and felt it was important that he go back to Saigon with a clear understanding of my personal views. We met in my office in the Executive Office Building. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara were there, as well as Under Secretary of State George Ball, CIA Director John McCone and McGeorge Bundy.

LODGE WAS optimistic. He believed the recent change of government in Saigon was an improvement. He was hopeful and expected the new military leaders to speed up their war efforts. He stated that our government had put pressure on the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem to change its course. Those pressures, he admitted, had encouraged the military leaders who carried out the coup on November 1, 1963. However, if Diem and his brother Nhu had followed his advice, Lodge said, they would still be alive. In his last talk with Diem on the afternoon of November 1, Lodge had offered to help assure the Vietnamese leader's personal safety, but Diem had ignored the offer.

I turned to John McCone and asked what his reports from Saigon in recent days indicated. The CIA director replied that his estimate was much less encouraging. There had been an increase in Viet Cong activity since the coup, including more VC attacks. He had information that the enemy was preparing to exert even more severe pressure.

I told Lodge and the others that I had serious misgivings. Many people were criticizing the removal of Diem and were shocked by his murder.

CONGRESSIONAL demands for our withdrawal from Vietnam were becoming louder and more insistent. I thought we had been mistaken in our failure to support Diem. But all that, I said, was behind us. Now we had to concentrate on accomplishing our goals. We had to help the new government get on its feet and perform effectively.

I told Lodge that I had not been happy with what I had read about our mission's operations in Vietnam earlier in the year. There had been too much internal dissension. I wanted him to develop a strong team; I wanted them to work together; and I wanted the Ambassador to be the sole boss. I assured him of full support in Washington. In the next few months we sent Lodge a new deputy, a new CIA chief, a new director of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) operations — and replacements for other key posts in the U.S. Embassy. By midyear Gen. William C. Westmoreland had replaced Gen. Paul Harkins as head of our Military Assistance Command.

In addition to my talk with Ambassador Lodge, I discussed the Honolulu meeting, held just before the assassination, with some of the principal participants — especially Rusk and McNamara — and with Mac Bundy and others. The net result of the Honolulu briefings and discussions was a modestly encouraging assessment of prospects in Vietnam, though Secretaries Rusk and McNamara expressed some reservations.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S principal foreign affairs advisers agreed that it was important to underline, especially within government circles, the continuity of policy and direction under the new President. I agreed. It was my first important decision on Vietnam as President, important not because it required any new actions but because it signaled our determination to persevere in the policies and actions in which we were already engaged.

This was the view of Vietnam I received during those first few tense days in office. It was a view shared by the top levels of our mission in Saigon and by my principal advisers in Washington. I had one important reservation about this generally [illegible]

lieved the assassination of President Diem had created more problems for the Vietnamese than it had solved. I saw little evidence that men of experience and ability were available in Vietnam, ready to help lead their country. I was deeply concerned that worse political turmoil might lie ahead in Saigon.

As I dug deeper into the Vietnam situation over the following weeks, I became convinced that the problem was considerably more serious than earlier reports had indicated. Rusk, McNamara, McCone, Bundy and others shared my growing concern. At the beginning of December I read a review of the military situation developed by the State Department's intelligence analysts.

THIS REPORT concluded that the military effort had been deteriorating in important ways for several months. Early in December Ambassador Lodge sent in a detailed study of a key province prepared by one of his field representatives. The document reported that in that northern delta province "the past thirty days have produced . . . a day-by-day increase in Viet Cong influence, military operations, physical control of the countryside, and Communist-controlled combat hamlets."

I believe two things were wrong with the reporting in 1963: an excess of wishful thinking on the part of some official observers and too much uncritical reliance on Vietnamese statistics and information. Many Vietnamese [illegible] officers in the

Continued

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

16 OCT 1971

Ex-President's Personal Record

Johnson Saw Need to Grasp Reins of Power Firmly, Quickly

By Lyndon B. Johnson

"The Vantage Point," former President Lyndon B. Johnson's own story of his five years in the White House, is one of the key books of our time. In this highly personal record, and in this, the second in a series of 12 excerpts, President Johnson recalls the days of transition after he took office on that grim November day in Dallas.

In spite of more than three decades of public service, I knew I was an unknown quantity to many of my countrymen and to much of the world when I assumed office.

I suffered another handicap, since I had come to the Presidency not thru the collective will of the people but in the wake of tragedy. I had no mandate from the voters.

A few people were openly bitter about my becoming President. They found it impossible to transfer their intense loyalties from one President to another. I could understand this, altho it complicated my task. Others were apprehensive. This was particularly true within the black community. Just when the blacks had had their hopes for equality and justice raised, after centuries of misery and despair, they awoke one morning to discover that their future was in the hands of a President born in the South.

Yet in spite of these yearnings for a fallen leader, in spite of some bitterness, in spite of apprehensions, I knew it was imperative that I grasp the reins of power and do so without delay. Any hesitation or wavering, any false step, any sign of self-doubt, could have been disastrous.

Averaged 4 Hours Sleep

During my first thirty days in office I believe I averaged no more than four or five hours' sleep a night. If I had a single moment when I could go off alone, relax, and forget the pressures of business, I don't recall it.

On Saturday morning, Nov. 23, I walked into McGeorge Bundy's office in the basement of the White House and received an international intelligence briefing from John McCone, director of the Central Intelligence Agency. On that sad November morning in 1963 the international front was about as peaceful as it ever gets in these turbulent times. The world, it seemed, had ceased its turmoil for a moment—caught in the shock of John Kennedy's death.

President Kennedy had kept me well informed on world events, so I was not expecting any major surprises in that first intelligence briefing.

Only South Viet Nam gave me real cause for concern. The next day, Nov. 24, I received my first full-dress briefing from Henry Cabot Lodge, who had just returned to Washington from his post as ambassador in Saigon. But compared with later periods, even the situation in Viet Nam at that point appeared to be relatively free from the pressure of immediate decisions.

The most important foreign policy problem I faced was that of signaling to the world what kind of man I was and what sort of policies I intended to carry out.

Met with De Gaulle

On Monday, Nov. 25, I met with President Charles de Gaulle of France. Just a few hours before our conversation, I received a report from Paris of a recent meeting between De Gaulle and an allied ambassador. They had discussed what the European response would be to [illegible] invasion of Western Europe.

President de Gaulle, according to the report, had said that the United States could not be counted on in such an emergency. He mentioned that the U. S. had been late in arriving in two world wars and that it had required the holocaust of Pearl Harbor to bring us into the latter.

With this account fresh in my mind, I met with the French president. I thanked him for crossing the Atlantic to express the sympathy of France in our hour of sadness.

The general spoke of the affection that both he and the French people had felt for John Kennedy. He then went on to say that the difficulties between our two countries had been greatly exaggerated, and that while changing times called for certain adjustments in our respective roles, the important thing was that Frenchmen knew perfectly well they could count on the U. S. if France were attacked.

I stared hard at the French president, suppressing a smile. In the years that followed, when De Gaulle's criticism of our role in Viet Nam became intense, I had many occasions to remember that conversation. The French leader doubted—in private, at least—the will of the United States to live up to its commitments. He did not believe we would honor our NATO obligations, yet he criticized us for honoring a commitment elsewhere in the world. If we had taken his advice to abandon Viet Nam, I suspect he might have cited that as "proof" of what he had been saying all along: that the U. S. could not be counted on in times of trouble.

Having met with the leader of France, our oldest ally, I turned to our relations with an adversary: the Soviet Union. On Tuesday morning, Nov. 26, Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan came to my office. I knew that I was dealing with one of the shrewdest men ever to come up thru the Communist hierarchy. One of the few surviving Bolsheviks with real power, Mikoyan had been brought to Moscow by Stalin in 1926, had escaped innumerable purges and had demonstrated an uncanny ability to survive and to associate himself with the right faction at the right time.

Not All Pleasantries

We talked for 55 minutes and the conversation was not all diplomatic pleasantries. I remembered how Nikita Khrushchev had misjudged President Kennedy's character and underestimated his toughness after their 1961 meeting in Vienna. That misjudgment, many people believe, led Khrushchev to test the U. S. with a new crisis in Berlin. I considered it essential to let Mikoyan understand that while the U. S. wanted peace more than anything else in the world, it would not allow its interests, or its friends' and allies' interests, to be trampled by aggression or subversion.

continued

WASHINGTON POST

18 OCT 1971

The Ultimatum to Diem 'Was a Serious Blunder'

This is the second of 15 excerpts from former President Johnson's book, "The Vantage Point," an account of his presidency, to be published shortly.

"STEADY ON COURSE: VIETNAM: 1963-1964"

As Air Force One carried us swiftly back to Washington after the tragedy in Dallas, I made a solemn private vow: I would devote every hour of every day during the remainder of John Kennedy's unfulfilled term to achieving the goals he had set. That meant seeing things through in Vietnam as well as coping with the many other international and domestic problems he had faced. I made this promise not out of blind loyalty but because I was convinced that the broad lines of his policy, in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, had been right. They were consistent with the goals the United States had been trying to accomplish in the world since 1945.



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Lodge was optimistic. He believed the recent change of government in Saigon was an improvement. He was hopeful and expected the new military leaders to speed up their war efforts. He stated that our government had put pressure on the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem to change its course. These pressures, he admitted, had encouraged the military leaders who carried out the coup on November 1, 1963. However, if Diem and his brother Nhu had followed his advice, Lodge said, they would still be alive. In his last talk with Diem on the afternoon of November 1, Lodge had offered to help assure the Vietnamese leader's personal safety, but Diem had ignored the offer.

I turned to John McCone and asked what his reports from Saigon in recent days indicated. The CIA Director replied that his estimate was much less encouraging. There had been an increase in Viet Cong activity since the coup, including more VC attacks. He had information that the enemy was preparing to exert even more severe pressure. He said the Vietnamese military leaders who carried out the coup were having difficulties organizing their government and were receiving little help from civilian leaders. McCone concluded that he could see no basis for an optimistic forecast of the future.

President Kennedy's principal foreign affairs advisers agreed that it was important to underline, especially within government circles, the continuity of policy and direction under the new President. I agreed and on November 26 approved National Security Action Memorandum 273. It was my first important decision on Vietnam as President, important not because it required any new actions but because it signaled our determination to persevere in the policies and actions in which we were already engaged.

NSAM 273, addressed to the senior officers of the government responsible for foreign affairs and military policy, began:

It remains the central objective of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and Government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported communist conspiracy. The test of all U.S. decisions and actions in this area should be the effectiveness of their contribution to this purpose.

When a President makes a decision, he seeks all the information he can get. At the same time, he cannot separate himself from his own experience and memory. This is especially true when his decisions involve the lives of men and the safety of the nation. It was natural as I faced critical problems during those first few months in office, that I should recall crises of the past and how we had met them or failed to meet them. No one who had served in the House or Senate during the momentous years of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, as I had, could fail to recall the many highs and lows of our performance as a nation. Like most men and women of my generation, I felt strongly that World War II might have been avoided if the United States in the 1930s had not given such an uncertain signal of its likely response to aggression in Europe and Asia.

The spirit that motivated us to give our support to the defense of Western Europe in the 1940s led us in the 1950s to make a similar promise to Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was signed in Manila on September 8, 1954, by representatives of seven countries—Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United Kingdom—as well as the United States.

The Senate then approved the treaty by a vote of 82 to 1. The only dissenting voice was that of Senator William Langer of North Dakota, a long-time opponent of the United Nations, NATO, and other forms of U.S. involvement in the world. Among my old Senate colleagues who gave their advice and consent to SEATO that day were Aiken and Case, Fulbright and Gore, Mansfield and Morse.

I respect a Langer, even if I disagree heartily with him, when he argues against our having any involvements in Europe or Asia or the rest of the world—and votes his convictions. I respect far more an Eisenhower or a Kennedy who sees our responsibilities in the world and acts to carry them out. I have little understanding for those who talk and vote one way, and after having given our nation's pledge, act another; for those who stand firm while the sun is shining, but run for cover when a storm breaks. The protection of American interests in a revolutionary, nuclear world is not for men who want to throw in our hand every time we face a challenge.

The failure to obtain North Vietnamese compliance with the Laos Accords of 1962 was a bitter disappointment to President Kennedy.

There was another reason the modest successes of late 1962 were not enlarged and multiplied in 1963. This was internal disruption inside South Vietnam in opposition to the Diem government and, especially, in fearful reaction to Diem's brother Nhu, who was quietly taking the levers of power into his own hands.

continued

NEW YORK TIMES

11 OCT 1971

The Word of Chou En-lai

By ALLEN WHITING

ANN ARBOR, Mich.—It is impossible to conceive of Chou En-lai reversing all of his Government's long-standing, explicit opposition against any form of "dual representation" in the United Nations, yet that is precisely what Secretary Rogers continues to see as a distinct possibility.

Perhaps the sudden willingness to abandon the traditional stereotype of "Chinese face" as a constraint on behavior stems from our own experiences with duplicity and cynical expediency in Government officials. Certainly U.S. policy on Chinese representation in the U.N. has tortuously twisted legal and political logic in repeated reversals over the last 22 years. But to assume from this that a similar opportunism exists in Peking is to misjudge Chou's personal and political position.

Within China, Chou's credibility rating is exceptionally high precisely among those Chinese who have had to calculate the reliability of his word. During the "blooming and contending" campaign of 1955-57, Chou's personal assurances that the invitation to criticism was not a trap persuaded seasoned intellectual and political figures to voice their views.

Many subsequently suffered in the "antirightist" reaction. Interestingly enough, however, Chou's personal esteem survived, as dramatically demonstrated by his unique ability to mediate among fiercely contending factions during the Cultural Revolution violence of 1967-68.

Outside of China, Chou's words are the quintessence of Chinese policy as experienced by the many governments and statesmen with whom he has dealt over his years both as Premier and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic. It was confidence in this factor which permitted the U.S. Government to predict the first Chinese nuclear test. On Sept. 26, 1964, we learned that Chou had informed a foreign chief of state that China planned to explode its first atom bomb on Oct. 1. Neither the Atomic Energy Commission nor the Central Intelligence Agency estimated Peking to have the technical capacity to detonate at that time. However, Secretary Rusk was willing, on his own, to accept the reliability of Chou's word and predicted the test at his press conference Sept. 30. When no test occurred the next day, State was chided for having overstepped its bureaucratic bounds. After the test occurred on Oct. 16, delay apparently stemming from problems at the Lop Nor site, C.I.A. director John McCone was quick to claim credit for "the intelligence community" in forecasting the event. While that "community" produced a wide range of valuable evidence, it was the estimate by political analysis of Chou's stake in credibility which accurately predicted China's entry into the nuclear club.

Obviously it would be fatuous to take every official Chinese statement as an irreversible, literal commitment to one particular course of policy. Flexibility and bargaining are manifest in much of Peking's declaratory and negotiatory behavior. Chou En-lai is deliberately evasive when he chooses to be, as in his reply to a question concerning the genuineness of China's alleged desire to see a total rupture of U.S.-Japanese military relations, with all that this might imply for the future of Japanese military developments.

However, there is no equivocation in his statements, "Should a state of two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan appear in the U.N., or a similar absurd state of affairs take place in the U.N. designed to separate Taiwan from China to create a so-called independent Taiwan, we will firmly oppose it and, under those circumstances, we will absolutely not go into the U.N."

At stake is nothing less than self esteem, both individual and collective. In Chou's words, "We will not barter away principles." Peking will not accommodate an expelled and defeated civil war government in exile in order to win the legitimate right of representing China in the symbolic assemblage of the world community. Moreover Chou's political position in Peking as well as Peking's relationships with Tirana, Hanoi, Pyongyang, Washington and Moscow preclude compromise on this point.

The alternatives are clear: Either the People's Republic is seated as the sole successor to the Government which ruled China from the founding of the U.N. in 1945 to its loss of the mainland in 1949, or there will be no participation by the People's Republic in any United Nations body. However the United States chooses to extricate its prestige from the prospects of defeat raised by last year's majority vote to support the Albanian resolution, no other government should entertain the slightest doubt as to the consequences of following Washington and ignoring Peking.

Allen Whiting was State Department [illegible] Far East, 1962-1966, and is chairman, Citizens Committee to Change U.S. China Policy.

FOR MEN ONLY
OCTOBER 1971

EXCLUSIVE PROFILE

CIA BOSS RICHARD HELMS



Cool and cunning, Helms knows what the Reds are thinking even before they think it—which makes the CIA the most deadly-efficient fact-finding corps in the world

By ARCHER SCANLON

AMERICA'S TOP SUPER SPY

He's Outfoxed Castro, Mao, And The Kremlin

Continued

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OAKLAND, CAL.
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OCT 1 1973

Arms Control

Nixon Taps 4 Advisers

Reuters News Agency

WASHINGTON — President Nixon Thursday nominated a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency and three other men to the general advisory committee of the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The former CIA head named was John A. McCone.

The others were Robert Ellsworth, former U.S. ambassador to NATO; retired Army Gen. Earle G. Wheeler and former Senator George A. Smathers of Florida.

The committee advises the President, the secretary of state and the disarmament director on matters affecting arms control, disarmament and world peace. Its chairman is John J. McCloy, former U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.

SEPTEMBER 1971

Dossier on the C.I.A.

by William R. Corson

For some time I have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times policy-making arm of the government. I never thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations. —ex-President Harry S. Truman.

NOTHING has happened since that pronouncement by the agency's creator in December 1963 to remove or reduce the cause for concern over the CIA's development. As currently organized, supervised, structured and led, it may be that the CIA has outlived its usefulness. Conceivably, its very existence causes the President and the National Security Council to rely too much on clandestine operations. Possibly its reputation, regardless of the facts, is now so bad that as a foreign policy instrument the agency has become counter-productive. Unfortunately the issue of its efficiency, as measured by its performance in preventing past intelligence failures and consequent foreign policy fiascos, is always avoided on grounds of "secrecy". So American taxpayers provide upwards of $750,000,000 a year for the CIA without knowing how the money is spent or to what extent the CIA fulfils or exceeds its authorized intelligence functions.

The gathering of intelligence is a necessary and legitimate activity in time of peace as well as in war. But it does raise a very real problem of the proper place and control of agents who are required, or authorized on their own recognizance, to commit acts of espionage. In a democracy it also poses the dilemma of secret activities and the values of a free society. Secrecy is obviously essential for espionage but it can be – and has been – perverted to hide intelligence activities even from those with the constitutional responsibility to sanction them. A common rationalization is the phrase "If the Ambassador/Secretary/President doesn't know he won't have to lie to cover up." The prolonged birth of the CIA was marked by a reluctance on the part of politicians and others to face these difficulties, and the agency as it came to exist still bears the marks of this indecision.

What we need to do is to examine how the U.S. gathers its intelligence, and consider how effective its instruments are and what room there is for improvement. Every government agency must be accountable, as Richard Helms, the CIA's Director, acknowledged before the American Society of Newspaper E... be supervised i... Intelligence Ag... The time is lo... supervisory rol... Central Intellig... War. Under this... CIA administra... of inquiry by i... and specifically... requiring disc... titles, salaries... CIA; (ii) expe... tions on exper... the Director's ... without adver... Government ... the Governme... for staff abroa... their families ... 1949 Central I... Director a lice...

With so mu... is seen by ma... stine coups, ... in Guatemala ... Mossadegh i... the Cuban ... failure). The ... President Ke... 28, 1961, w... heralded – y... Because the ... agency's "m... representative of the unending gambitry and bigger ... life human aspect of espionage and secret operations. At this level the stakes are lower and the "struggle" frequently takes bizarre and even ludicrous twists. For, as Alexander Foote noted in his *Handbook for Spies*, the average agent's "real difficulties are concerned with the practice of his trade. The setting up of his transmitters, the obtaining of funds, and the arrangement of his rendezvous. The irritating administrative details occupy a disproportionate portion of his waking life."

As an example of the administrative hazards, one day in 1960 a technical administrative employee of the CIA stationed at its quasi-secret headquarters in Japan flew to Singapore to conduct a reliability test of a local recruit. On arrival he checked into one of Singapore's older hotels to receive the would-be spy and his CIA recruiter. Contact was made. The recruit was instructed in what a lie detector test does and was wired up, and the technician plugged the machine into the room's electrical outlet. Thereupon it blew out all the hotel's lights. The ensuing confusion and darkness did not cover a getaway by the trio. They were discovered, arrested, and jailed as American spies.

By itself the incident sounds like a sequence from an old Peters Sellers movie, however, its consequences were not nearly so funny. In performing this routine mission the CIA set off a two-stage international incident between England and the United States, caused the Secretary of State to write a letter of apology to a foreign chief of state, made the U.S. Ambassador to Singapore look like the proverbial cuckold, the final outcome being a situation wherein the United States Government lied in public – and was caught!

NEW YORK TIMES
6 AUG 1971

STAT

The Story Behind The Bombing

By U.S. GRANT SHARP

SAN DIEGO—There has been so much discussion about the Pentagon papers recently that I thought I had better get my comments in while the subject is still hot. It is important to begin by defining exactly what we are talking about when we say "The Pentagon papers."

In the middle of 1967 Secretary of Defense McNamara commissioned a group to do a history of the United States' role in Indochina. The group was made up of State and Defense Department civilians, a few military officers, and defense-oriented individuals from Government-financed research institutes. Some thirty-odd persons contributed to this history; most of them were in the office of the Secretary of Defense and worked on this just part-time.

The current discussions of the so-called Pentagon papers are not discussions of the total 3,000 pages of narrative and 4,000 pages of appended documents. People are discussing the information which has been obtained by reading the Pentagon papers as published by The New York Times. This history, which appeared in several editions of The Times and has now come out in a paperback, does not, of course, comprise a summation of the information which is available in the total narrative.

In reporting the Pentagon history The Times writers said they tried to keep the articles within the general limits set by the narrative analysis and the documents as a whole. Material was brought in from the public record only when it seemed necessary to put the papers into context for the general reader. Mr. Neil Sheehan, one of the writers, states in the book's introduction that the very selection and arrangement of the facts, whether in a history or in a newspaper article, inevitably mirrors a point of view or state of mind. Thus, the articles as written by The Times undoubtedly reflect some of the conceptions of The Times reporters.

So what we have here is not necessarily an objective history, but rather a distillation of a large document written by people who have a definite point of view. What is the point of view of The Times reporters? Well, certainly the editorial view of The Times, as frequently expressed, is that the war in Vietnam was a great mistake and that our actions have been ineffective.

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We might also ask what is the point of view of the various historians appointed by Mr. McNamara to develop this history. As revealed by the history itself, a great many civilians in the Defense Department in the middle of 1967 were disenchanted with the war, convinced that the bombing of North Vietnam was ineffective and that we should get out of Vietnam as quickly as possible. Thus, the history from which The Times writers distilled their summary may also be lacking in objectivity. My study of The Times version leads me to believe that it is indeed lacking in objectivity.

Nevertheless, it is interesting reading, contains much information that I knew about quite intimately, and also some with which I was not familiar.

You can be sure that this document is required reading for some people. It certainly is required reading in Hanoi, in Moscow, and in Peking, for this book contains information on the decision-making processes of our Government which is of distinct aid and benefit to the enemy. The Times has made the job of the enemy intelligence services quite simple. All they have to do is go to the nearest newsstand.

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I want to comment on the air war over North Vietnam because as Commander in Chief, Pacific, I was running the air war, with not much help from certain sectors in Washington. I believe that the air war was the most misunderstood part of our whole engagement. It was especially misunderstood by the civilians in the Pentagon who were making the broad decisions and many of the smaller decisions of the air war. The severe restrictions under which our Air Force operated resulted in markedly decreased effectiveness of the tremendous power we had available and resulted in wide misunderstanding of the effectiveness of air power when properly used.

In February of 1965 the decision was made to conduct a bombing campaign against North Vietnam. From the very first there was a wide divergence of opinion as to how our air power should be used. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desired that we hit hard at Hanoi's capabilities to carry on the war in order to convince Hanoi that the course of action it was pursuing would be unprofitable, and to let them know early in the game that we were willing to apply the force we had available.

Numerous civilians in the Department of Defense, however, desired that air power be used very sparingly, in limited doses, well spaced to give the other side opportunity to contemplate the seriousness of their acts. The civilian advisers won, so our air raids against North Vietnam started with minuscule doses of air power, applied to targets which hardly were worth the effort. Our air power was never used to its full effectiveness. I should say that throughout the war I got complete cooperation from the Joint Chiefs. They backed me on every recommendation I made.

I wouldn't want to leave the impression that it was only the military that advocated a strong policy on the air war. Mr. John McCone, who in 1965 was the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, recommended in April that unless the United States was willing to bomb the North, with minimum restraint, to break Hanoi's will, it was unwise to commit ground troops to battle. Mr. McCone expressed these views to the President at least twice in the month of April.

On the other side of the picture Mr. George Ball, Under Secretary of State, from the very beginning believed that neither bombing the North nor fighting the guerrillas in the South, nor any combination of the two offerred a solution to the problem. He believed that we should cut our losses and withdraw from South Vietnam. Mr. Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State and Mr. Ball's boss, advocated a strong policy in the air war.

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The air campaign of 1965 was characterized by excessive restrictions from Washington which limited us to piddling strikes against generally unimportant targets, although toward the end of the year we were beginning to get a few better targets and the numbers of planes we were able to use was beginning to be useful.

The Times article says that the Pentagon study of the 1965 period discloses that high-level civilian authorities, including Secretary McNamara, began to have serious doubts about the effectiveness of both the air and ground war as early as the fall of 1965. I must say that I have difficulty understanding how they expected the air campaign to show any measure of effectiveness when it was so heavily restricted, both as to targets and as to numbers of strike aircraft.

Continued

NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
22 JUL 1971

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A SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT:

Kennedy's Private War

Ralph L. Stavins

The article that follows is part of *The Planning of the Vietnam War*, a study by members of the Institute of Policy Studies in Washington, including Richard J. Barnet, Marcus Raskin, and Ralph Stavins.* In their introduction to the study, the authors write:

"In early 1970, Marcus Raskin conceived the idea of a study that would explain how the Vietnam disaster happened by analyzing the planning of the war. A group of investigators directed by Ralph Stavins concentrated on finding out who did the actual planning that led to the decisions to bomb North Vietnam, to introduce over a half-million troops into South Vietnam, to defoliate and destroy vast areas of Indochina, and to create millions of refugees in the area.

"Ralph Stavins, assisted by Canta Pian, John Berkowitz, George Pipkin, and Brian Eden, conducted more than 300 interviews in the course of this study. Among those interviewed were many Presidential advisers to Kennedy and Johnson, generals and admirals, middle level bureaucrats who occupied strategic positions in the national security bureaucracy, and officials, military and civilian, who carried out the policy in the field in Vietnam.

"A number of informants backed up their oral statements with documents in their possession, including informal minutes of meetings, as well as portions of the official documentary record now known as the "Pentagon Papers." Our information is drawn not only from the Department of Defense, but also from the White House, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency."

The study is being published in two volumes. The first, which includes the article below, will be published early in August. The second will appear in May, 1972.

*The study is the responsibility of its authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute, its trustees, or fellows.

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At the end of March, 1961, the CIA circulated a National Intelligence Estimate on the situation in South Vietnam. This paper advised Kennedy that Diem was a tyrant who was confronted with two sources of discontent, the non-Communist loyal opposition and the Viet Cong. The two problems were closely connected. Of the spreading Viet Cong network the CIA noted:

> Local recruits and sympathetic or intimidated villagers have enhanced Viet Cong control and influence over increasing areas of the countryside. For example, more than one-half of the entire rural region south and southwest of Saigon, as well as some areas to the north, are under considerable Communist control. Some of these areas are in effect denied to all government authority not immediately backed by substantial armed force. The Viet Cong's strength encircles Saigon and has recently begun to move closer in the city.

The people were not opposing these recent advances by the Viet Cong; if anything, they seemed to be supporting them. The failure to rally the people against the Viet Cong was laid to Diem's dictatorial rule:

> There has been an increasing disposition within official circles and the army to question Diem's ability to lead in this period. Many feel that he is unable to rally the people in the fight against the Communists because of his reliance on virtual one-man rule, his tolerance of corruption extending even to his immediate entourage, and his refusal to relax a rigid system of public controls.

The CIA referred to the attempted coup against Diem that had been led by General Thi in November, 1960, and concluded that another coup was likely. In spite of the gains by the Viet Cong, they predicted that the next attempt to overthrow Diem would originate with the army and the non-Communist opposition.

> The Communists would like to initiate and control a coup against Diem, and their armed and subversive operations including united front efforts are directed toward this purpose. It is more likely, however, that any coup attempt which occurs over the next year or so will originate among non-Communist elements, perhaps a combination of disgruntled civilian officials and oppositionists and army elements, broader than those involved in the November attempt.

In view of the broadly based opposition to Diem's regime and his virtual reliance on one-man rule, it was unlikely that he would initiate any reform measures that would sap the strength of the revolutionaries. Whether reform was conceived as widening the political base of the regime, which Diem would not agree to, or whether it was to consist of an intensified counter-insurgency program, something the people would not support, it had become painfully clear to Washington that reform was not the path to victory. But victory was the goal, and Kennedy called upon Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to draw up the victory plans. On April 20, 1961, Kennedy asked Gilpatric to:

> a) Appraise the current status and future prospects of the Communist drive to dominate South Vietnam.
> b) Recommend a series of actions (military, political, and/or economic, overt and/or covert) which will prevent Communist domination of that country.

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BOSTON GLOBE
16 July 1971

STAT

CIA seen poor choice for Viet scapegoat

By Crocker Snow Jr.
Globe Staff

The Pentagon Papers (which now warrant the prefix 'public more than 'secret') suggest that the last few American Presidents should have listened more to the analysts from the Central Intelligence Agency about Vietnam than to their advisers in the State Department, Pentagon and National Security Council.

Starting from the earliest parts of the study of US involvement in Vietnam, the national intelligence estimates of the situation look reasonably sound — especially in the revealing glare of hindsight.

The partial documentation of the study suggests that the intelligence community weighed in quite negatively about President Ngo Dinh Diem and his effect on South Vietnam; downplayd the domino theory; was scornful of the value of committing US ground units to a combat role with only a limited bombing campaign underway; and ultimately helped persuade Defense Secretary Robert McNamara of the futility of Rolling Thunder, the bombing war on North Vietnam.

The 7000-page report on these events was compiled by the Defense Department and thus is more representative of Pentagon thinking on the war than of any other Washington agency.

Yet scattered references and direct quotations from CIA estimates can be found throughout. The foresight and overall accuracy of these estimates is one of the most dramatic impressions to come from reading of those portions of the full report which have become available.

Some of the most important intelligence judgements which are at least partially documented in the report are listed here.

o In August 1954, when President Eisenhower was first being urged to prop up the South Vietnamese several months after the French defeat by Vietnamese communists at Dienbienphu, a quoted national intelligence estimate read:

"Although it is possible that the French and Vietnamese, even with firm support from the US and other powers, may be able to establish a strong regime in South Vietnam, we believe that the chances for this development are poor and, moreover, that the situation is more likely to continue to deteriorate progressively over the next year."

o With Ngo Dinh Diem consolidating his regime in the South during the mid-fifties, the Pentagon writers describe American officials in the embassy, the military and the CIA as regularly reporting on him as "authoritarian, inflexible and remote." By 1960, when the United States, for better or worse, was supporting the then President Diem as a strongman, the CIA minced no words. One intelligence report which the Pentagon analysts characterize as "remarkably sound" in August of 1960 read in part:

"In the absence of more effective Government measures to protect the peasnats and to win their positive cooperation, the prospect is for expansion of the areas of Viet Cong control in the countryside, particularly in the southwestern provinces. Dissatisfaction and discontent with the government will probably continue to rise. These adverse trends are not irreversible, but if they remain unchecked, they will almost certainly in time cause the collapse of the Diem regime."

Four years later, with the United States beginning to get involved in a big way, the CIA is shown as one agency willing to debunk the then conventional wisdom of the domino theory, which held that if South Vietnam fell to the Communists all the rest of East Asia would inevitably too. On June 9, 1964, several months before the Tonkin Gulf incidents, the report quotes President Johnson at a general meeting about the situation asking: "Would the rest of Southeast Asia necessarily fall if Laos and South Vietnam came under North Vietnamese control?"

The CIA, according to the Pentagon study, answered that Cambodia "might," but no other nation "would quickly succumb."

The agency acknowledged that such a development "would be profoundly damaging to the US position in the Far East" and suggested that it would hurt American prestige and credibility in containing the spread of communism in the area. But the CIA said that even a clear-cut Communist victory in the South would not affect the wider American interest of containing overt attacks "as long as the United States can effectively operate from (its island) bases" in the Far East.

In October 1964, following Tonkin Gulf, at the high point of President Johnson's election campaign vs. Barry Goldwater, with a continuing political crisis in Saigon a year after Diem's assassination, while the defense establishmen was actively considering a number of contingency plans for widening the war, the CIA was far from sanguine about the prospects: "We believe that the conditions favor a further decay of GVN (Government of South Vietnam) will and effectiveness. The likely pattern of this decay will be increasing defeatism, paralysis of leadership, friction with Americans, exploration of possible lines of poiltical accommodations with the other side, and a general petering-out of the war effort."

o The following spring with the Rolling Thunder bombing of North Vietnam underway, President Johnson prepared to send two Marine battalions into the war as the Joint Chiefs asked Secretary McNamara to clear away "all administrative impediments that hamper us in the prosecution of this war."

Just at this time, on April 2, 1965, according to one of the chronologies contained in the Pentagon report, CIA director McCone circulated a memo "dissenting from the presidential decision to have US troops take active part in active combat.

"He feels that such action is not justified and wise unless the air attacks on the North are increased sufficiently to really be physically damaging to the DRV (Democratic Republic of North Vietnam), and to put real pressure on her." The CIA director predicted, said the report, that the United States "was getting mired down in a war it could not win."

continued

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HUMAN EVENTS

Passage of Mansfield Amendment Could Cause Humiliating Pullout

By PAUL SCOTT

President Nixon's phased and orderly military withdrawal from Viet Nam could turn into a humiliating and disorderly pullout if Senate-House conferees go along with the Senate-passed Mansfield withdrawal amendment to the draft bill.

That's the hard-nosed interpretation that several conferees are giving to a private warning delivered to them by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird in a last-hour effort to try to shelve or drastically change the Mansfield proposal.

Approved by the Senate, 57 to 42, but rejected by the House, 219 to 176, the Mansfield amendment calls for a total U.S. military pullout from Viet Nam within nine months of final enactment of the draft bill, provided the prisoner of war issue is settled.

In discussing the Mansfield amendment with several of the conferees, Secretary Laird frankly reported that an orderly withdrawal of the remaining 244,000 American troops from Viet Nam would take at least 12 months.

The legislators were told that the President is proceeding with a withdrawal rate that is as rapid as the logistics of the situation will allow. To one conferee, Secretary Laird put it this way:

> "Should the President decide this very day to withdraw all forces from Viet Nam, it would take him 12 months to get the job done. And this would be true even if the Defense Department used every sea and air transport available to it."

A faster rate of withdrawal, Laird stressed, would force the U.S. to shift naval transport ships and planes from the explosive Middle East and Europe and to employ American civilian flag ships of all sizes.

"If we are forced to withdraw all American forces in nine months, we would have to leave a lot of good equipment behind," stated Laird.

Secretary Laird's belated warning comes at a time that congressional supporters of Mansfield's withdrawal amendment are so sure of victory that they already are preparing to shift the Viet Nam battle in Congress to another level.

Headed by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D.-Mont.), the author of the withdrawal amendment, the anti-war group now plans to seek a cutoff or limit the amount of military aid that the U.S. can provide South Viet Nam to defend that nation.

This switch in strategy is indicated in the private statements of Mansfield, who seems to have lost all interest in blocking a Communist takeover of Indochina after his close friend, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, was ousted as head of state. Sihanouk is now living in Peking.

> Sen. Mansfield, who also serves as chairman of the Foreign Relations Far East subcommittee, is privately letting other senators know that he is against the U.S. supporting a sustained military effort by South Viet Nam after we pull out.

While Mansfield is agreeable to the turning over of U.S. military equipment in South Viet Nam to the Saigon government, he is opposed to giving them any additional military help.

It is Mansfield's position that the U.S. has a moral obligation to help on reconstruction and rehabilitation, but that is predicated on an end of the conflict and would not apply to its continuance through Vietnamization of the war effort.

If the Mansfield position is adopted by Congress, it would thwart President Nixon's hope, through Vietnamization, of guaranteeing South Viet Nam a "reasonable chance" of survival against Soviet-Chinese Communist-supported North Vietnamese aggression.

The anti-Communist Saigon government estimates that a total of $2.5 billion in military and economic aid will be needed yearly for at least three years to support the million-man army needed to defend that country after American troops are withdrawn.

American intelligence officials report that there has been no let-up in Soviet and Chinese Communist help for North Viet Nam. In recent months Russia has actually stepped up its military deliveries, while Hanoi has increased its preparations for new large-scale military operations this fall.

☆ ☆ ☆

Any congressional review of what went wrong in Viet Nam should carefully consider a memorandum from CIA Director John McCone to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy.

Dated April 2, 1965, the document foretold of ineffective results that would come from the adoption of a "gradual military response" policy in Viet Nam which guided the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations' military operations there.

> In discussions on changing the mission of American troops from one of advice and static defense to active combat in Viet Nam, McCone took the position that the enemy's base in North Viet Nam had to be destroyed for the new strategy to work.

Now part of the so-called "McNamara study" of the Viet Nam war, the McCone memorandum in part states:

"I feel that the decision is correct only if our air strikes against the North are sufficiently heavy and damaging really to hurt the North Vietnamese. The paper we examined yesterday does not anticipate the type of air operations against the North necessary to force the North Vietnamese to reappraise their policy. . . . It is my personal opinion that this program is not sufficiently severe to bring results

Continued

THE ECONOMIST
10-16 July 1971

THE WORLD

American Survey



Westmoreland, Rusk, McNamara: what is the truth?

Voices from a different America

Washington, DC

All the time, in reading the summaries and excerpts of the Pentagon Papers (or "History of the United States Decision-making Process on Vietnam Policy," as they are officially called), one has to remind oneself that the world was different then, in the early 1960s, and that the men whose positions are recorded were speaking and acting for a different America. The idea that an object of policy might be desirable but still beyond their country's strength came only very slowly to them. "Perhaps the world has passed me by," reflected Mr Dean Rusk, who was Secretary of State to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and is now a professor in Georgia, in a television interview on July 2nd. Preventing the third world war, protecting the reputation of the United States (ideas which, to Mr Rusk, are largely synonymous), were "unfashionable" ideas now, he reflected, when half the American people had no memory of the second world war. Mr Rusk used his hour of television time to defend the integrity of his colleagues and his chief and to brood on the change that had occurred in the national mood. He admitted two substantial errors of judgment: "I personally, I think, underestimated the persistence and the tenacity of the North Vietnamese" and "I overestimated the ability of the American people to accept a protracted conflict."

The interest of the Pentagon Papers is not in telling us what happened; that, broadly speaking, we knew already. But suddenly, by courtesy of Dr Daniel Ellsberg, we are able to listen to the actors talking business to one another over a period of 20 years and it is a different experience from listening to their press conferences or their television chats. When an ambassador talks of "assuring the South Vietnamese the opportunity to determine their future without outside interference," we think we know what he means, but in the Pentagon Papers we have it in black and white: "the United States should commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam to communism" (Mr Rusk and Mr McNamara, then Secretary of Defence, to President Kennedy, November, 1961).

That Mr Dulles disliked the Geneva accords which were intended to put an end to the conflict in Indochina in July, 1954, and refused to join in the final declaration, is not news. But the official American position was one of dignified aloofness, coupled with a promise "to refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb" the accords. The Pentagon Papers put the attitude of the Eisenhower Administration, under the guidance of Mr Dulles, in sharper relief. The National Security Council took three weeks to decide that the Geneva accords were a disaster and then set out on an American policy of building a new South Vietnamese state round the person of Ngo Dinh Diem.

The accords had been categorical that Vietnam was not two states but one; the northern and southern halves were merely "the regrouping zones of the two parties" and everybody concerned—including the United States in its unilateral declaration—subscribed to the "unity" of the country. But American actions were dictated by the haste to stem "a major forward stride of communism which may lead to the loss of southeast Asia," as the decision of the National Security Council put it, and they paid no heed to the country's notional unity. The fact has more than momentary significance, since it led to the sincerely held belief of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations in the 1960s that the trouble in Vietnam was a simple case of international aggression by one state against another.

It had become accepted, and remained accepted under successive

continued

without making a "fad" of the subject or destroying our system of manufacturing and business which is envied by every country on earth. By insisting that our education give at least equal time to the positive aspects of our country, instead of overlooking much of it because "patriotism is bunk." I think that every generation of young people has to be told about our country, educated in its meaning. Today we seem to think that we'll just "pick it up" naturally. This isn't always so.

We can make our country better by feeling—and showing—our pride in it. We have to think and act in a positive way instead of a negative one. This is a job where leadership has to come from the attitudes of our politicians, our teachers, our religions, but in which each one of us has an important role to play too.

We have an awful lot to be thankful for and proud of. If we work to make things better, they will become better. They will never be accomplished by people who sit on the sidelines and offer nothing but criticism. If we don't bother to do what we are capable of as individuals, and let people who think only in terms of tearing down have their way, and let them dominate public media, their gloomy predictions will come true.

You don't have to use propaganda to glorify a country which has always been a goal for a lot of little people all over the world. We do have to take stock of what we have, though, and to tell others—especially our own children—about it, so that they will understand and appreciate it and work themselves to make it better.

But in the end, it is not just words and ideas that are going to make it that way. It is the private actions of each one of us, because we're not just a people, or a nationality; we're 200,000,000 Americans—each one an individual, and each one free to add to or detract from this country of ours.

CBS, CFR AND THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW

HON. JOHN R. RARICK
OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 12, 1971

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, we will be voting shortly on a resolution to find CBS in contempt of Congress.

The CBS propagandists are wrapping themselves in the Constitution and chanting, "The right of the people to know must not be jeopardized."

Every Member of this body agrees that it is the right of the people to know what is at issue. But, has the CBS conglomerate been telling the people the facts or simply what CBS wants them to know? It has been CBS that has been the censor—not this body. The CBS "Selling of the Pentagon" was in turn followed by a second lateral assault called the Pentagon papers incident. Both Pentagon attacks must be considered as concerted efforts by the influential opinion molding monopoly to degrade our military forces under the guise of hastening an early Vietnam surrender date.

But the CBS people, who would have us believe they want to tell the American people the truth of what is going on involving imaginary financial and control conspiracies, have not told the American people about a very real conspiracy—which is to transfer the defeat of our foreign policy in Vietnam from the responsible parties and make the military forces, who have had no voice in the planning of the no-win policy nor little control over the operations, the scapegoat. Pressure from the top and bottom now becomes lateral pressure from both sides.

I hold a copy of the so-called Pentagon papers booklet, which has been printed for profit by the New York Times.

Commencing at page 630 are contained the biographies of key figures in the Vietnam study. Eight of the 14 named Americans involved in the secret history are members of a financial-economic-industrial group known as the Council on Foreign Relations. The Pentagon, except for having an image of being the command post of our military, is not even involved. Why then does not CBS, which wants the American people to know what is going on, tell them all about the Council on Foreign Relations and its role in the United Nations and the Vietnam war?

Why does not CBS tell the American people that Mr. Sulzberger, president and publisher of the New York Times, the late Mr. Graham, former chairman of the board of the Washington Post, as well as its board chairman Frederick S. Beebe are listed in the Council on Foreign Relations membership list?

Why do not CBS's interpretive analysts tell our people that their president, Frank Stanton, is listed as a member of the CFR as well as former chairman of the Rand Corp., or that Daniel Ellsberg, admitted thief of the stolen top secret Pentagon papers, is a member of CFR?

What is it about the CFR that the CBS refuses to tell the people?

Could it be that every U.S. Ambassador to the Paris peace talks, David K. E. Bruce, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Averell W. Harriman, are all listed as members of the CFR?

Could it be that the Presidential advisers Henry A. Kissinger, Walt W. Rostow, and McGeorge Bundy are listed as members of the CFR?

Could it be that the U.S. Ambassadors to Saigon, Frederick Reinhardt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Maxwell Taylor, and Ellsworth Bunker are all listed as members of the CFR?

Could it be that the Directors of the CIA, Allen Dulles, John J. McCloy, and John A. McCone are all listed as members of the CFR?

Or could it be that the military leaders who were entrusted with the lives of our men and with the honor of our country, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Gen. Harold K. Johnson, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, and Air Force Gen. Carl A. Spaatz are all listed as members of the CFR?

Could it be that Stanley Resor, Secretary of the Army; former Secretaries of State Dean Rusk and Dean Atcheson; former Secretaries of Defense Thomas S. Gates and Robert Strange McNamara are listed as members of the CFR?

Could it be that CBS and many of its other opinion-making friends do not want to tell the American people that Mr. Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, president and publisher of the New York Times; Mr. Frederick S. Beebe, chairman of the board of the Washington Post; Mr. Osborne Elliott, president of Newsweek; Walter Lippmann, syndicated news columnist and editor of the New Republic magazine; Mr. Bill D. Moyers of Newsday; and Brig. Gen. David Sarnoff are all listed as members of the CFR?

Certainly CBS, in addition to knowing its president, Frank Stanton, is a member of the CFR, must fully understand the complete scope of this intellectual-financial-industrial complex, in fact, in December of 1965, the CBS Foundation made a $300,000 grant to the CFR to fund a fellowship reportedly to "a promising American foreign correspondent" for "study and reflection."

And how do we know who are members of the CFR? From the CFR annual report, which is supplied voluntarily to each Member of Congress and each Senator. There are reportedly but 1,451 members. Yet this small group of Americans includes men in positions of control or influence in every military, financial, and diplomatic decision from the start of our involvement in Vietnam to the present.

I do not want to create any impression that there are any secret or mysterious associations. But when the policies and activities of the CFR are against the best interests of the American people and constitutional government, then they, like all other decisionmakers, must bear their share of the responsibility for the thousands of American boys who have been killed and the waste of billions of taxpayers' dollars that have been poured into this international economic venture.

It was not the average American citizen nor the U.S. fighting man who wanted this war in the first place or who have wanted it to continue. If CBS and Mr. Stanton want to lift their self-imposed censorship so that the American people know the truth, then this matter would not be before Congress in this instance.

"The Selling of the Pentagon" and the Pentagon papers have not scratched the surface of the kingmakers and new ruling royalty. Who will tell the people the truth if those who control "the right to know machinery" also control the Government?

I insert a clipping from the December 30, 1965, New York Times:

EDWARD R. MURROW FUND FOR FELLOWSHIPS SET UP

John J. McCloy, chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, announced yesterday the establishment of an Edward R. Murrow Fellowship for American Foreign Correspondents.

William S. Paley, chairman of the Columbia Broadcasting Company, joined Mr. McCloy in making the announcement. The C.B.S. Foundation has given $300,000 to pay for the fellowship program.

A spokesman for C.B.S. said one fellowship would be awarded each year to "a promising American foreign correspondent" for "study and reflection." A committee composed largely of men connected with the council will make the selection. C.B.S. will also be represented on the committee. The stipend is expected to be about $10,000 in most cases.

I particularly call the attention of my colleagues to my remarks "CFR: For Whom We Serve," page E11137, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of December 29, 1969,

BATON ROUGE -- STATE TIMES

One Thing Is Learned

One thing is clearly ascertained by a perusal of the Pentagon study, about the publication of which so much controversy has arisen.

That thing is the perceptive level of performance of the Central Intelligence Agency as to Indochina in the 1964-forward period in which American involvement in Vietnam was mushrooming.

The CIA clearly "read" very well the indications of what might develop in Indochina as the American commitment was extended.

In specifics, the CIA rejected the domino theory — that if South Vietnam fell, there would also topple Laos, then Cambodia, then other Asian states, like a falling row of dominoes. The CIA saw only limited damage to American interests from a Red victory in South Vietnam. This still could have been a faulty conclusion but the intelligence on which it was based was sound.

Again in specifics, the CIA expected — and rightly — little impact on the war potential of North Vietnam through restricted bombing. It did not believe North Vietnam would be intimated by the possible loss of its minuscule industrial complex — it had the Soviet Union and Red China on which to rely. Its own production was a drop in the bucket measured against the outpouring of martial and industrial aid from the Big Reds.

Most of the strategic conclusions made by the CIA were rejected by the policy makers and the rejection was ratified by action of then President Johnson. This included the CIA dissent to commitment of U.S. forces to offensive combat operations without any change in the limited tempo of bombing operations being conducted. An April, 1965, memo from the CIA director, John A. McCone, put the dissent this way: In effect if the planned ground operation goes in motion we will find ourselevs mired down in combat in the jungle in a military effort that we cannot win and from which we will have extreme difficulty extricating ourselves."

Hindsight being 20-20 invariably, one could wish that Mr. McCone might have been a little more persuasive with Mr. Johnson and those to whom the then president did listen.

NORTHERN VIRGINIA SUN
7 JUL 1971

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Inside Washington

Pentagon Papers Point Up Good Intelligence

Robert S. Allen and John A. Goldsmith

WASHINGTON — The U.S. intelligence community often criticized and recently under fire from presidential adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, emerges from the Pentagon study of the Vietnam war with its reputation much enhanced.

War critics will complain that, over the years of U.S. involvement, the Central Intelligence Agency is shown to have conducted covert operations in Indochina. Operational responsibility for such actions is an old controversy, of course, and those sub-rosa activities were ordered by a succession of U.S. presidents and their National Security Councils.

With respect to its major function, intelligence and its assessment, the CIA proves to have been very perceptive over the Vietnam years. The intelligence analysts read very well the indications of what might develop in Indochina as the United States extended its commitment there.

Specifically, the CIA and the intelligence studies in which CIA participated, rejected the domino theory — the idea that the fall of Vietnam would topple Laos, then Cambodia and then other Asian nations — like a falling row of dominoes. CIA saw limited damage to U.S. interests from a Communist victory in Vietnam.

Additionally, CIA minimised the impact, in North Vietnam, of a restricted campaign of U.S. bombing. It thus dismissed the thesis of Walt W. Rostow that North Vietnam would be intimidated by the possible loss of its tiny industrial complex which had been painstakingly developed after the war with the French.

"INDIGENOUS" SUPPORT — Rostow, then a State Department official, offered his thesis in February 1964, when the administration was beginning to stress the controlling role of North Vietnam in the war in the South. At that time, however, intelligence analyses were reporting that the primary source of Communist strength was "indigenous."

That CIA view, of a revolutionary Communist movement identified with nationalist sentiments carried over from the war with the French, was given little credence by President Johnson and his top aides, according to the Pentagon study.

In June of 1964 President Johnson asked CIA whether the rest of Southeast Asia would necessarily fall to the Communists if South Vietnam and Laos came trol. That was an occasion on which CIA challenged the domino theory, asserting that "with the possible exception of Cambodia" no nation in the area would quickly fall to the Communists.

Again, administration policy makers were not persuaded, and fears for such nations as Malaysia persisted in high adminstration councils, the Pentagon study reports.

In November of 1964, when the National Security Council was considering plans for carrying the bombing to North Vietnam, it was an intelligence panel — including CIA, State Department intelligence and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligency Agency — which said the plan had little chance of intimidating the North Vietnamese.

In the spring of 1965, when the discussions had turned to possible commitment of U.S. troops to offensive combat operations, CIA Director John A. McCone said a change in the role of U.S. troops was inconsistent with the limited tempo of the bombing operations then being conducted. He said the proposed air and ground pressures on Hanoi would not be enough.

"In effect," said McCone in an April 1965 memo, "we will find ourselves mired down in combat in the jungle in a military effort that we cannot win, and from which we will have extreme difficulty extricating ourselves."

STYLE CHANGED —In that memo McCone, the rather dour California industrialist who was brought in to revive CIA after the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion, showed himself to be a full participant in the formulation of U.S. policy. With the benefit of hindsight, one can wish he had been more persuasive.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER

M - 463,503
S - 867,810

JUL 4 1971

Letters to the Editor

'Blunders' Were McNamara's

To the Editor:

Your editorial entitled, "Pentagon Blunders in Vietnam Cry Out for Defense Overhaul" was predictable. You have arrived at the conclusion which the so-called Pentagon historians sought in producing the mammoth 47-volume "history" of the U. S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

During his tenure as Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara ruled the Pentagon with a rod of iron. No one group was able to win him over to their point of view—it was the other way around.

May I call your attention to an authoritative study of the management of our defense establishment under Secretary McNamara, "How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969" by Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith. Enthoven was assistant secretary of defense for systems analysis during much of McNamara's tenure, and Smith was Enthoven's special assistant. They state that McNamara had an "active management" conception of his role according to which "the principal task of the secretary of defense is personally to grasp the strategic issues and provide active leadership to develop a defense program that sensibly relates all factors" including foreign policy, military strategy, defense budgets, and the choice of major weapons and forces.

As in all other phases of defense planning, McNamara participated fully in the planning of the Vietnam war. He ordered the phasing of the intervention as well as the bombing. The bombing policy which he imposed carried within it the seeds of failure. Mr. McCone, the civilian director of the CIA, pointed out at the time that Hanoi would be able to see through the symbolic nature of such bombing as was initially conducted under the gradual escalation policies ordered by Mr. McNamara.

Only after the initial phase of the bombing campaign had failed did some of the military leaders argue, unsuccessfully, that the policy be changed. But for the sake of Mr. McNamara's reputation and those anti-Johnson elements within the Democratic Party, the blame had to be shifted from civilian to military leaders.

If military leaders are to be charged with incompetence, the credibility of their civilian masters in the Department of Defense should be equally subjected to questioning, especially in light of the revealing study by Enthoven and Smith about the McNamara management of the Pentagon, supposedly the most efficiently run department under the leadership of one of the greatest organizational genuises of this century.

WILLIAM R. KINTNER
Director, Foreign Policy
Research Institute
Philadelphia.

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PORTLAND, ME.
PRESS-HERALD
M - 56,603
TELEGRAM
S - 108,937

2 1971

Nobody Listened

The Central Intelligence Agency, favorite target for dissenters from campus to Congress, comes off rather well in the much disputed Pentagon papers which now seem to have a circulation only slightly less than that of the New York Times itself.

The whole intelligence community seems to have had better information and greater ability to interpret it than the policymakers who prevailed in the presidential councils.

In mid-1964, the CIA disputed the domino theory and declared that not all of Southeast Asia but probably only Cambodia would be endangered if South Vietnam and Laos fell to the Communists. The report was not heeded.

Later that same year, when bombing of North Vietnam was under consideration, the CIA, along with State Department Intelligence and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, said the proposed bombing would do little in the way of intimidating Hanoi.

CIA Director John A. McCone warned against combat troop commitment with the prediction that "we will find ourselves mired down in combat in the jungle in a military effort we cannot win and from which we will have extreme difficulty extricating ourselves."

Undoubtedly intelligence has goofed up in some instances. But if more credence had been given to intelligence reports earlier, the opportunities for the later errors never would have arisen.

KEY VIETNAM TE

THE KENNEDY YE

Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, dealing with the Administration of President John F. Kennedy up to the events that brought the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

U.S. Ambassador's '60 Analysis Of Threats to Saigon Regime

Cablegram from Elbridge Durbrow, United States Ambassador in Saigon, to Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Sept. 16, 1960.

As indicated our 495 and 538 Diem regime confronted by two separate but related dangers. Danger from demonstrations or coup attempt in Saigon could occur earlier; likely to be predominantly non-Communistic in origin but Communists can be expected to endeavor infiltrate and exploit any such attempt. Even more serious danger is gradual Viet Cong extension of control over countryside which, if current Communist progress continues, would mean loss free Viet-nam to Communists. These two dangers are related because Communist successes in rural areas embolden them to extend their activities to Saigon and because non-Communist temptation to engage in demonstrations or coup is partly motivated by sincere desire prevent Communist take-over in Viet-nam.

Essentially [word illegible] sets of measures required to meet these two dangers. For Saigon danger essentially political and psychological measures required. For countryside danger security measures as well as political, psychological and economic measures needed. However both sets measures should be carried out simultaneously and to some extent individual steps will be aimed at both dangers.

Security recommendations have been made in our 539 and other messages, including formation internal security council, centralized intelligence, etc. This message therefore deals with our political and economic recommendations. I realize some measures I am recommending are drastic and would be most [word illegible] for an ambassador to make under normal circumstances. But conditions here are by no means normal. Diem government is in quite serious danger. Therefore, in my opinion prompt and even drastic action is called for. I am well aware that Diem has in past demonstrated astute judgment and has survived other serious crises. Possibly his judgment will prove superior to ours this time, but I believe nevertheless we have no alternative but to give him our best judgment of what we believe is required to preserve his government. While Diem obviously resented my frank talks earlier this year and will probably resent even more suggestions outlined below, he has apparently acted on some of our earlier suggestions and might act on at least some of the following:

1. I would propose have frank and friendly talk with Diem and explain our serious concern about present situation and his political position. I would tell him that, while matters I am raising deal primarily with internal affairs, I would like to talk to him frankly and try to be as helpful as I can be giving him the considered judgment of myself and some of his friends in Washington on appropriate measures to assist him in present serious situation. (Believe it best not indicate talking under instructions.) I would particularly stress desirability of actions to broaden and increase his [word illegible] support prior to 1961 presidential elections required by constitution before end April. I would propose following actions to President:

2. Psychological shock effect is required to take initiative from Communist propagandists as well as non-Communist oppositionists and convince population government taking effective measures to deal with present situation. Otherwise present matters could get out of hand. To achieve that effect following suggested:

4. Permit National Assembly ... legislative initiative and area of genuine debate and bestow on it authority to conduct, with appropriate publicity, public investigations of any department of government with right to question ... official even President himself. This step would have three-fold purpose: (A) find some mechanism for dis-

NEW YORK TIMES
JUL 1971

Johnson Decides to Use Ground Troops

President Johnson decided on April 1, 1965, to use American ground troops for offensive action in South Vietnam because the Administration quickly found that sustained bombing of North Vietnam—begun on March 2—was not going to stave off collapse in South Vietnam.

The President's decision was described in the third installment, published June 15, of The Times series on the Defense Department history.

One of 16 documents published with that installment was National Security Action Memorandum 328, dated April 6, 1965. This reported that the President had "approved an 18-20,000 man increase in U. S. military support forces to fill out existing units and supply needed logistic personnel."

Further, he approved sending ashore two Marine battalions that Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the commander in Vietnam, had asked for on March 17, adding to two Marine battalions with 3,500 men that had landed March 8 as defenders of Danang airfield.

A Change of Mission

Mr. Johnson also approved deployment of a Marine air squadron and "a change of mission for all Marine battalions . . . . to permit their more active use. . . ." He approved "urgent" efforts to get South Korean, Australian and New Zealand troops.

And he desired that "premature publicity be avoided," and the actions "should minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy."

There was a comment in an April 2 memorandum by Mr. McCone of the Central Intelligence Agency that bombings "have not caused a change in the North Vietnamese policy of directing Vietcong insurgency, infiltrating cadres and supplying material" and "if anything, the strikes to date have hardened their attitude."

Mr. McCone warned of becoming "mired down in combat in the jungle in a military effort that we cannot win."

The March 8 landings had brought the United States force in South Vietnam to 27,000 men. In mid-March, Gen. Harold K. Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, made two recommendations relating to a possible ground war.

One was to send a division of American troops to South Vietnam to hold coastal enclaves or to defend the Central Highlands, freeing Saigon Government forces for offensive action against the Vietcong.

The other was to establish a four-division force of American and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization troops to interdict infiltration by patrolling the demilitarized zone on the border between North and South Vietnam and the Laotian border region.

Before N.S.C. Meeting

In preparation for April 1-2 National Security Council meetings, Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton wrote in a memorandum:

"Can the situation inside SVN be bottomed out (a) without extreme measures against the D.R.V. and/or (b) without deployment of large numbers of U.S. (and other) combat troops inside SVN? The answer is perhaps, but probably no."

General Westmoreland, in a report completed March 26 for the same strategy meeting, contended that South Vietnamese troops could not hold the line against growing Vietcong strength long enough for the bombing to become effective.

General Westmoreland asked for the equivalent of two American divisions to arrive by June, to bring strength in Vietnam up to about 70,000.

He proposed to send an Army division to "defeat" the Vietcong in the Central Highlands, and indicated that more troops might be required if bombing failed to achieve results.

On March 20, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had proposed sending two American divisions and one South Korean division for offensive combat operations.

The Joint Chiefs, the Pentagon study said, "had the qualified support" of Secretary McNamara.

A 'Mobile Role' Sought

On April 4, Ambassador Taylor proposed "the use of Marines in a mobile counter-insurgency role in the vicinity of Danang for the improved protection of that base and also in a strike role as a reserve in support of [South Vietnamese Army] operations anywhere within 50 miles of the base." This was described as an enclave strategy.

On April 20, Secretary McNamara met General Westmoreland and other officials in Honolulu. The Pentagon study said there were 33,500 American troops then in Vietnam.

The conferees agreed that United States ground forces should be increased from 4 to 13 maneuver battalions involving 82,000 men, with 4 battalions involving 7,250 men also to be sought from Australia and South Korea.

A series of major military victories by the Vietcong in May and June led General Westmoreland to ask on June 7 for still more help—for a total of 44 battalions.

The study said that on June 13, he proposed a "search-and-destroy strategy for U.S. and third-country forces," with the "primary focus" for South Vietnamese forces to be pacification.

Authority for Westmoreland

On June 26, the study reported, General Westmoreland was given authority to commit United States forces whenever he decided they were needed "to strengthen the relative position" of Government forces.

The first major ground action by United States forces took place June 27-30, with the 173d Airborne Brigade, an Australian battalion and South Vietnamese in "a search-and-destroy operation into Vietcong base areas."

On July 17, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance said in a cablegram that President Johnson had decided to go ahead with a plan to deploy 34 battalions. On July 30, the Joint Chiefs backed deployment of 44 battalions, involving 193,887 United States soldiers.

The search-and-destroy strategy, the study commented, "left the U. S. commitment to Vietnam open-ended." As to President Johnson and Secretary McNamara, it added, "there are manifold indications that they were prepared for a long war."

NEW YORK TIMES
JUL 1971

'Consensus' on Bombing Reached Before the Election

Leaders of the Johnson Administration reached a "consensus" at a White House strategy meeting on Sept. 7, 1964, the Pentagon study of the war says, that sustained air attacks against North Vietnam would probably have to be launched, and indicated a start for early 1965.

In the second installment, The Times reported that the analysis had added that "what prevented action for the time being was a set of tactical considerations."

First among these, the analysis went on, was that "the President was in the midst of an election campaign in which he was presenting himself as the candidate of reason and restraint as opposed to the quixotic Barry Goldwater," who was publicly advocating full-scale bombing of North Vietnam.

Before that "consensus," there had been an Aug. 18 cablegram from Ambassador Maxwell Taylor—one of 16 texts published with the installation—declaring that "the present in-country pacification plan is not enough." The Ambassador urged "deliberate escalation of pressure against North Vietnam, using Jan. 1, 1965, as a target D-Day" to start bombing military facilities.

Marines for Danang

The bombing plan, Ambassador Taylor added, would entail sending Army Hawk anti-aircraft missile units to protect airfields at Saigon and Danang and a force of Marines to Danang.

On Aug. 26, a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff termed "accelerated" actions against North Vietnam "essential to prevent a complete collapse of the U.S. position in Southeast Asia."

On Sept. 3, a memorandum by Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton said "the situation in South Vietnam is deteriorating." He proposed actions to cause "increasing apprehension" in North Vietnam and "likely at some point to provoke a military D.R.V. [North Vietnam] response" so that "the provoked response should be likely to provide good grounds for us to escalate if we wished."

The Sept. 7 "consensus" meeting was attended by President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; Ambassador Taylor, and John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence.

A Sept. 8 memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy described "the consensus reached in discussions ... for review and decision by the President."

Patrols to Resume

It was followed by a Sept. 10 memorandum by McGeorge Bundy, adviser to the President on national security. This reported Mr. Johnson's approval of resumption of American naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin and resumption of South Vietnamese coastal raids against North Vietnam. The raids had been covert, but were to be admitted now.

The patrols resumed Sept. 12, and the raids in October. A covert step-up in air operations in Laos ordered by the President began Oct. 14.

On Nov. 1, a Vietcong mortar barrage struck American planes and facilities at Bienhoa airfield. President Johnson, at a White House meeting, held off on reprisals and expressed concern over possible counter-retaliation by North Vietnam or Communist China against American bases and civilian dependents.

On Nov. 24, a select committee of the National Security Council heard General Wheeler, speaking for the Joint Chiefs, argue for a hard, fast bombing campaign—as entailing "less risk of a major conflict before achieving success" than the option of gradually rising air strikes, favored by Assistant Secretaries McNaughton and Bundy.

'A Losing Game'

On Nov. 27, Ambassador Taylor, in a briefing, urged gradually increasing air strikes —"we are playing a losing game in South Vietnam."

On Nov. 29, there was a "draft position paper" by an interagency working group on Vietnam headed by William Bundy. It set out "first-phase actions" over 30 days to intensify South Vietnamese maritime, Laotian air and United States reconnaissance operations already under way.

Reprisal air strikes against North Vietnam by South Vietnamese forces, "supplemented as necessary by U. S. forces," were proposed to take place preferably within 24 hours of "any VC provocation."

The next phase would be "progresssively more serious air strikes," as well as possible aerial mining of ports and a naval blockade.

The Pentagon study says President Johnson became "cautious and equivocal." In a White House meeting on Dec. 1, he said he wanted "new, dramatic, effective" aid from allied countries.

Air Strikes Begin

Nevertheless, on Dec. 14, Operation Barrel Roll began the 30 days of Phase I—air strikes by United States Air Force and Navy jets against infiltration routes and facilities in the Laotian panhandle.

On Jan. 6, 1965, William Bundy, in a memorandum, suggested "an early occasion for reprisal action" against North Vietnam and "possibly beginning low-level reconnaissance" at once.

"Introduction of limited U. S. ground forces into the northern area of South Vietnam," Mr. Bundy added, "still has great appeal to many of us, concurrently with the first air attacks into the D.R.V."

The Pentagon study reported that a Jan. 27 memorandum by Mr. McNaughton, agreed to by Secretary McNamara, favored initiating air strikes against North Vietnam.

On Feb. 6, nine Americans were killed and 76 wounded in Vietcong attacks on a military advisers' compound and a helicopter base. The study said this "triggered a swift, though long-contemplated Presidential decision to give an 'appropriate and fitting' response."

Within 14 hours, 49 Navy jets raided Donghoi in North Vietnam. Next, the enemy attacked an American barracks; the President on Feb. 11 launched a heavier reprisal raid. On Feb. 13, he decided to begin Operation Rolling Thunder—the sustained air war against North Vietnam.

GRAND ISLAND, NEBR.
INDEPENDENT

E - 22,126
JUN 29 1971

A Page Devoted to

UNDERSTANDING

Editorially Speaking:

The Pentagon Papers (3)

You can argue all day about whether the executive branch of government (and the military) knows best about what the public should be told.

At this point in history, however, there seems little doubt that the American people were told just enough about Vietnam to build up support for what was an ever-widening involvement in Southeast Asia.

It was not the first time in our nation's history. The Spanish-American War might be a parallel, but one without the disastrous results of Vietnam.

But what about Congress? When it was being taken down the same path in 1964 and 1965, might wiser heads have prevailed had more facts been made known and a more realistic picture painted?

Gen. Maxwell Taylor, who moved from a job as chairman of the joint chiefs of staff to our ambassador in South Vietnam during the height of the buildup, referred to that question in the wake of the disclosures of the Pentagon Papers' contents.

"To my knowledge, this is the first time in history that a government's right to carry on some of its business outside the public eye has, in effect, been challenged," he said.

But he denied there had been any deception, adding, "One of the problems here is exactly what is meant. In the practice of foreign policy, a President owes a good deal to certain elements of Congress — the leadership — in the way of openness. But the President does not by any means owe that to all of Congress."

OK, we do have separation of the two branches of government, and foreign policy is the obligation of the executive.

But there's a lot of difference between the "openness" to which Taylor refers and the way it is now apparent Congress was also misled in those earlier years.

In fact, it was on Aug. 8, 1964, that the House approved, 416-0, and the Senate, 88-2, a resolution which gave President Johnson authorization to take "all necessary measures . . . to repel any armed attack" against U.S. forces and "to prevent further aggression."

That became the vehicle under which the war was expanded.

At the time, only Sens. Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening voted against the resolution.

Over the ensuing years, others began to speak out.

What might have happened, though, in 1964 and 1965 had at least Congressional leaders known of the opposition to our policies of CIA director John McCone?

Or, in 1965, if they'd have heard some testimony from George Ball, undersecretary of state, which reflected a July 1 memo which he sent to the President? From the viewpoint of 1971, what he wrote six years ago is almost uncanny:

"No one can assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on our terms," he said, "no matter how many hundred thousand white, foreign (U.S.) troops we deploy. Once we deploy substantial numbers of troops in combat, it will become a war between the U.S. and a large part of the population of South Viet Nam. U.S. troops will begin to take heavy casualties in a war they are ill-equipped to fight in a non-cooperative if not downright hostile countryside. Once we suffer large casualties, we will have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so great that we cannot — without national humiliation — stop short of achieving our objectives. I think humiliation would be more likely — even after we have paid terrible costs."

At the same time, however, that these misgivings were being expressed privately, all public pronouncements were exactly the opposite, and presumably private consultations with Congressional leaders were as optimistic as the public mouthings.

War fever, it would seem, was built up in part because there really wasn't any "openness" on the part of the executive — even with congressional leaders.

None of which is to criticize the motives of our leaders, however. They obviously did what they felt best. It just developed they were wrong.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
28 JUN 1971

STAT

A matter of disagreement: How secret were the secrets?

By JERRY GREENE
Chief of The News Washington Bureau

The 47-volume Pentagon Papers—officially called "History of the United States Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy"—present a broken and admittedly incomplete documentary account of how four administrations carried the nation into war, not always with great foresight and sometimes with plans and decisions withheld from public view.

The history is incomplete because early records had disappeared. It falls short of a total picture because it presents mainly the Pentagon's record. And 3,000 words of it are a narrative analysis made by the 30-odd authors involved—a flawed record that often reflects their own biases and prejudices.

The harsh judgments are to be found in the narrative account by the analysts. To the confusion of the public, moreover, portions of the study published in newspapers have not always made a clear distinction between the quoted text of a document and the anonymous historian's view of it.

Yet as incomplete as the record is, and imperfect as it is, three major conclusions can still be drawn:

1. There is apparent evidence of deception and duplicity on the part of the government, during the administration of former president Lyndon B. Johnson.

2. Far from being kept in the dark, congressional leaders and appropriations committees on Capitol Hill were fully informed on most operations.

3. Many of the so-called "secrets" revealed by the Pentagon Papers actually were reported on fully, and with almost pinpoint accuracy, by the ever-zealous American press.

Among the presidents involved with the war, Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy came off lightly compared with Johnson, and Richard Nixon escapes entirely, since the study does not extend beyond 1968. Reportedly, however, unpublished portions of the papers may deal with Nixon's role when he was vice president under Eisenhower.

Lyndon Johnson, who is said to feel that the study is biased and distorted, comes under attack as a man who ordered an increase in army forces in Vietnam and a switch in the combat role of Marine Corps battalions with a directive that "premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions." Evidence is to be found that there was evasion and even lying on the part of some officials about tactical matters.

Leslie H. Gelb, the former Pentagon official who was in charge of the historical compilation, has admitted some of the weaknesses of the final product.

In his covering letter with the final report, which was submitted to the U.S. district court here last week as an exhibit, Gelb wrote: "Of course we all had our prejudices and axes to grind and these shine through clearly at times, but we tried, we think, to suppress or compensate for them.

"Writing history, especially where it blends into current events, is a treacherous exercise. We could not go into the minds of the decision makers, we were not present at the decisions, and we often could not tell whether something happened because someone decided it, decided against it, or most likely because it unfolded from the situation."

Against that backdrop, these are the salient disclosures in the published portions of the Pentagon Papers:

o Former President Eisenhower in January, 1951, approved a National Security Council policy statement setting as a national objective the security of Southeast Asia from communist domination.

o U.S. State Department officials played a vital, hidden role in encouraging the ouster by coup of South Vietnam President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. Diem and his shadowy brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were murdered.

o Former President Lyndon Johnson's aides were recommending bombing of North Vietnam and preparing contingency plans for attack during 1964 at the same time he was denouncing his GOP presidential opponent, Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), as "trigger happy."

o U.S. officials were cooperating in secret South Vietnamese sabotage attacks against North Vietnam in operation 34-A long before the Gulf of Tonkin incident. LBJ approved an 18,000 to 20,000 army force increase for South Vietnam and authorized Marine battalions there to change from a defensive to a "more active" mission. He demanded, however, that the actions "should be taken as rapidly as practicable but in ways that should minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy. . . ."

o LBJ, as had the late President Kennedy before him, received a steady stream of conflicting advice from the soft and hardliners on his staff, with Johnson getting warnings from the CIA that the planned bombing attacks would not achieve their purpose.

o Johnson advisers, particularly Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, regarded bombing pauses not as much help toward peace, but as a time to regroup and solidify public

The case of the Pentagon Papers and their publication in parts of the American press has created a good deal of confusion about Vietnam policy and how it was created. In a four-page special section today, THE NEWS reviews and evaluates what we have learned.

Continued

NEWSWEEK
28 JUN 1971

As Lyndon Johnson Sees It

The man in the eye of the storm, Lyndon B. Johnson, maintained a calm, and some thought stoic, silence last week, turning away interviewers who wanted his reaction to the top-secret Pentagon study of his stewardship of the war. From Austin, he passed the word that "all questions" raised by the Pentagon papers would be answered in his own book, "The Vantage Point," to be published next fall and that he was making "no changes" in the galleys to accommodate the new disclosures. But behind his silence, Johnson was naturally concerned about the study and its treatment in the press. Those in Austin privy to his feelings sketch this picture:

The ghostly hand of Robert Kennedy is on the Pentagon study. Bobby indeed may well have inspired the report. He was close to Robert McNamara and

AP

Johnson, 1971: Ammunition in Austin

he needed an issue for his intended challenge to Johnson in 1968. He couldn't find any weakness in the Johnson record on civil rights, race, health, education, environment or anything else. He pinned his hopes on Vietnam, and McNamara was a Kennedy man. In fact, the whole Pentagon Establishment was Kennedy. Johnson left it intact. He trusted McNamara—in fact told him once that if McNamara quit he would have him arrested and brought back.

McNamara, while in the process of becoming disillusioned with the war, went to the Kennedy Center in Cambridge, Mass., and talked with about twenty Harvard professors around the time he ordered the study. Some of those twenty may be among the authors of the report—somebody should find out who they are and who wrote what. The study is heavily committed. They couldn't make an objective report. They didn't try to get White House and State Department records, which shows they didn't try very hard. If they were honest they would have disqualified themselves.

Some of The New York Times digest of the Pentagon study was objective. But parts of it might have been written by John Kenneth Galbraith. Over all, it was dishonest—one distorted and biased side of the picture. And all the circumstances surrounding the leak come close to treason. The danger now is that President Nixon will be pressured to get out of Vietnam before achieving the main objective—getting South Vietnam in shape to protect itself.

One of Johnson's big headaches when he took over the Presidency and the war effort was the political instability of the government in Saigon following the overthrow and murder of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. One of the first things Johnson did was to call in McNamara, Dean Rusk, CIA director John McCone and Henry Cabot Lodge—all JFK holdovers—and object to what had been done. While JFK was out of Washington, a cable from Roger Hilsman, the State Department's director of Intelligence and Research, gave "a green light" for the coup. That was inexcusable.

The Senators

Critics now were trying to make it seem that he had decided in 1964 to bomb in 1965, that his campaign was a lie and that he was trying to put something over on Congress. That just wasn't so. There were contingency plans for Vietnam. There are contingency plans for bombing Moscow; that doesn't mean that Moscow is going to be bombed. Johnson always insisted on consulting the Senate about major moves. Georgia's Richard Russell, the late chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and Arkansas's J. William Fulbright, chairman of Foreign Relations, always knew what the Administration was doing. Russell said so, but Fulbright conveniently forgot.

The first Gulf of Tonkin resolution actually was prepared by Senate leaders. But it was too complicated to be understandable, and Johnson objected. So the senators asked the Administration to prepare a simplified version and said they would adopt it. They all participated. The government had radio intercepts showing that North Vietnam ordered torpedo attacks on the U.S. destroyers in Tonkin Gulf. Fulbright has forgotten that, too—now he claims it was all a fraud—but he knew it at the time. The resolution authorizing Johnson to do what he thought needed doing from then on was adopted unanimously by the House and with two opposing votes in the Senate. The two dissenters may have been wrong, but they were at least honest.

The military wanted Johnson to bomb long before he did. But both McNamara and Rusk were against it for a long time, and Johnson went with them. He vetoed the military recommendation on five different occasions—in November and December 1964 and on Jan. 2, 1965. Finally, on Feb. 7, 1965, with the approval of everybody concerned, he OK'd the bombing with the idea that it would be a deterrent to the north. [Johnson's recollection now is at variance with at least one past version. Five years ago, he told NEWSWEEK's Charles Roberts, then the magazine's White House correspondent, that he had made the decision in October 1964 during the Presidential campaign.] He hadn't said in his campaign that he would never commit Americans to fight in Vietnam. In New Hampshire, he said that Asians should fight their own wars, but in context he wasn't promising not to help.

The Deserters

In January 1965, McNamara and McGeorge Bundy were urging strong measures against North Vietnam. They argued that the time had come for full use of American power. Either get in or get out, they said. At that point, Rusk didn't agree with them. He wasn't for getting out but neither was he for a big escalation. He finally did agree with McNamara and Bundy the following June and July, and Johnson issued the orders. Everybody agreed by then. Some became disillusioned even before leaving the government. Bundy was the first to abandon ship and McNamara was next. It might have been weakness of character.

Lately Clark Clifford has been saying that he had orders from Johnson only to find out how to escalate further. But Johnson has a copy of his order to Clifford—initialed by Clifford when he received it—telling him to make a broad study of all alternatives. He also has copies of orders Clifford gave to subordinates to pursue possibilities other than escalation.

His own book, in fact, draws on 31 million documents on file at the LBJ library. Included in the collection are several memos from men such as Bundy, Clifford and McNamara, urging a stepped-up war effort. One of his favorites, already surfaced in the Times, shows McNamara proposing on March 16, 1964—five months before the Tonkin Gulf incident and eleven months before the Viet Cong attack on Pleiku—that the U.S. should be ready for "retaliation" against North Vietnam on three days' notice. Another shows that Bundy, in Saigon at the time of the Pleiku attack, came back to Washington urging "sustained reprisal" bombing attacks against North Vietnam, the policy Johnson adopted. And the former President has a memorandum showing that Clifford—as late as March 4, 1968—was recommending "no new peace initiatives" on Vietnam and advocating the callup of reserves. Johnson feels he has a pretty good pile of ammunition—and his book will make pretty good use of it.

NEWSWEEK
28 JUN 1971



AP

B-52 bomber raid in 1965: Early in the war, the U.S. ran out of alternatives to pressure

The War According to the Pentagon Papers

The secret Vietnam study commissioned by Robert McNamara is a historian's dream and a statesman's nightmare. With the story splashed on page one, Americans have for the first time been able to read some of the crucial secret documents of a war that is still being fought. The Pentagon papers are, at best, only an incomplete account of America's slide into the Vietnam quagmire. But they are also a revealing—and deeply disturbing—account of the delusions, deceptions and honest errors of judgment that propelled the United States into a destructively unpopular war.

The initial installments published by The New York Times and The Washington Post transfix some members of Lyndon Johnson's Administration in a merciless spotlight. McNamara labors on as the war's most tireless technocrat even after he has begun to lose heart for the fight. Walt Whitman Rostow clings doggedly to the assumption that America is simply too powerful to be thwarted. Maxwell Taylor, the humanist general for whom Robert Kennedy named one of his sons, blusters like a pouty proconsul. And the Bundy brothers grind out options to order, while generals and admirals constantly promote the idea that more is better.

Other reputations gain from the exposure. George Ball's standing as a prescient dove is enhanced by the tone of his memorandums, and the intelligence services—particularly the CIA—weigh in with advice that, in retrospect, often seems to have been dead right. The spotlight skips over still other key policymakers. Dean Rusk figures only rarely in most of the narrative. And except for brief appearances, the most important actor of all—Lyndon Johnson—broods alone in the middle distance.

The material that was made public covers a period beginning in 1945, skips over the Kennedy years and focuses on the wartime Johnson era. But even when it concentrates on the LBJ years, the Pentagon study is by no means the final word. It provides a fascinating peek into the government's files, but it contains few White House or State Department records of the period. It also draws on few of the private memorandums that McNamara, Rusk and others wrote for the President, and it shows no trace of the many private, soul-searching conversations between top officials. Flawed as a current account, the study is no less seriously flawed as a retrospective because the Pentagon analysts were not permitted to interview the principal players in the drama.

But despite those shortcomings, the study is invaluable. The Eisenhower era material—first printed in The Washington Post—strikes many of the notes that were to echo throughout America's involvement in Vietnam. There is the strong assumption that the stakes extend beyond Indochina to all of Asia, and that the U.S. is embroiled in a proxy confrontation with Communist China. There are the efforts to solve problems by backstage maneuvering. And, above all, there is Washington's repeated inability to make events in Indochina conform to its desires.

A Vote Against Elections

In 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles fought hard but unsuccessfully at the Geneva conference on Indochina to prevent the scheduling of elections in Vietnam which, he feared, "might eventually mean unification [of] Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh." But despite Dulles's strong stand, the U.S. backed away from taking overt action on its own in Indochina. In 1955, when South Vietnamese strongman Ngo Dinh Diem refused even to consider holding elections, Washington stepped back. As the Pentagon analysis declares: "The U.S. did not—as is often alleged—connive with Diem to ignore the elections." And although Dwight Eisenhower permitted the military to draw up contingency plans for American intervention in Laos and Vietnam, he decided against such a step when Dulles failed to line up support from America's allies.

By the time Lyndon Johnson took office, the situation in South Vietnam had worsened. Diem had been assassinated, and the sad series of revolving-door juntas that followed him were fast losing their grip on the country. "We should watch the situation very carefully," Defense Secretary McNamara wrote in December 1963 after a visit to South Vietnam, "running scared, hoping for the best, but preparing for more forceful moves if the situation does not show early signs of improvement." This concern was by no means confined to secret government deliberations. By March 1964, Sen. J. William Fulbright was warning Congress that there were "only two realistic options open to us in Vietnam in the immediate future: the expansion of the conflict in one way or another or a renewed effort to bolster the capacity of the South Vietnamese to prosecute the war successfully on its present scale." And as the mood of crisis deepened, many newspapers—including The New York Times—warned against the possible loss of South Vietnam to the Communists.

But although the American people were well aware that things were going badly in South Vietnam—an awareness that would be heightened during the Goldwater-Johnson election campaign—a whole spectrum of undercover activities was kept secret from them. The Pentagon papers show that on Feb. 1, 1964, "an elaborate program of covert military operations against the state of North Vietnam was begun under the code name Operation Plan 34A. Directed from

continued

TIME
28 JUN 1971

Pentagon Papers: The Secret War

To see the conflict and our part in it as a tragedy without villains, war crimes without criminals, lies without liars, espouses and promulgates a view of process, roles and motives that is not only grossly mistaken but which underwrites deceits that have served a succession of Presidents.

—Daniel Ellsberg

THE issues were momentous, the situation unprecedented. The most massive leak of secret documents in U.S. history had suddenly exposed the sensitive inner processes whereby the Johnson Administration had abruptly escalated the nation's most unpopular—and unsuccessful—war. The Nixon Government, battling stubbornly to withdraw from that war at its own deliberate pace, took the historic step of seeking to suppress articles before publication, and threatened criminal action against the nation's most eminent newspaper.

The dramatic collision between the Nixon Administration and first the New York *Times*, then the Washington *Post*, raised in a new and spectacular form the unresolved constitutional questions about the Government's right to keep its planning papers secret and the conflicting right of a free press to inform the public how its Government has functioned (*see story page 17*). Yet, even more fundamental, the legal battle fo-

that the Government was fighting so fiercely to protect. Those records afforded a rare insight into how high officials make decisions affecting the lives of millions as well as the fate of nations. The view, however constricted or incomplete, was deeply disconcerting. The records revealed a dismaying degree of miscalculation, bureaucratic arrogance and deception. The revelations severely damaged the reputations of some officials, enhanced those of a few, and so angered Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield—a long-patient Democrat whose own party was hurt most—that he promised to conduct a Senate investigation of Government decision making.

The sensational affair began quietly with the dull thud of the 486-page Sunday New York *Times* arriving on doorsteps and in newsrooms. A dry Page One headline—VIETNAM ARCHIVE: PENTAGON STUDY TRACES 3 DECADES OF GROWING U.S. INVOLVEMENT—was followed by six pages of deliberately low-key prose and column after gray column of official cables, memorandums and position papers. The mass of material seemed to repel readers and even other newsmen. Nearly a day went by before the networks and wire services broke news of the unprecedented action was to refrain from comment so as not to give the series any greater "exposure." But when Attorney General John Mitchell charged that the *Times's* disclosures would cause "irreparable injury to the defense of the United States" and obtained a temporary restraining order to stop the series after three installments, worldwide attention was inevitably assured.

A Study Ignored

The *Times* had obviously turned up a big story (*see* PRESS). Daniel Ellsberg, a former Pentagon analyst and superhawk-turned-superdove, apparently had felt so concerned about his involvement in the Viet Nam tragedy that he had somehow conveyed about 40 volumes of an extraordinary Pentagon history of the war to the newspaper. Included were 4,000 pages of documents, 3,000 pages of analysis and 2.5 million words—all classified as secret, top secret or top secret-sensitive.

The study was begun in 1967 by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who had become disillusioned by the futility of the war and wanted future historians to be able to determine what had gone wrong. For more than a year, 35 researchers, including Ellsberg, Rand Corporation experts, civilians and uniformed Pentagon personnel, worked out of an office adjoining McNamara's. With [illegible] were able to obtain Pentagon documents dating back to arguments within the Truman Administration on whether the U.S. should help

JULY 1965: JOHNSON DISCUSSING VIET NAM POLICY BEFORE TELEVISION SPEECH

Always the secret option, another notch, but never victory.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
28 JUN 1971

STAT

Storm Over Leaked Documents—

SECRET DECISIONS THAT ALTERED THE VIETNAM WAR

Impact of Pentagon's massive analysis of the Government's policy-making processes on Vietnam—disclosed by "The New York Times"—extends far beyond the war itself.

In the published documents: recommendations and judgments at high levels, showing how the nation's vast military commitments in the Indo-China conflict took shape.

A FUROR over publication of secret material on step-by-step escalation of the U. S. role in Vietnam has taken on far-reaching proportions.

The controversy was triggered on June 13 when "The New York Times" began printing a series of articles based on a Pentagon study of how and why American involvement in the Indo-China war grew to its peak commitment of forces totaling half a million men.

The "Times" articles included classified documents submitted to President Johnson by advisers such as Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, Director John A. McCone of the Central Intelligence Agency and White House aides McGeorge Bundy and Walt W. Rostow; also texts of decisions to be implemented through the National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A bombshell effect—which Government officials now expect to be felt for months—increased with publication, on June 14 and 15, of the second and third articles in a scheduled multipart series.

Expanding repercussions. Disclosures of secret decisions on U. S. strategy touched off bursts of anger in Congress and in foreign capitals and brought unprecedented action by the Nixon Administration.

The Department of Justice sought an injunction banning further publication of material obtained by "The Times" on the ground that it would cause "irreparable injury to the defense interests of the United States."

On June 15, U. S. District Judge Murray I. Gurfein, in New York, issued a restraining order halting publication pending arguments and a ruling on the Government's demand for a permanent injunction. White House officials said action was taken against "The Times" not only because U. S. interests were damaged, but for the further reason that publication of classified documents, if unchallenged, would set a dangerous precedent.

"Responsibility to publish." Gist of the stand taken by "The Times" was expressed in an editorial on June 16, in these words:

"A fundamental responsibility of the press in this democracy is to publish information that helps the people of the United States to understand the processes of their own Government, especially when those processes have been clouded over in a veil of public dissimulation and even deception."

While the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other arms of the Government sought to fix responsibility for the leak of the secret material to "The Times," diplomatic and congressional reverberations continued.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers told a news conference on June 15 that publication of the articles was a violation of the law on secret documents and a "very serious matter" that would cause a "great deal of difficulty" for the U. S. in its relations with foreign governments.

Mr. Rogers said that the State Department had received diplomatic inquiries from other governments expressing concern about the articles and raising questions as to whether those governments could be sure of dealing with the U. S. on a confidential basis.

"Deliberate escalation." The Communist world was quick to react. The Soviet news agency, Tass, asserted that the documents published in the "Times" series "confirm the United States deliberately escalated and broadened the war in Indo-China, and misled the American public in giving its reasons for doing so."

In Australia—which has contributed troops to the Vietnam war effort—"The Sydney Daily Mirror" declared in an editorial that the secret Pentagon papers "show that while President Johnson was winning friends with his apparent sincerity and humanity he was, at the same time, provoking North Vietnam into an escalated war."

The Paris newspaper "France Soir" said the "Times" articles show that "in order to attack North Vietnam" Mr. Johnson "misled Congress."

On Capitol Hill, sharp comment came from Senator Barry Goldwater (Rep.), of Arizona, who was Lyndon Johnson's opponent in the 1964 presidential race.

Senator Goldwater said he knew during the 1964 campaign that Mr. John-

continued

President Johnson and Defense Secretary McNamara. Series in "Times" focused on top-level documents that shaped strategy.

THE CHICAGO SUN TIMES

STAT

Tell CIA pullout advice to Nixon

By Morton Kondracke
and Thomas B. Ross
Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — The Nixon administration was advised by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1969 that it could immediately withdraw from Vietnam and "all of Southeast Asia would remain just as it is at least for another generation."

Government documents revealed Friday that the CIA offered the following prediction of what would happen if President Nixon, at the start of his administration, had pulled all U.S. troops out of Vietnam and opened the way to a possible Viet Cong take-over of the Saigon government:

"We would lose Laos immediately. Sihanouk would preserve Cambodia by a straddling effort. All of Southeast Asia would remain just as it is at least for another generation.

"Thailand, in particular, would continue to maintain close relations with the U.S. and would seek additional support. Simultaneously, Thailand would make overtures and move toward China and the Soviet Union. It would simply take aid from both sides to preserve its independence.

"North Vietnam would consume itself in Laos and South Vietnam. Only Laos would definitely follow into the Communist orbit."

In totally rejecting the so-called domino theory on which U.S. policy was based in the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the CIA took a position consistent with a long line of estimates dating back to the original U.S. involvement in 1954.

For example, the documents show that on May 25, 1964, the CIA declared in a National Intelligence Estimate that the United States would "retain considerable leverage in Southeast Asia even if Laos and South Vietnam came under North Vietnamese control."

Robert McNamara's doubts in 1966 on escalating the war revealed, Page 6.

The CIA produced the estimate as part of its pessimistic assessment of the value of launching a bombing campaign against North Vietnam. It argued that air attacks were unlikely to break Hanoi's will and carried the danger of escalating the war into a direct confrontation with Communist China and the Soviet Union.

"Retaliatory measures which the North might take in Laos and South Vietnam," the CIA declared, "might make it increasingly difficult for the U.S. to regard its objectives as attainable by limited means. Thus, difficulties of comprehension might increase on both sides as scale of action mounted."

Former President Lyndon B. Johnson rejected the CIA's advice and started sustained bombing in February, 1965.

Similarly, President Nixon disregarded the CIA estimate in 1969 and decided on a slow withdrawal, an expansion of the war into Cambodia and Laos and a partial revival of the bombing of North Vietnam.

On several occasions since coming to office, Mr. Nixon has referred to immediate, total U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia as "precipitate" and the equivalent of "our defeat and humiliation."

In various ways, he has signaled an intention to preserve non-Communist governments in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Instead of pulling out of Vietnam rapidly, Mr. Nixon has withdrawn gradually, to give the South Vietnamese a "reasonable chance" to maintain their present government.

U.S. troop levels were at 540,000 when Mr. Nixon took office. They are scheduled to be down to 184,000 by Dec. 1, close to the end of Mr. Nixon's third year in office. The President has not said when — if ever — U.S. forces will be completely gone from Vietnam.

Meanwhile, Mr. Nixon stoutly denied that the invasions of Cambodia in 1969 and Laos in 1970 constituted expansions of the war or were even related to political conditions in those countries.

In 1969, U.S. troops joined South Vietnamese forces in the invasion, while the Laos incursion was conducted by Vietnamese ground forces supported by U.S. planes and helicopters.

Mr. Nixon defended both actions as efforts to speed the "end of the war" in South Vietnam. Nevertheless, the administration has exhibited interest in preserving the non-Communist character of the governments of Laos and Cambodia.

There has been a massive infusion of military and economic aid to the anti-Communist regime of Lon Nol in Cambodia, and U.S. air power continues to support South Vietnamese and Cambodian army combat operations there.

The Cambodian operations began on the heels of Lon Nol's overthrow of Sihanouk, the man the CIA predicted would retain power if the United States left Southeast Asia. The United States did not leave, and Sihanouk fell. In some quarters, his overthrow has been ascribed to the CIA.

In Laos, the United States has continued extensive bombing raids both along the Ho Chi Minh infiltration routes in the southern part of the country and in north Laos near the Plain of Jars.

The north Laos operations — bombing and aid to anti-Communist guerillas—are linked to retention of a neutralist government in Vientiane, the capital.

The government documents, disclosed to The Sun-Times by a number of reliable sources, show the CIA consistently reported that the bombing of North Vietnam was not effective, either in military or political terms.

The CIA's estimates, the documents also reveal, provided the basis for former Defense Sec. Clark Clifford's silent campaign to get the bombing stopped in 1968.

The CIA's Office of National Estimates advanced the case against the bombing in 1965 despite CIA Director John A. McCone's advice that U.S. planes "hit them harder, more frequently, and inflict greater damage."

In an April 2, 1965, memo to Sec. of State Dean Rusk, White House adviser McGeorge Bundy and Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor, McCone argued that Mr. Johnson's decision the previous day to commit U.S. troops to combat would: work only "if our air strikes against the north are sufficiently heavy and damaging really to hurt the North Vietnamese."

He warned that a slow escalation of the bombing would open the U.S. government to "increasing pressure" from the press and public opinion to stop the raids.

Then, McCone concluded: "We will find ourselves mired down in combat in the jungle in a military effort that we cannot win, and from which we will have extreme difficulty in extracting ourselves."

THE CHICAGO SUN TIMES
25 June 1971

STAT

Bombing of North Vietnam described as a failure

By Morton Kondracke
and Thomas B. Ross
Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — Secret Pentagon "war games" indicated early in 1964 that strategic bombing of North Vietnam might be a failure, and other high-level studies in 1967 concluded that the policy had indeed failed.

Despite the warnings of 1964, which emerged from computerized "Sigma games" reminiscent of the movie "Dr. Strangelove"—the administration of former President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered the bombing to begin in March, 1965, under the code name "Rolling Thunder."

And despite the analyses of 1967 — which include photos of war materiel leaving Yugoslavia and arriving in North Vietnam—the bombing was not finally halted until late 1968.

The early war games predicted — correctly — that North Vietnam could station civilians on airstrips to deter U.S. bombing and, if they were hit anyway, could use the fact to propaganda advantage.

After the bombing had been under way for 2½ years, the 1967 study showed that exaggerated claims for the success of the bombing had been fabricated in Vietnam and were believed by high-ranking officials in Washington.

Top-secret Pentagon documents and other sources also indicate a set of significant switches in U.S. aims in bombing North Vietnam. At first, the Johnson administration thought bombing stationary targets would break the will of North Vietnam and its leaders. Within a month, however, U.S. officials concluded that bombing would not accomplish that purpose, and the United States began trying to interdict supplies heading from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.

By April 20, 1965, the U.S. command concluded that bombing the north would not win the war, and that victory could come only by defeating the Viet Cong on the ground in South Vietnam.

Nevertheless, the bombing continued until it was stopped totally on the eve of the 1968 presidential elections.

In 1967, a study panel headed by Defense Undersecretary Paul Nitze concluded that the results of the bombing had been largely negative. The study concluded that there was no way to stop the flow of materiel into North Vietnam and no way to interdict it on its way to the south.

Ninety-five per cent of North Vietnam's war supplies entered through Haiphong Harbor — a forbidden target under President Johnson's rules. Had the harbor been attacked, however, supplies could have been shipped in by railroad from Port Biurd in China.

In 2½ years of bombing, the study concluded, North Vietnam had the same number of trucks — 11,000 — as it had when the bombing began, only they were new trucks in 1967, replacing the old ones of 1965.

The United States had knocked out 70 per cent of North Vietnam's electrical plants, yet the north had more generating capacity than it had before the war started. Diesel generators had been shipped in.

Bombs dumped at sea

Further, evidence indicated that U.S. policy encouraged U.S. pilots to dump their bombs at sea or avoid their primary targets.

Military budgets depended on flying the maximum number of sorties authorized by Washington, meaning that pilots had to make two bombing runs a day. To do that, they would have had to fly the shortest route to target, which were known as "milk runs," that were saturated with enemy antiaircraft defenses.

A pattern developed: Pilots would fly part of the milk run only, drop their bombs short of target or in the sea, fly back to their bases -- getting credit for one sortie — refuel, then fly out and bomb secondary targets outside North Vietnam, either along the Ho Chi Minh Trail or elsewhere in Laos.

Documents indicate that the North Vietnamese became accustomed to the pattern and scheduled truck traffic along the Ho Chi Minh Trail to coincide with the arrival of second sorties.

Documents indicate that 15 minutes before the planes arrived at their secondary target, the trucks moved off the trail, waited in the bush, watched the bombs drop, then continued on their way.

Statistics reported doctored

There was a high sortie rate and a large consumption of bombs but, indications were that statistics were doctored to make it appear to Washington that the planes were dropping their ordinance on primary targets in North Vietnam.

The Nitze study reached conclusions, after 2½ years of bombing, that were similar to the predictions laid down by top-secret study groups in 1963 and early 1964. One of these was an interagency task force, the Vietnam Working Group, headed by William H. Sullivan, currently deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian Affairs.

Simultaneously, high-level officials were meeting periodically in the Pentagon's war game rooms to play "Sigma games," the devising of possible U.S. bombing strategies, likely North Vietnamese counterstrategies, and U.S. counter-counterstrategies.

The officials were split into a "Red Team," headed by Marshall Green, assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs, matched against a "blue team" that consisted of McGeorge Bundy, then President Johnson's national security adviser; his brother, William, from the State Department, and Generals Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force chief of staff.

They plan Hanoi roles

It was Green's team, playing the roles of Hanoi's leaders, which suggested putting civilians on the airfield runways.

Separately, the Sullivan task force and the Sigma players reached similar conclusions in the spring of 1964; North Vietnam would be able to withstand aerial punishment and expand its aid to guerrillas in the south. Bombing the north would improve the morale of the people there, not break their will, and the United States would inherit the image in the world of "bully."

While documenting a case against strategic bombing, the Sullivan committee recommended Rolling Thunder on other grounds. Its report said: "We must prove to the world U.S.

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DAILY WORLD
24 JUN 1971

Standard Oil and the War

"A boycott of Standard Oil can be effective. Most families own cars and a decided majority are against the war. Standard Oil brands are well-known — there are alternatives available, equal in price and quality."

By Victor Perlo

There is a way now to hurt Vietnam warmakers in the only sensitive part of their anatomy—the pocketbook. That is a mass boycott of Standard Oil, an action just recommended by the World Peace Council for global application. The boycott is already being actively promoted in Chicago and California and, as a national campaign with the concentrated backing of the peace movement, it can greatly strengthen the pressure to force withdrawal of the United States from Indochina.

Three of the "Seven Sisters" of the International Petroleum Cartel are Standard Oil companies—Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), known as "Jersey," Standard Oil Company of California, and Mobil Oil Corporation (N.Y.), Two other Standard Oil companies, Marathon Oil (Ohio), and Standard Oil Company (Indiana), are increasingly active in foreign investments.

Three companies divide up the oil business of South Vietnam—Jersey, Shell and Caltex. Caltex is a joint company of Standard of California and Texaco. Formerly Jersey shared its Vietnamese business with Mobil—in a joint company, Standard Vacuum—but bought out the share of its across-the-river sister company in 1962.

Standard Oil has been in Vietnam since the turn of the century. When the U.S. took over South Vietnam from French colonialists in the 1950s, Standard Vacuum became the largest U.S. business in the country. Its general manager, George Case, told a Congressional Committee:

"My own company . . . has very satisfactory relations with the Vietnamese (Diem) Government. We have access to any official that we want to see. . . Our relations with the American Government officials in the country are also good, and we can get a fair, honest hearing at any time with either government."

Civilian oil imported into South Vietnam is financed by U.S. "foreign aid" funds; military oil, by the U.S. Defense Department—all is paid for by U.S. taxpayers. Jersey, Mobil, and Standard of California are the three largest suppliers of oil to the Pentagon. Their total sales in fiscal 1969 and fiscal 1970 came to $1¼ billion.

Much energy was devoted by U.S. peace forces to the boycott of napalm-maker Dow Chemical. But the main ingredient is not Dow's thickener, but Standard Oil's gasoline. Moreover, Jersey played a leading role in the development of the napalm weapon.

In 1965 the Vietnam cartel group planned to set up a refinery near Saigon, to be run by Jersey. But National Liberation Front victories have indefinitely delayed this action. However, Standard Oil companies are among those straining to participate in the offshore oil which the Thieu Government says it will lease. An American oilman, representing 'one of the world's most powerful" companies—obviously Standard Oil—threatened to "reduce or block all economic aid to South Vietnam" if the puppet government gave French interests a prominent share in the offshore oil. The Thieu Government complied (NY Times, 6/11).

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There is great danger that U.S. oil companies, if once established offshore, will use the U.S. fleet to protect their position from a liberated South Vietnam.

Thailand, deeply involved in the Indochina War, is another happy hunting ground for Standard Oil companies. Jersey has an asphalt plant which it plans to expand into a full-fledged refinery. Standard of Indiana and Marathon have large concessions off Thailand, and Jersey a monster concession off the Malaysia-Thai border area.

The largest offshore oil production in the world today is off Louisiana. But a major oil company official made this comparison: "Yet the Louisiana area is minute compared with Southeast Asia — about like a postage stamp on an elephant's rear end." (Ocean Industry, December 1969). Standard Oil is playing for stakes of tens of billions in Southeast Asia, at the expense of millions of lives.

The Standard Oil companies, of course, are part of the Rockefeller-Chase Manhattan Bank-Standard Oil financial-industrial empire. With U.S. aggression at its height, Chase Manhattan opened the first U.S. branch bank in Saigon. Set up to serve the U.S. shadow government and the military, it was a fortress bank, windowless, with shooting holes for machine guns.

The Rockefeller-Standard Oil group has been foremost in pushing the aggressive expansionist U.S. foreign policy in general, and in Vietnam in particular. Leo D. Welch, then Treasurer of Jersey, said that the U.S. must seize "political, social and economic" leadership in world affairs: "We (are) the majority stockholder in this corporation known as the world. Nor is this for a given term of office. This is a permanent obligation" (Speech to National Foreign Trade Council, Nov. 1946).

Nelson Rockefeller, the family's chief political spokesman, has been an influential "hawk" throughout. He gave public support to the most aggressive actions of Democratic and Republican administrations in Vietnam. Rockefeller men devised and have led the attempted ex-

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
24 JUN 1971

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U.S. Rejected First Viet-Pullout Advice

Key Rusk Aide Spurned by Top Kennedy Council

BY STUART H. LOORY
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—Advised for the first time that the United States faced a can't-win situation in the Vietnam war, President John F. Kennedy's National Security Council in August, 1963, rejected the recommendation of a State Department expert on Vietnam to pull out honorably, the Pentagon's top-secret history of the war shows.

Instead, Secretary of State Dean Rusk put down such talk from one of his subordinates as "speculative," saying:

"It would be far better for us to start on the firm basis of two things —that we will not pull out of Vietnam until the war is won, and that we will not run a coup."

Overruled Expert Named

The expert overruled by Rusk was Paul M. Kattenburg, then head of the State Department's Vietnam Working Group, who had dealt with President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam for 10 years. Then-Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, among other important officials, backed Rusk's view, the account says.

The report on the session, held at the State Department and chaired by Rusk in President Kennedy's absence, is contained in a memorandum written by Marine Maj. Gen. Victor C. Krulak, then the Pentagon's top expert on counterinsurgency.

Krulak's memorandum is included in previously unpublished sections of the report that The Times has obtained. The sections are from the same Pentagon study that were the subject of previous stories in the New York Times, Washington Post and Boston Globe. It was prepared by a team of Pentagon analysts under a directive from McNamara in 1968. The analysts had access to documents only on file in the Defense Department. The analysts did not have access to the complete files at the White House or State Department.

The meeting Krulak describes was called as a "where-do-we-go-from-here" session after a group of Saigon generals failed to bring off a coup against the increasingly unpopular regime headed by Diem.

The meeting was a key session in the period from May to November, 1963, during which non-Communist opposition to the Diem regime grew rapidly and eventually boiled over into the overthrow of Diem and the assassination of him and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu on Nov. 2.

During the National Security Council session, Kattenburg advanced the suggestion that, in Krulak's words, "At this juncture it would be better for us to make the decision to get out honorably."

The complete text of Krulak's report on Kattenburg's presentation said:

"Mr. Kattenburg stated that as recently as last Thursday it was the belief of Ambassador (Henry Cabot) Lodge (Jr.) that, if we undertake to live with this repressive regime, with its bayonets at every street corner and its transparent negotiations with puppet bonzes (Buddhist monks) we are going to be thrown out of the country in six months.

Would Not Separate

"He stated that at this juncture it would be better for us to make the decision to get out honorably. He went on to say that having been acquainted with Diem for 10 years, he was deeply disappointed in him, saying that he will not separate from his brother. It was Kattenburg's view that Diem will get little support from the military and, as time goes on, he will get less and less support and the country will go steadily downhill.

"Gen. (Maxwell D.) Taylor (then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) asked what Kattenburg meant when he said that we would be forced out of Vietnam within six months. Kattenburg replied that in from six months to a year, as people see we are losing the war, they will gradually go to the other side and we will be obliged to leave.

Rusk dismissed the view and McNamara agreed. Rusk then went on to say there was "good proof," in Krulak's term, that the war was being won. Lyndon Johnson agreed, saying that "from both a practical and a political viewpoint, it would be a disaster to pull out; that we should stop playing cops and robbers and get back to talking straight to the GVN (Saigon government) and that we should once again go about winning the war."

Sharply Critical

The Pentagon report on the meeting was sharply critical of the deliberations. It spoke of the officials' "rambling inability to focus the problem, indeed to reach common agreement on the nature of the problem."

The report continues:

"More importantly, however, the meeting is the first recorded occasion

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WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
24 JUN 1971

Bruce Biossat

The 'right to know'

NOT surprisingly, prize-winning historian James MacGregor Burns sees the New York Times' publication of major Vietnam war documents as providing important benefits for the American people and their chroniclers. But he also has some big reservations about the effect of this particular undertaking.

Said Mr. Burns in a telephone interview:

"I'd rather have partial disclosure than none at all."

He considers it an unforgivable failure of government that the major materials of history are, by common practice, generally kept bottled up for a generation or more.

The State Department is only now releasing the full documentaion of events which transpired in 1945-46. Mountains of priceless evidence contained in presidential papers from Harry Truman and thru Lyndon Johnson are still screened from all but very special viewing.

Mr. Burns thinks the State Department's 25-year embargo on release is absurdly long. There have been suggestions thte limit ought to be no more than 10 years, just a bit beyond a sitting president's possible two terms. But Sen. Edmund Muskie is proposing that an independent board survey classified matter and turn much of it loose after two years.

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HAVING made his point on the "historian's right to know," Mr. Burns contends, however, that The Times' use of the so-called Pentagon papers has an effect which is "terribly distorting and may do great injustice to some people."

For one thing, the 7,000-page war study is based wholly on the Pentagon's files. It does not draw upon former President Johnson's papers, nor upon the still impounded State Department materials. Any of these found in the study are there by the accident of being in Pentagon files. That means the study's "inside history" of the Vietnam war is necessarily grossly incomplete.

For instance, it is estimated that in LBJ's newly christened library in Austin, there are some 3.1 million separate classified documents. Inevitably, a sizable proportion must deal with the war. No historian and no journalist yet have had access to this gold mine.

Mr. Burns views as valid the complaint of some that a good part of the published documentation in the Pentagon papers represents not presidential decision, not settled policy, but contingency planning.

He makes another point heard in many quarters — that many memos, position papers and the like can only be understood in their full context. In the study, no principal in the Johnson administration could be interviewed. Was a paper ordered by a superior to present one side of a case? Was twhe writer giving his true views or playing devil's advocate?

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ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., once said of his White House years that much present top-level history runs thru telephone wires but no farther. Later recollections, put down in "oral histories," are often fuzzy.

The consequence of these limitations is distortion. Averell Harriman, foreign affairs aide to many presidents, says, for example, that the Pentagon study makes former Assistant Defense Secretary John McNaughton look like a "warlike fellow," but that in fact he was always dovish. Do the documents support Mr. Johnson's judgment that the then Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and then CIA head John McCone were the "most docile" of his advisers?

Professor Burns, immensely happy at having some of the raw stuff of the war years on the open record, nevertheless is appalled at the reaction of some public figures which puts a "web of duplicity" label on that record.

"I don't envy anyone trying to put these papers in sober perspective," says Mr. Burns. "On top of everything, I'm afraid the over-reaction to publication means Vietnam will be lost to reason from any point of view."

Study Details Diem's Loss Of U.S. Faith

The following story was originated and distributed from the Los Angeles Times.

By Stuart H. Loory

Advised for the first time that the United States faced a can't-win situation in the Vietnam war, President Kennedy's National Security Council in August, 1963, rejected the recommendation of a State Department expert on Vietnam to pull out honorably, the Pentagon's top secret history of the war shows.

Instead, Secretary of State Dean Rusk put down such talk from one of his subordinates as "speculative," saying:

"It would be far better for us, to start on the firm basis of two things—that we will not pull out of Vietnam until the war is won, and that we will not run a coup."

The expert overruled by Rusk was Paul H. Kattenburg, then head of the State Department's Vietnam working group, who had dealt with South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem for 10 years. Then-Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, among other important officials, backed Rusk's view, the account says.

The report on the session, held at the State Department and chaired by Rusk in President Kennedy's absence, is contained in a memorandum.

The memorandum was written by Marine Maj. Gen. Victor C. Krulak, then the Pentagon's top expert on counter-insurgency.

Krulak's memorandum is included in previously unpublished sections of the report which The Los Angeles Times has obtained. The sections are from the same Pentagon study that were the subject of previous stories in The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Boston Globe. It was prepared by a team of Pentagon analysts under a directive from McNamara in 1968. The analysts had access to documents only on [illegible] Defense Department. The analysts did not have access to the complete files at the White House or State Department.

The meeting Krulak describes was called as a "where-do-we-go-from-here" session after a group of Saigon generals had failed to bring off a coup against the increasingly unpopular regime headed by Diem.

The meeting was a key session in the period from May to November, 1963, during which non-Communist opposition to the Diem regime grew rapidly and eventually boiled over into the overthrow of Diem and the assassination of him and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu on Nov. 2.

This account focuses on this period, during which the Kennedy administration vacillated between opposing a coup, supporting it and then settled on an attitude of not thwarting it if one had promise of being successful.

During the course of the National Security Council session, Kattenburg advanced the suggestion that, in Krulak's words, "at this juncture it would be better for us to make the decision to get out honorably."

The complete text of Krulak's report on Kattenburg's presentation said:

"8. Mr. Kattenburg stated that as recently as last Thursday it was the belief of Ambassador (Henry Cabot) Lodge (Jr.) that, if we undertake to live with this repressive regime, with its bayonets at every street corner and its transparent negotiations with puppet bonzes, we are going to be thrown out of the country in six months.

"He stated that at this juncture it would be better for us to make the decision to get out honorably. He went on to say that, having been acquainted with Diem for 10 years, he was deeply disappointed in him, saying that he will not separate from his brother. It was Kattenburg's view that Diem will get little support from the military and, as time goes on, he will get less and less support and the country will go steadily down hill.

"9. Gen. (Maxwell D.) Taylor (then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff) asked what Kattenburg meant when he said that we would be forced out of Vietnam within six months. Kattenburg replied [illegible] as people see we are losing the war, they will gradually go to the other side and we will be obliged to leave.

"Ambassador (Frederick) Nolting (who had just left his post in Saigon to be replaced by Lodge) expressed general disagreement with Mr. Kattenburg. He said that the unfavorable activity which motivated Kattenburg's remarks was confined to the city and, while city support of Diem is doubtless low now, it is not greatly so. He said that it is improper to overlook the fact that we have done a tremendous job toward winning the Vietnam war, working with the same imperfect, annoying government."

Rusk dismissed the view and McNamara agreed. Rusk then went on to say there was "good proof," in Krulak's term, that the war was being won. Vice President Johnson agreed, saying that from both a practical and a political viewpoint, it would be a disaster to pull out; that we should stop playing cops and robbers and get back to talking straight to the GVN (Saigon government) and that we should once again go about winning the war."

The Pentagon report on the meeting was sharply critical of the deliberations. It spoke of the officials' "rambling inability to focus the problem, indeed to reach common agreement on the nature of the problem."

The report continues:

"More importantly, however, the meeting is the first recorded occasion in which someone followed to its logical conclusion the negative analysis of the situation — i.e., that the war could not be won with the Diem regime, yet its removal would leave such political instability as to foreclose success in the war; for the first time it was recognized that the U.S. should be considering methods of honorably disengaging itself from an irretrievable situation.

"The other alternative, not fully appreciated until the year following, was a much greater U.S. involvement in and assumption of responsibility for the war. At this point, however, the negative analysis of the impact of the political situation on war effort was not shared by McNamara, Taylor, Krulak, nor seemingly by Rusk."

The documents accompanying the account of the pre-coup period show that Kattenburg's gloomy assessment of the situation dovetailed with the views expressed by South Vietnamese Gen. Duong Van Minh, known as Big Minh, in secret contacts with Lodge.

The disclosure of Minh's role in privately advising the American ambassador on conditions in South Vietnam during the Diem era has special relevance today. Minh is expected to be the leading opponent to President Nguyen Van Thieu in this October's election.

Outwardly that spring, the study says, the regime "seemed to exhibit no more signs of advanced decay or imminent demise than might have been discerned since 1958 or 1959," when Diem was at the peak of his popularity.

But Nhu, the head of the secret police and the important strategic hamlet program, was growing more and more dominant over his brother the president, the report notes.

Nhu's wife, the report notes, was developing a private obsession of her own.

Isolation Noted

The regime was growing more isolated from the people. The report says "the regime, in fact, had no real base of political support and relied on the loyalty of a handful of key military commanders to keep it in power by forestalling any overthrow. The loyalty of these men was bought with promotions and favors. Graft and corruption should also have drawn concern, even if governmental dishonesty was endemic in Asia, and probably not disproportionate at that time in South Vietnam."

These facts were not comprehended by U.S. officials at the time. Instead, the line was typically expressed in a briefing for McNamara at a strategy conference in Honolulu in May. The paper read:

"The overall situation in Vietnam is improving. And in the military sector of the counterinsurgency, we are winning. Evidences of improvement are clearly visible, as the combined impact of the programs which involve a long lead time begin to have effect on the Vietcong."

Continued

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
23 JUN 1971

Pentagon papers portray stern U.S. face

Second in a series on the substance of the Pentagon documents on the origin and the escalation of the Vietnam war.

By Courtney R. Sheldon
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
Washington

The disclosures of covert United States actions, directed both at friendly Saigon and hostile Hanoi, show a stern Washington face the public seldom sees distinctly.

Throughout the Vietnam war era, presidents have approved a string of secret military and diplomatic subversions. They were, those in command at the time insist, necessities of the times.

Not knowing of these clandestine operations until long after the event, the public and Congress are seldom in a position to challenge them on moral or political grounds.

The Pentagon papers, now being filtered out through the New York Times, Washington Post, the Boston Globe, and Rep. Paul N. McCloskey Jr. (R) of California, give an unparalleled glimpse of life behind Washington curtains.

Without the current disclosures, misleading and incomplete as they may be in some instances, most of the stories would have had to await normal release times, usually some 20 years hence.

Scolded by Taylor

Here are some of the clandestine or subsurface operations the Pentagon papers and their interpreters confirm or allege that the United States sponsored or engaged in in the Vietnam war period:

o While U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was counseling South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, U.S. authorities were plotting the Nov. 1, 1963, coup which busted him (per Mr. McCloskey, who adds, "We were in it up to our eyeballs").

o Later, when more coups got in the way of successful prosecution of the war, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor called young South Vietnamese military men to the embassy and "read them the riot act."

"Do all of you understand English?" the Ambassador impatiently asked the Vietnamese officers (according to a cable included in the Pentagon papers). "I told you clearly at General Westmoreland's dinner we Americans were tired of coups. Apparently I wasted my words. . . . Now you have made a real [illegible] carry you forever if you do things like this."

o As early as May 11, 1961, when the American public knew only that the U.S. had advisers in Vietnam, President Kennedy was dispatching underground agents to sabotage and harass the Communists in North Vietnam.

o President Johnson sanctioned similar attacks in the months which preceded the North Vietnamese attack on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Justification for attacks

It is not known whether the North Vietnamese thought at the time the destroyers were part of or supporting the pattern of attacks being made against them.

But it is a fact of history that the Johnson administration used the attacks on the destroyers to sell Congress the Tonkin Gulf resolution which was later to be cited as legal justification for the war.

In retrospect, it appears that the American public knew far less about the actions of their government than did the enemy in Hanoi.

The North Vietnamese Foreign Office issued a white book on the war in July, 1965. It discussed position papers of various U.S. officials which, in light of the Pentagon papers, sound eerily as if Hanoi had a pipeline into official Washington.

William L. Ryan, foreign affairs expert of the Associated Press, analyzed the white book and concluded, "There is evidence the North Vietnamese and their Viet Cong allies in the South knew a good deal about U.S. plans, operations, prospects, and weaknesses."

U.S. involvement in the political affairs of the South Vietnam Government have been apparent all along even to the unsophisticated eye. Hanoi calls South Vietnamese leaders puppets. Washington publicly says it is giving advice and assistance, but not interfering in internal politics.

In one of the New York Times summaries of the Pentagon papers, it reports that "during another heated meeting on July [1964], General Khanh asked Ambassador Taylor whether to resign [from the premiership]. The Ambassador asked him not to do so. . . ."

In early 1965, one of the Pentagon papers reported McGeorge Bundy, special assistant for national security affairs, as not agreeing with Ambassador Taylor that General Khanh "must somehow be removed from the . . scene."

Three weeks later, the Pentagon papers reported that some young Turks in the South Vietnamese Army were determined to get rid of General Khanh.

The authors of the Pentagon report said General Khanh "made frantic but unsuccessful efforts to rally his supporters" and finally submitted his resignation, claiming that a "foreign hand" was behind the coup.

Thus it is not surprising the difficulties the U.S. has today in convincing the Hanoi government that it is keeping hands off in the October presidential elections in Saigon.

The Central Intelligence Agency seems to come off quite well in the papers that have thus far been published. Its forebodings have proved too accurate.

However, it is hard to forget that only on April 15 of this year the present director of central intelligence, Richard Helms, was saying in a public speech:

"We [the CIA] cannot and must not take sides. When there is debate over alternative policy options in the National Security Council . . . I do not and must not line up with either side."

'Must hit harder'

Yet here is an excerpt from a 1965 memorandum from John A. McCone, director of CIA, to other officials:

". . . It is my judgment that if we are to change the mission of the ground forces we must also change the ground rules of the strikes against North Vietnam. We must hit them harder, more frequently, and inflict greater damage. Instead of avoiding the MIGs, we must go in and take them out. A bridge here and there will not do the job. We must strike their airfields, their petroleum resources, power stations, and their military compounds.

"This, in my opinion, must be done promptly and with minimum restraint. If we are unwilling to take this kind of decision now, we must not take the actions concerning the missions of our ground forces. . . ."

Another official whose advice was not heeded was Undersecretary of State George Ball. Tucked away in one of his memos was a confirmation of how U.S. governments act without the public's knowledge.

Speaking of how best to get a U.S. peace proposal to the Hanoi government, Mr. Ball said:

"The contact on our side should be handled through a nongovernmental cutout (possibly a reliable newspaperman who can be repudiated)."

THE BOSTON GLOBE
MAY 31 1971

At Honolulu parley

CIA played down US domino theory

By Darius S. Jhabvala
Globe Staff

A key Johnson Administration military adviser had proposed in in 1964 that tactical nuclear weapons would have to be deployed if Communist Chinese forces entered the ground war in Vietnam. Admiral Harry D. Felt, then the commander in chief of the Pacific forces, emphatically demanded also that commanders be given the freedom to use such weapons "as had been assumed under various plans."

This question, among others, was discussed among his top advisers at the Honolulu conference, June 1-2, 1964.

Following the meeting, President Johnson asked his advisers the basic question: "Would the rest of Southeast Asia necessarily fall if Laos and South Vietnam came under North Vietnamese control?"

On June 9, the Board of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency, provided a response, stating:

"With the possible exception of Cambodia, it is likely that no nation in the area would quickly succumb to Communism as a result of the fall of Laos and South Vietnam. Furthermore, a continuation of the spread of Communism in the area would not be inexorable and any spread which did occur would take time — time in which the total situation might change in any number of ways unfavorable to the Communist cause."

These and other details are part of the on Vietnam study that was made for Defense Department.

The State Department approached the Honolulu conference "with a basic assumption," namely "our point of departure is and must be that we cannot accept the overrunning of southeast Asia by Hanoi and Peking."

Beyond this, the discussions "were intended to help clarify issues with respect to exerting pressures against North Vietnam." The joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that "the US should seek through military actions to accomplish destruction of the North Vietnamese will and capabilities as necessary to compel the Democratic Government of Vietnam to cease providing support to the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos."

LIMITED ACTION

However, the JCS went on to note that "some current thinking appears to dismiss the objective in favor of a lesser objective, one visualizing limited military action which, hopefully, would cause the North Vietnamese to decide to terminate their subversive support."

During discussions of the extent of new military action, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge "argued in favor of attacks on north." He is reported to have stated "his conviction that most support for the Viet Cong would fade as soon as some 'counter-terrorism measures' were begun against DRV."

Discussions then turned to the desirability of obtaining a congressional resolution prior to wider US action. Lodge felt that it would not be necessary, since the US response would be on a "tit-for-tat" basis. But Defense Secretary McNamara, Rusk and CIA Director John McCone all argued in favor of the resolution.

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, then raised "the final possibility" of Chinese involvement. Were that to occur, the allies would require "seven ground divisions."

"Secretary McNamara then went on to say that the possibility of major ground action also led to a serious question of having to use nuclear weapons at some point," the reports points out. "Admiral Felt responded emphatically that there was no possible way to hold off the Communists on the ground without the use of tactical nuclear weapons and that it was essential that the commanders be given freedom to use these as had been assumed under various plans," it added.

Gen. Taylor was "more doubtful as to the existence or at least to the degree of the nuclear weapon requirement."

"The point, the report concluded, "was not really followed up."

BINGHAMTON
SUN-BULLETIN

M - 28,638
JUN 18 1971

The secret papers (1)

The documents relating to the secret Pentagon study of the Vietnam war, which appeared in the New York Times last week until a court order stopped further publication (at least temporarily), have raised many grave problems. Not the least of these is the problem that a federal judge has been wrestling with, which is where the line should be drawn on official secrets.

But these official secrets are out now, or at least many of them are, and we must examine them carefully. They reveal many facts which could only be guessed at before, and throw new light on the whole Vietnam adventure.

☆ ☆ ☆

One thing they reveal is that the quality of American representation in Vietnam was not exactly glittering. For a time the U.S. ambassador in Saigon was Henry Cabot Lodge, who has long enjoyed a reputation that far exceeds his talents—presumably because he used to look so handsome on television when he was at the United Nations.

Secretary McNamara came away from a visit to Saigon in December, 1963, with a less than flattering estimate of Ambassador Lodge. On Dec. 21, 1963, Mr. McNamara reported on his trip to President Johnson, and referred to the "country team" — the top American officials in Saigon, including the ambassador, the military commander (General Paul D. Harkins), the CIA chief, and others. He told the President:

> "The Country Team is the second major weakness. It lacks leadership, has been poorly informed, and is not working to a common plan. A recent example of confusion has been conflicting USOM and military recommendations both to the government of Vietnam and to Washington on the size of the military budget. Above all, Lodge has virtually no official contact with Harkins. Lodge sends in reports with major military implications without showing them to Harkins, and does not show Harkins important incoming traffic. My impression is that Lodge simply does not know how to conduct a coordinated administration. This has of course been stressed to him both by Dean Rusk and myself (and also by John McCone), and I do not think he is consciously rejecting our advice; he has just operated as a loner all his life and cannot readily change now."

Obviously an ambassador who will not bother to communicate with the commanding general, and who cannot get the military and the USOM (economic) planners together on recommendations to Washington, is hardly the man to rely on for sound advice on the country to which he is assigned. Yet this was the caliber of our mission in Saigon during those crucial days.

☆ ☆ ☆

Another eye-opener is the fact that men like Secretary McNamara did have a pretty good idea of how bad things were in Vietnam, despite the propaganda they mouthed for publication. If they had acknowledged publicly what they knew privately, there would have been no credibility gap; but perhaps there would have been no Vietnam War, either. In his same report to President Johnson, Mr. McNamara said:

> "Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup, with my best guess being that the situation has in fact been deteriorating in the countryside since July to a far greater extent than we realized because of our undue dependence on distorted Vietnemese reporting. The Viet Cong now control very high proportions of the people in certain key provinces, particularly those directly south and west of Saigon.. The Strategic Hamlet Program was seriously over-extended in those provinces, and the Viet Cong has been able to destroy many hamlets, while others have been abandoned or in some cases betrayed or pillaged by the government's own Self-Defense Corps. In these key provinces the Viet Cong has destroyed almost all major roads, and are collecting taxes at will."

When Secretary McNamara mentioned "distorted Vietnamese reporting," he was referring to official government intelligence reports. He could not have been referring to the American newsmen in Vietnam, for they were at that very time being vilified as traitors because they dared to report publicly the very facts Secretary McNamara was giving President Johnson privately.

Even more tragic was the fact that it did not occur to Mr. McNamara, or to anyone else in the Johnson Administration, that if the Viet Cong were so successful in South Vietnam, the reason might be that the people preferred them over the cockerels, crooks and buccaneers who composed the so-called government of South Vietnam.

WASHINGTON STAR

16 JUN 1971

CARL T. ROWAN

Top Aides to Johnson Misled on War, 'Used'

President Lyndon B. Johnson and a handful of intimates were misusing the National Security Council as an approval "cover" for clandestine war operations that were never discussed in Security Council meetings.

Johnson asked top aides to approve retaliatory bombing raids on North Vietnam even while keeping it secret from those aides that the United States was provoking the Communists into the acts against which we were retaliating.

This critical point has not yet been made clear in the New York Times' articles that have made it appallingly obvious that the Johnson administration misled the public and duped the Congress into giving early support to U.S. military intervention in Vietnam.

On Feb. 7, 1965, a Security Council meeting was called after 8 American servicemen were killed and 62 wounded in a Viet Cong raid on Pleiku. The Security Council was asked to approve "retaliatory" raids on North Vietnamese targets despite the added risks flowing out of the fact that Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin was in Hanoi.

The Council did "approve" such raids, which were the beginning of round-the-clock bombings of North Vietnam, although months of U.S.-inspired commando raids, mercenary bombings, sabotage and other assaults against North Vietnam under "Plan 34A" had not been revealed to:

1. Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, a statutory member of the National Security Council.

2. Edward A. McDermott, director of the Office of Emergency Planning and also a statutory member of the council, or to his successor.

3. This reporter, who was then director of the U.S. Information Agency, and who sat on the Security Council at the invitation of the President.

There were others present who were asked by the President to say yea or nay on the bombing raids (the council is advisory only, the President alone making decisions), but who were being asked to endorse grave actions without being given all the facts.

Only intuition, suspicion and a piecing together of vague references in certain "top secret" and "no distribution" telegrams enabled some who sat on the council to know that there was a "plan 34A."

"When I read '34A' I thought they were talking about a hotel room," Humphrey told me. "I swear I'd never heard of it until I read it in the Times. Those papers revealed by the Times were as secret to me as they were to the general public."

Certain highly classified data is made known to government officials only on a "need to know" basis, and very clearly President Johnson or his top advisers decided that the vice president and others in the Security Council meetings did not have a "need to know."

The Times revelations have made it clear to people holding topmost jobs in the Johnson administration that they were being used as a "cover" for clandestine operations planned and ordered by the President and a handful of intimate advisers.

Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, CIA Director John McCone, presidential adviser McGeorge Bundy and Gen. Maxwell Taylor, sometime-presidential-adviser and sometime-ambassador-to-Saigon, were the key men calling the signals that Johnson asked the Security Council to endorse.

The Tonkin Gulf episode, five months before the Pleiku raid, was a similar case of misuse of the National Security Council. Some members of the council knew of the U.S. Desoto patrol, but were left to believe that it was just an innocent surveillance operation that was attacked wantonly by the North Vietnamese.

The full Security Council never was told that the allies had carried out two destructive 34A raids against North Vietnam only hours before North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy. Nor was the Congress told this before it voted, 88 to 2 in the Senate and 416 to 0 in the House, for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that broadened the President's war-making powers.

These are facts that the public, the courts, the Justice Department, the White House and everyone else ought to ponder before they get too busy harassing and hounding the New York Times, trying to halt the flow of information that the people should have had years ago.

The Times has revealed things that certainly are embarrassing to the United States internationally, and damning of some individuals domestically. But Defense Secretary Melvin Laird must face the fact that embarrassment is not the same as "damaging to national security."

This tragic episode tells us that political leaders who try to dupe the public and the Congress get burned—and that the truth comes out anyhow.

It also tells us that a passion for secrecy, which Johnson had, is dangerous in a democracy. When a President limits great decisions on war and peace to a small clique of advisers, callously using others as a cover, he is more likely to lead the country into trouble.

Instead of trying to curb the Times' freedom to continue what has been a monumental public service, the Nixon administration would better devote its time to figuring out how it can avoid the errors that brought tragedy to Lyndon Johnson.

CHICAGO, ILL.
TRIBUNE

M - 775,416
S - 1,045,176

JUN 17 1971

Mansfield Vows Full War Report Probe

[Chicago Tribune Press Service]

WASHINGTON, June 16 — Sen. Mike Mansfield [D., Mont.] vowed today to make public thru Senate hearings the content of the secret papers on the Viet Nam war if the Justice Department blocks further publication.

Mansfield told a press conference the public has a right to know what is in the 47volume secret report on how America got into the war which was being summarized by the New York Times until halted by Court action yesterday.

"The purpose will be to lay the facts out for the people," Mansfield, majority leader, said.

Calls for Probe

Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey [D., Minn.], whose ambitions to seek the Democratic nomination for the presidency again may have been sabotaged by the publication, called for a joint Senate-House investigation.

The papers disclosed Johnson-Humphrey administration clandestine maneuvering to get combat troops into Viet Nam unknown to Congress. Some Democrats in Congress have suggested that former President Johnson be called to testify.

Mansfield said that Johnson and his advisers Walter Rostow and McGeorge Bundy "may have legitimate reasons for what they have done," as exposed by the secret papers.

"They have a right to be heard if they want to explain their position," Mansfield said.

Jackson Is Pushing

Mansfield said Sen. Henry Jackson [D., Wash.] wants the Senate Armed Services Committee, of which Jackson is the third ranking Democrat, to conduct its own investigation.

Mansfield said he and Sen George Aiken [R., Vt.], ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, discussed a possible investigation by that committee. It is a committee dominated by Viet Nam doves which has been relentless in its efforts to put much of the blame for the Viet Nam war on Johnson.

Mansfield said that if neither the Armed Services nor Foreign Relations Committee decides to make the investigation, then he will have his own foreign relations subcommittee on the Far East conduct public hearings.

Committee on Security

Humphrey proposed the establishment of a joint committee on national security to make the investigation.

Humphrey, at a breakfast session with a group of Minnesota reporters, said he had been "shocked and surprised" by the Times stories.

"I was as shocked and surprised as you were and I thought I knew what was going on," Humphrey said. "I just didn't believe it."

Humphrey said he has been told by some "who had a lot to do" with preparation of the report for former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, that "this isn't nearly all the papers." He said many papers covering administration decisions on the war had not been included in the volumes obtained by the Times.

Memos Not Definite

"These memos were not definitive," Humphrey said. "Many were advisory and there are advisory papers laying all over government."

He said the "great loss" from their publication by the Times results from "the loss of confidence in the government." He said it just "aids and abets the general conclusion and suspicion of government."

Humphrey said the "big decisions" on America's involvement in Viet Nam were made by Johnson at Tuesday luncheons with the secretaries of defense and state, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency and a member of the joint chiefs of staff.

Clifford Copy in Safe

Meanwhile, Clark M. Clifford, the second defense secretary in the Johnson administration, said today that he had received a copy of the Pentagon study on the Viet Nam war after he had left office but that he had never looked at it.

The study has been kept locked up in his law offices since it was delivered there in the summer of 1969, some months after he left the Pentagon, he said.

Ronald Ziegler, White House press secretary, was asked at his morning briefing about a charge by Pierre Salinger, press secretary to President Kennedy, that the Nixon administration might have leaked the documents to the Times. Humphrey had said their publication could help President Nixon in some degree by reinforcing his posture as the peace candidate.

Denies Salinger Knows

"I don't know who leaked the classified information, but I assure you, Mr. Salinger doesn't," Ziegler told the reporters.

Ziegler said the Nixon administration would not move to take the secret label off the Viet Nam report before a final court decision is made on the Justice Department request that further publication be banned. A decision on a permanent injunction will be sought Friday.

"The President feels the American people have the right to know a good deal," Ziegler said. But the materials being summarized in the Times contain "highly classified" information outweighing the right of the people to know their full contents right now.

PROVIDENCE, R.I.
JOURNAL

M - 66,673
S - 209,501

JUN 17 1971

Accurate Warning

In trying to assess the McNamara Report hastily —aside from suffering a bad case of intellectual excess—one is impressed not the least by the generally high quality of the advice given by the intelligence community.

The voluminous report—just the part that has been published in newspapers—provides a fascinating, and sometimes shocking, insight into the process by which the United States became enmeshed in the jungle of an unwinnable Indochina war. But of all the branches of the government that had a share in the decisions on Vietnam, the intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA, come out looking the best.

The intelligence people warned—and accurately —that neither the South Vietnamese government nor the American forces could overcome the appeal of the Viet Cong to the South Vietnamese people. They warned—and accurately—of the ineffectiveness of aerial bombing. They suggested the inconclusiveness of introducing large numbers of American ground troops into the fighting in South Vietnam. After more bomb tonnage had been dropped on North Vietnam than had been dropped in World War II and after half a million American troops had been deployed in South Vietnam, the enemy remained undefeated and victory remained as elusive as it had been for 15 years.

To be sure, the CIA cannot claim 100 per cent commendation. In mid-1965 John A. McCone, head of the CIA, warned that the use of U.S. combat troops would be ineffective unless the aerial bombing campaign, already under way, was subject to "minimum restraint." That sounds suspiciously like the later exhortation of Gen. Curtis LeMay to bomb the North Vietnamese "back to the stone age."

But in general, the estimates of the CIA and other intelligence agencies seem to have gauged accurately the mood of the Vietnamese people, the staying power of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, and the limitations of American military might when separated from the democratic ideals that had in the past motivated American intervention abroad.

If American power and ideals became separated, a large part of the reason was the failure of the highest officials in our government to inform the people or even Congress fully about both the conditions that existed in Vietnam and the real purposes for expanding the war. The McNamara Report is not a complete record of the entanglement process, but it is record enough to show the folly of presidential decisions that ignored the best intelligence and the arrogance of presidential war-making without the full participation of Congress.

Many Americans—probably a majority—failed to get aroused about Vietnam when the Johnson administration was making the fateful commitment of American combat troops because, like the officials at the top, they believed the tiny enemy could not stand for long against the overwhelming might of American troops and planes. The argument has frequently been used that these officials had little more information than the general public for the crucial decisions. But the McNamara Report indicates that they did have considerably more—and quite specific —information, much of it negative in its implications. Those who trusted the highest officials to know what they were doing were sadly mistaken. A full-dress congressional debate might have avoided the pitfall into which the country stumbled, particularly if the intelligence estimates had been more widely available.

WASHINGTON POST
3 D JUN 1971

STAT

Vietnam: The Public's Need to Know . . .

There are a number of things to be said about the McNamara Papers, now in a state of court-ordered suspension—things ceremonial and things substantive. We would begin with a tribute to Mr. McNamara for his initiative to arrange for the collection and preservation of these records documenting our Vietnam involvement, for the convenience of historians and scholars and future decision-makers. It was not exactly a selfish gesture: to the extent that the war will be judged as a calamitous mistake, and Mr. McNamara as a major contributor, he must have recognized the risk he ran of helping to indict himself. And he doubtless was not overjoyed to see it all surface so soon in The New York Times' brilliant and painstaking display —and, neither, in a certain unelevated sense, were we.

But never mind; those of us who believe that the reader, which is to say the public, always gains from the maximum possible comprehension of what the government is doing and how it all works (particularly when it works badly) can only applaud the Times' enterprise; it is hard for us to think of an argument for withholding such material once it was in hand. So we are also grateful to the Nixon administration for at least being good enough to allow this series to run for three days before deciding that the installments as yet unpublished somehow endangered national security in a way which the three installments already published apparently did not. Why the government moved on Tuesday, instead of, let us say, late Saturday night when the first edition became available, is, well, puzzling.

But there is plenty to chew on as it is and there are more than enough lessons to study and absorb. Taking nothing away from the Times, the story that unfolds is not new in its essence — the calculated misleading of the public, the purposeful manipulation of public opinion, the stunning discrepancies between public pronouncements and private plans — we had bits and pieces of all that before. But not in such incredibly damning form, not with such irrefutable documentation. That is what brings you up breathless: the plain command to the Secretaries of Defense and State and the head of CIA from McGeorge Bundy, in the President's name, to carry out decisions to expand and deepen our involvement in the war as rapidly as possible, while making every effort to project a very gradual evolution, with no change in policy; the careful concealment of clandestine intervention in Laos and North as well as South Vietnam in early 1964; the clear "consensus" of at least the main body of presidential advisers in September 1964 in favor of bombing the North even while President Johnson was publicly promising in campaign speeches *not* to "go North," not to send American boys to fight what they ought to fight for themselves.

That is what is so chilling: the contempt for public opinion; the ready recourse to the press as an instrument for misleading the public; the easy arrogance with which these men arrogated to themselves decisions which no government ought to take without the knowledge, let alone consent, of the people; the contempt for Congress as yet another inconvenience to be dealt with, when necessary, with blithe duplicity. This is Political Biz, you could say, but it doesn't make it any less sorry a performance.

And yet the deceit is only a part of it because a policy of calculated deception flows quite logically from the larger strategy of a limited war, fought for limited objectives, with limited means. And therein lies perhaps the most important lesson from the McNamara papers now available, for they tell us more explicitly than anything that has so far been said publicly how this strategy was supposed to work — and why, when it didn't work out rather quickly, it was doomed to fail.

It all began, the documents tell us, with a recognition in early 1964 that the South Vietnamese were too weak to bargain for a settlement. So the name of the game was to even up the odds, to redress the balance of force, to widen the war in the name of peace because only by widening the war could you create the conditions that would lead both sides to accept a settlement. This was the New War; you weren't going to win in the old conventional way: by a "graduated response," you were going to project the specter of an almost limitless application of American power on the ground and in the air, in hopes that the enemy, looking far ahead, would accept the hopelessness of it all, and negotiate long before you had reached the limit of the military measures you were prepared to take. That's where the deceit came in, for you couldn't really tell the American public, at least at the outset, everything you contemplated doing without stirring debate, and inflaming war fever and provoking dissent — without projecting to the enemy, in short, precisely the impression of doubtful resolve that you did not want to project. So instead we assembled huge stacks of chips and played them a few at a time in hopes that the North Vietnamese, instead of raising back, would simply call, by suing for peace.

Only it didn't work out that way because Hanoi kept raising back and in early 1968 the Johnson administration ran out of playable chips; there was the Tet offensive and the military demand for more troops and the prospect of economic controls and a run on the dollar and the antiwar movement and Lyndon Johnson had to check. The narcosis of padded progress reports could not dull the hard realities. The resilience and resourcefulness of the enemy had been terribly misread; the effectiveness of the bombing turned out to be a fraud.

continued

Don Oberdorfer

WASHINGTON POST
17 JUN 1971

Where Did It Go Wrong?

ON APRIL 1, 1965, amid national concern about the growing U.S. involvement in South Vietnam, President Lyndon B. Johnson had a press conference at the White House. One of the newsmen noted that the President was in the midst of a series of conferences with Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the U.S. ambassador to the Saigon regime, and he asked if anything dramatic was being discussed.

"I don't know exactly how to answer that 'dramatic' term," Mr. Johnson replied. "I think we will be exchanging viewpoints on how we can improve America's position and how we can be of increased help, give increased efficiency to our effort to help the South Vietnamese people. I think that we are inclined to be too dramatic about our prophesies and our predictions and I might say too irresponsible sometimes."

He added that some people were saying there were factions in the U.S. government and "a great critical decision" in the offing. Those who say such things "have a good hat but not a very solid judgment on their shoulders or on their heads," Mr. Johnson continued. "I know of no division in the American government, I know of no far-reaching strategy that is being suggested or promulgated."

THIS WEEK, more than six years later, The New York Times published the text of National Security Action Memorandum 328, one of the most important secret papers which put this country into war in 1965. According to The Times account, the memorandum said:

"On Thursday, April 1, (1965), the President made the following decisions with respect to Vietnam:

". . . The President approved the urgent exploration of the 12 suggestions for covert and other actions submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence . . . The President repeated his earlier approval of the 21-point program of military actions submitted by General Harold K. Johnson (Army Chief of Staff) . . .

"The President approved an 18-20,000 man increase in U.S. military support forces (in Vietnam) . . . The President approved the deployment of two additional Marine Battalions and one Marine Air Squadron and associated headquarters and support elements . . .

"The President approved a change of mission for all Marine Battalions deployed to Vietnam (until then, they had been solely assigned to guard duty U.S. air bases) to permit their more active use under conditions to be established and approved by consultation with the Secretary of State.

"The President approved the urgent exploration with the Korean, Australian and New Zealand governments of the possibility of rapid deployment of significant combat elements from their armed forces in parallel with the additional (U.S.) Marine deployment . . .

"We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of Rolling Thunder operations (the bombing of North Vietnam) . . . possibly moving in a few weeks to attacks on the rail lines north and northeast of Hanoi . . . Air operations in Laos . . . should be stepped up . . .

THE FINAL PARAGRAPH of NSAM 328 relayed Mr. Johnson's desire that "premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions" with respect to the assignment of new U.S. Marine units and the change in their mission.

"The actions themselves should be taken as rapidly as practicable but in ways that should minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy . . . The President's desire is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy," the paper said.

Thus it was that a democratic nation, founded on principles of limited government and of consent of the governed, slipped into the most agonizing foreign war in our history.

Men did what they thought was right, there is no doubt of that, but what seemed to be right did not turn out the way they planned.

The revelations of the past few days will not be easily or quickly comprehended, but the ultimate impact is likely to be powerful. The documents seem to validate the worst that had been thought and said about our government — yet we know that our leaders did not set out to do the worst.

Where did our leaders and our government go wrong? How do we face the truths about how it worked in 1964 and 1965 and may work today? No court of law can suppress the questions which have been raised with [illegible] down.

AKRON, OHIO
BEACON JOURNAL

E - 175,468
S - 203,112

JUN 16 1971

Pentagon Papers: An Ugly Picture Of Men, Motives

A News Analysis

By ROBERT HOYT
Beacon Journal Staff Writer

Publication of the Pentagon Papers by the New York Times — the "nuclear bomb rocking Washington" — destroys the credibility of more public figures in one stroke than probably any "inside report" in history.

These men stand naked — from President Kennedy and President Johnson to highly regarded academics and career statesmen like the Bundy brothers to cabinet secretaries Rusk and McNamara to military men like generals Westmoreland and Taylor (also an ambassador) and the admirals.

The Kennedy administration, though ultimately spared from major escalation decisions by the death of President Kennedy, transformed the policy of "limited-risk gamble" which it inherited into a "broad commitment" that left LBJ with a choice between more war and withdrawal.

Further, most of the principals in the key decisions of the Johnson administration were men he kept on after Kennedy's death.

WHAT ARE now labeled "the Pentagon Papers" will in some circles be called "McNamara's Folly" — for it was he who ordered the study, apparently deep in the personal depression growing out of his involvement in the whole Vietnam affair.

Surely no President will ever again allow the preparation of such a report by a department of government with access to secret documents.

Probably never in modern times have the facts come to light so quickly after the events — making the excruciating judgment of history even more painful because it comes within the lifetimes and the careers of the men involved.

THE DISCLOSURES of the McNamara-ordered study show that:

U. S. OFFICIALS were much more interested in the American image than about the plight of the South Vietnamese.

POLICY was based to an alarming degree on the so-called domino theory — that if South Vietnam and Laos fell to Communism, so would all Asia — despite a CIA analysis that indicated the theory was nonsense and that only Cambodia if any other country would be affected.

PRESIDENTS get a good range of advice on such critical issues as Vietnam and that leaves them relatively free to choose to do whatever their instincts would have them do.

ONCE THE PRESIDENT has decided on a course of action, all levels of government — career people included — seem ready to bend every effort to support and justify the decision.

PRESIDENTS and their advisers are willing to lie endlessly to the American public, to Congress, to the world — if they believe it is in their own short-range self-interest.

"THE PENTAGON Papers" cement many impressions:

IT WAS "Alice in Wonderland" in Saigon — as the Pentagon analyst described it — in the period when LBJ decided that he had to give all-out support to the feeble South Vietnam government, no matter what the consequences of such action were to be.

LIFE WITH LBJ in the White House during those days were like living with a collection of speed freaks. Action begat action begat action — each heating up the war and each moving to a new level of danger. And — always — the attempt to move without letting the public or Congress know what was going on.

Adding to the hectic nature of the play was the constant changing of the principals by Johnson as he named new generals, new ambassadors, new advisers.

THE SANEST man in the whole ugly drama appears to have been Undersecretary of State George Ball who said:

In the beginning: "Don't do it."

Later: "If you do, you'll be sorry."

Still later: "Stop. Never mind your losses — get out!"

THE "NEXT SANEST" was CIA Director John McCone who predicted that bombing the North would make them more determined, not force them to negotiate; then predicted that a U. S. ground war would only repeat Korea's mistake.

The CIA generally comes off with good marks — its assessments of both military and political situations seems to have been excellent.

It's noteworthy because so many peace advocates have blamed the CIA for many of the problems the U. S. has faced in recent years.

THE 47-VOLUMES of the Pentagon Papers paint a picture of the principals:

ROBERT McNAMARA — Interested only in how to do it better — no matter what "it" was: bombing, maneuvering, reporting, use of materials and men. No strong opinions about what "should" be done, judging by the documents in the study.

DEAN RUSK — a man still living in the "contain China" days, the last remnant of the philosophy of former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

THE BUNDY BROTHERS — they suggested almost every possible course of action — at one time or another. William Bundy, the one at the State Department, had talent for finding "middle ground" between the extremes of "do nothing" and "all-out war".

As events unfolded, the alternatives got closer and closer together — but he seemed always to be able to find a new "middle ground." His view often prevailed — making U. S. policy therefore appear to be an endless series of "half steps" toward all-out war.

McGEORGE BUNDY, probably LBJ's closest adviser on the war and considered the principal architect of Vietnam policy, was more concerned with protecting LBJ's image than the quality of advice he gave the President.

He toned down the "bomb now" panic reports of others, but when he went to Saigon to investigate personally for LBJ, McGeorge Bundy was seized by the "we must do something" fever that eventually afflicted everyone but Ball and McCone.

continued

BALTIMORE SUN
16 JUN 1971

JOHNSON HID INVOLVEMENT

Times Report Traces Start Of Major Combat Role

By CHARLES W. CORDDRY
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, June 15—Pentagon records published today show that President Johnson made his momentous decision to use United States ground troops for offensive action in Vietnam on April 1, 1965, but banned any immediate publicity or official concession that a drastic policy shift was involved.

Events surrounding this major departure from the "never again" attitude against ground war in Asia, which had persisted from the end of the Korean war, formed the highlights of the third in a series of New York *Times* articles.

The articles are based on "top secret" defense department studies of American involvement in Indochina from World War II to mid-1968. The government obtained a federal court order in New York today suspending further publication at least until Saturday.

Much Already Known

Much of what has been published, in news reports and textual material, documents in detail what had been generally known on the course of the war—particularly from the time just before the Tonkin Gulf episode of August, 1964, to the post-Tet offensive studies in the winter and spring of 1968 which ended the U.S. build-up in Vietnam.

But the secret documents and accompanying narrative in the Pentagon papers also dramatically expose instances when major policy shifts were concealed.

One was the decision on commitment of ground forces to offensive action, described in the *Times* as a result of the Johnson administration's discovery that the bombing of North Vietnam in early 1965 would not prevent the South's collapse.

Mr. Johnson's decision was recorded in a National Security Action Memorandum dated April 6, 1965, signed by McGeorge Bundy, and one of the huge numbers of documents the *Times* has published. Mr. Bundy was President Johnson's special assistant for national security.

The memo was addressed to Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, and John A. McCone, director of central intelligence. It reported decisions taken April 1, including expansion of the forces in Vietnam, especially including additional marine battalions, and a "change of mission" for the Marines. That change called for "more active use" under conditions to be fixed by Secretaries McNamara and Rusk.

The Pentagon study called this a "pivotal" change and a "departure from a long-held policy" with momentous implications. But the Bundy-memorandum said Mr. Johnson desired that "premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions."

The military actions were to be taken rapidly, "but in ways that should minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy." Mr. Bundy wrote that "the President's desire is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy."

The public learned officially of the shift of ground forces to a combat—rather than defensive—role almost inadvertently when the State Department referred to it vaguely on the following June 8.

By that time, however, observers recall, Mr. Johnson's course was beginning to be apparent, for all the lack of official comment. In February, Marine antiaircraft units had been deployed at Da Nang to protect the air base from which bombing originated.

In March, a battalion of Marine infantry had been sent to Vietnam, followed in May by activation of the big Marine headquarters in Da Nang and arrival of Army airborne troops. The original purpose of the March deployment had been defense of the air base.

It had become clear during this period that the fragile South Vietnamese government and its Army faced collapse and that the "Rolling Thunder" bombing campaign against the North, started in February, 1965, would not prevent it.

The Pentagon study said "the bombing effort seemed to stiffen rather than soften Hanoi's backbone," and optimism waned after a month of the air campaign.

The choice then was to withdraw, or to go to war on the ground. There were deep differences within the administration, the *Times* noted, citing views of George W. Ball, then under secretary of state, and Mr. McCone.

Mr. Ball believed neither bombing nor ground fighting would solve the problem and proposed in a memorandum June 28 that the United States "cut its losses" and get out, according to the Pentagon account.

Mr. McCone, on the other hand, had argued in April that it would be unwise to commit ground troops unless there were also willingness to bomb the North with "minimum restraint" in an effort to break Hanoi's will.

But at that time, President Johnson was accepting the counsel of Gen. William C. Westmoreland, then American commander in Vietnam, using combat troops, and was in no mood for compromise, the Pentagon account indicates.

Regarding the commitment of ground forces, the Pentagon papers say there was a "subtle change in emphasis."

"Instead of simply denying the enemy victory and convincing him he could not win," the study says, "the thrust became defeating the enemy in the South. This was sanctioned implicitly as the only way to achieve the U.S. objective of a non-Communist South Vietnam."

CHARLOTTE, N.C.
OBSERVER
JUN 16 1971
M - 174,906
S - 204,225

Pentagon Study On Vietnam Shows Paths Of Deception

The New York Times' publication of the details of a secret Pentagon study on the origins and history of United States involvement in Vietnam should clear the cobwebs from a lot of minds.

Lyndon Baines Johnson campaigned for a second presidential term in 1964 as a candidate of peace and restraint but was carrying around plans in his pocket for an escalated war.

Five months before the celebrated Gulf of Tonkin incident, the President had already approved a step-up in covert military attacks on North Vietnam, one of which led to the Tonkin contact between U. S. destroyers and North Vietnamese torpedo boats.

That contact led, in turn, to the adoption by Congress of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which was used so thoroughly by the President in stepping up the bombing of North Vietnam and expanding U. S. action on the ground in South Vietnam.

But the escalation plan had long been ready. It waited only the right moment to see the light of day. And it saw that light after a long period in which Congress and the American people had been kept in the dark about the Johnson Administration's intentions.

Furthermore, U. S. involvement in the war was apparently slowed down in that summer and fall of 1964 so Johnson could make the most of being the peace candidate. Meanwhile, Barry Goldwater was being pilloried for recklessness in his statements on the need to bomb North Vietnam.

The real difference between the two candidates on that score was that Goldwater was vulnerable. Johnson, by masking his true intentions, was not.

The steady and bloody expansion of our role in South Vietnam from 1964 to 1968 was an incredible job of stage management and behind-the-scenes maneuvering of Machiavellian proportions.

President Johnson carried out the bombing of the North in the way he had in mind during the campaign. The bombing didn't break the North's will either to resist or to continue its support of the Viet Cong in the South. Therefore, on April 1, 1965, Johnson decided to use American troops for offensive action, but with a minimum of information to Congress and the people.

The actions went against intelligence advice. The two major dissenters within the administration, George Ball of the State Department and John McCone of the Central Intelligence Agency, did not prevail.

Even the predominant reason for large-scale U.S. intervention was stage managed. For the Pentagon study shows that it was not so much the independence and self-determination of the South Vietnamese that was at stake as it was the U.S. fear of loss of face and the belief that "neutralization" or loss off South Vietnam would be disastrous to our own prestige.

It was not even the estimate of U.S. intelligence that the ceelbrated "domino theory" was valid. The CIA's assessment of the results of a Communist victory in South Vietnam and Laos was that only Cambodia would be clearly in jeopardy. But we still poured in a half-million men and took a death toll of more than 50,000.

Not that the Johnson Administration alone was to blame. The Pentagon study covers three decades of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia and shows a steady progression toward the hard war through the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson years.

But the 7,000-page report, for all its gaps due to the unavailability of private presidential papers, shows that, in the last years especially, the executive branch did not level with either the people or their elected representatives.

For that reason, if for no other, we are gratified that the classified document — the result of a project ordered by Robert S. McNamara when he was Secretary of Defense — has been brought to light.

The law says that anyone will be prosecuted who divulges classified material "prejudicial to the safety of interest of the United States." This information, in our judgment, does the opposite.

We, the people, needed to know its contents — and we needed to know them a long time ago.

FOLLOW THE LEADER?
. . . from right, Johnson, Maxwell Taylor, McNamara, Gilpatric and LeMay.

CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES

M - 541,086
S - 697,966

JUN 16 1971

3d New York Times install-ment

LBJ's secret war step-up

By Thomas B. Ross
Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON — Former Presdent Lyndon B. Johnson purposely concealed his decision to send U.S. troops into offensive operations in Vietnam, according to top secret Pentagon documents revealed Tuesday.

In the third installment of a series of disclosures on a massive Defense Department history of the war, the New York Times reported that on April 1, 1965, Mr. Johnson decided to order the marines into combat because the bombing of North Vietnam showed no sign of preventing the collapse of the Saigon government.

The President transmitted his decision, the Times revealed, in an April 6 National Security Action Memorandum which warned he desired that "premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions" so as to "minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy."

Mr. Johnson's decision was successfully obscured until June when the State Department, apparently inadvertently, declared that U.S. troops were "available for combat support."

A question and an answer

But even in announcing an increase in the troop level from 75,000 to 125,000 men the following month, Mr. Johnson denied any change in the original policy of keeping U.S. forces in a defensive role.

"Mr. President," a reporter asked during a July 28 press conference, "does the fact that you are sending additional forces to Vietnam imply any change in the existing policy of relying mainly on the South Vietnamese to carry out offensive operations and using American forces to guard installations and act as emergency backup?"

Mr. Johnson replied: "It does not imply any change in policy whatever. It does not imply change of objective."

In fact, as the Times quotes from the Pentagon history, it was well recognized within the administration that the [illegible] "momentous implications" and that the July decision was "a threshold — entrance into an Asian land war."

Prepared for 'long war'

"The conflict," the history reportedly goes on to declare, "was seen to be long, with further U.S. deployment to follow . . . Final acceptance of the desirability of inflicting defeat on the enemy rather than merely denying him victory opened the door to an indeterminate amount of additional force . . . there are manifold indications that they (Mr. Johnson and his top advisers) were prepared for a long war."

The Times report on the Pentagon history provides the following chronology of events on the fateful decision to enter a major ground war in Vietnam.

Within one month of the start of full-scale bombing attacks on North Vietnam, the Johnson administration realized that the raids "seemed to stiffen rather than soften Hanoi's backbone."

Despite public assertions of optimism, there was also intense awareness within the administration that things were rapidly deteriorating in South Vietnam.

McNamara warned

On March 24, 1965, John T. McNaughton, a native of Pekin, Ill., and assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, warned Defense Sec. Robert S. McNamara that "there is consensus that efforts inside SVN (South Vietnam) will probably fail to prevent collapse."

"The situation is general," McNaughton's memo declared, "is bad and deteriorating. The VC (Viet Cong) have the initiative. Defeatism is gaining among the rural population, somewhat in the cities and even among the soldiers."

But the administration was determined to [illegible] ness and issued terms that were described as "compromise" but, in reality, were "a demand for their (North Vietnam's) surrender."

Alone among Mr. Johnson's top advisers, Undersecretary of State George Ball was urging that the United States "cut its losses" and withdraw. Ball recognized that the nation would lose face in Asia but insisted the setback would be temporary and in the long run it would emerge "wiser and more mature."

CIA misgivings

John A. McCone, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, had misgivings about the commitment of U.S troops to offensive operations but for a different reason. He argued that the policy change would prove futile without a great intensification of the bombing of North Vietnam.

"We will find ourselves," he said in a memo of April 2, "mired down in combat in the jungle in a military effort that we cannot win and from which we will have extreme difficulty extracting ourselves."

Mr. Johnson was constantly being stirred to stronger action by his leading intellectual, Walt W. Rostow, who wrote at one point: "There may be a tendency to underestimate both the anxieties and complications on the other side and to underestimate that limited but real margin of influence on the outcome which flows from the simple fact that at this

continued

NORFOLK, VA.
LEDGER-STAR
JUN 16 1977
E - 106,121

The CIA said stay out

Whatever the outcome of the publication by *The New York Times* of a secret documentary on the American presence in Indochina may be in the light of the granting of a temporary federal court injunction sought on the ground that the law had been violated, one thing already is very clear. That is, the role ascribed by its critics to the Central Intelligence Agency as the evil genius of U.S. involvement proves to be more myth than reality.

The fact is the record now revealed shows that the CIA warned against deeper involvement as early as November, 1964. In describing the attitude of the intelligence community, the *Times* says the study shows the people involved "tended toward a pessimistic view."

An intelligence panel composed of members of the three leading agencies—the CIA, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the Defense (Department's) Intelligence Agency—ordered to study a Joint Chief's recommendation that North Vietnam be bombed into surrender, concluded that there was no "strong chance of breaking Hanoi's will."

"The course of actions the Communists have pursued in South Vietnam over the past few years implies a fundamental estimate on their part that the difficulties facing the U.S. are so great that U.S. will and ability to maintain resistance in that area can be gradually eroded—without running high risks that this would wreak heavy destruction on the D.R.V. (Hanoi) or Communist China," the panel said. ". . . We do not believe that such actions (large-scale bombing of industry) would have a crucial effect on the daily lives of the overwhelming majority of the North Vietnam population . . ."

In April, 1965, John McCone, then head of the CIA, warned against plans to undertake combat operations on the ground against Viet Cong guerrillas without commensurate increase in bombing of North Vietnam; in short, we cannot win cheaply and to win at all we must go all out.

"In effect, we will find ourselves mired down in combat in the jungle in a military effort that we cannot win, and from which we will have extreme difficulty extricating ourselves."

These advices are hardly what one would expect from an organization so many believe is at the bottom of all our overseas adventures. In fact, instead of urging the U.S. to escalate the war, the CIA was warning the U.S. not to increase our commitment. It ran up the danger flags, and acted as responsibly as its harshest critics could have hoped it would.

WASHINGTON POST
6 JUN 1971

LBJ Hid Buildup In 1965

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Johnson ordered public silence initially on a critical decision of April 1, 1965, which started the massive buildup of American ground forces in the Vietnamese war, it was revealed in official documents published yesterday by The New York Times.

The basic shift in U.S. strategy from defense and retaliation to offense and calculated escalation did seep out piecemeal in later months. But the orders, details, and consequences of that change—described as "pivotal" in the U.S. share of the war—are disclosed for the first time in the secret documents assembled in the Pentagon in 1967-68.

Administration officials were instructed to take "all possible precautions" to avoid "premature publicity" on the President's April 1 decision on a "change of mission" for two U.S. Marine battalions which had landed at Danang on March 8, 1965, for airbase defense, and for an initial increase of 18,000 to 20,000 more U.S. troops in Vietnam.

Even the change in the troop mission was only guardedly identified in a secret National Security Action Memorandum, number 328, as an authorization "to permit their more active use." Instructions were given to act rapidly, "but in ways that should minimize any appearance of s u d d e n changes in policy," to make the new actions appear to be "gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy."

In fact, the United States was embarking upon the first use of major combat forces in a land war in Asia since the Korean conflict of the early 1950s. The U.S. position on entering into negotiations that might freeze U.S. activities without ending the Vietcong challenge to the Saigon government was described in totally negative terms.

McGeorge Bundy, President Johnson's national security adviser, told him in a memorandum dated Feb. 7, 1965:

"We want to keep before Hanoi the carrot of our desisting as well as the stick of continued pressure. We also need to conduct the application of force so that there is always a prospect of worse to come . . .

"We should accept discussion on these terms in any forum, but we should not now accept the idea of negotiations of any sort except on the basis of a standdown of Vietcong violence."

President Johnson told Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor in Saigon on May 10, 1965, that he was planning to order the first pause in the recently launched sustained bombing of North Vietnam. The President said he would use the pause "to good effect with world opinion."

"You should understand," he told Taylor, "that my purpose in this plan is to begin to clear a path either toward restoration of peace or toward increased military action, depending upon the reaction of the Communists."

That five-day bombing pause produced nothing, to the surprise of few administration strategists. By June 1, the administration already had secretly approved plans for deploying about 70,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam but the official U.S. public position concealed those plans and intentions.

What a Pentagon analyst describes in the documents as "an honest and superficially innocuous statement by Department of State Press Officer Robert J. McCloskey on June 8" was the first public hint of the major strategy shift authorized on April 1. McCloskey said, "American forces would be available for combat support together with Vietnamese forces when and if necessary," and had engaged in "combat."

President Johnson exploded over this admission, even though there already had been news "leaks" on the secret change in strategy. The White House, "hoisted by its own petard," according to a Pentagon analyst, tried to equivocate but was forced into an admission.

A White House statement said, "There has been no change in the mission of United States ground combat units in Vietnam in recent days or weeks." The statement said "The primary mission" was to "secure and safeguard" installations such as the Danang air base, but "if help is requested" in "support of Vietnamese forces faced with aggressive attack" the U.S. Commander, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, "also has authority" to supply it.

Even that backhanded admission that a military threshhold had been crossed, however, gave the public only fragmentary awareness of what was actually happening in a U.S. troop buildup that eventually grew to over half-a-million men.

A State Department cablegram to U.S. diplomatic missions abroad, on Feb. 18, 1965, instructed them that "focus of public attention will be kept as far as possible on DRV (North Vietnamese) aggression; not on joint GVN-US (South Vietnamese-American) military operations."

The United States had moved with great speed through multiple stages of military involvement, starting in February. "Operation Flaming Dart," initiated Feb. 6, 1965, had authorized "tit-for-tat" retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam. On Feb. 13, President Johnson had crossed the next major dividing line, authorizing "Operation Rolling Thunder"—continuing bombing of the North, which began March 2.

But before a month was out "optimism began to wane," even among the optimists, about the prospects for getting North Vietnam and the Vietcong to agree to negotiations to break off the war. Many military and civilian planners had been convinced from the outset that those hopes were highly misplaced anyhow.

While these initial actions were being launched the Joint Chiefs of Staff and many other strategists were intensively planning, and urging, the introduction of U.S. ground troops in multiple division strength.

One footnote illustrates the military coordination problem during that first hectic period. South Vietnamese Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, who was leading South Vietnamese bombers on a Feb. 8 joint reprisal strike against the North, reportedly "dumped his flight's bomb loads on an unassigned target in the Vinlinh area" in order, as Ky maintained, to avoid colliding with U.S. aircraft that he said were hitting his assigned target.

The Pentagon study states that once "the bombing effort seemed to stiffen rather than soften Hanoi's backbone . . . The U.S. was presented essentially with two options:

"(1) to withdraw unilaterally from Vietnam leaving the South Vietnamese to fend for themselves, or (2) to commit ground forces in pursuit of its objectives. A third option, that of drastically increasing the scope and scale of the bombing, was rejected because of the concomitant high risk of inviting Chinese intervention."

John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense, in a March 24, 1965, memorandum to McNamara, said "U.S. policy appears to be drifting . . . because while there is consensus that efforts inside" South Vietnam to arouse more effective civilian and military improvements "will probably fail to prevent collapse, all . . . of the possible remedial courses of action have so far been rejected."

But large-scale U.S. troop deployments were precisely what the Joint Chiefs and Gen. Westmoreland in Saigon w e r e contemplating. The Joint Chiefs, especially since March 20, were urging the initial introduction of three divisions, two Americans and one South Korean, for "destroying the Vietcong."

Initially the Joint Chiefs were pushing for more forces than was Westmoreland, but as the South Vietnamese forces began to crumble under a Vietcong offensive in the summer of 1965, with the first North Vietnamese units reported in the South, Westmoreland became the advocate of what was described as a "44 battalion" input strategy.

At first, the United States embarked on an "enclave" strategy, to establish and hold base positions on the South Vietnamese coast. Ambassador Taylor, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the

Continued

NEW YORK TIMES

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KEY TEXTS FR
PENTAGON'S VIETNA

Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, covering the opening of the sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam in the first half of 1965. Except where excerpting is indicated, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

Letter From Rostow Favoring Commitment of Troops by U.S.

Personal letter from Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, to Secretary McNamara, Nov. 16, 1964, "Military Dispositions and Political Signals."

Following on our conversation of last night I am concerned that too much thought is being given to the actual damage we do in the North, not enough thought to the signal we wish to send.

The signal consists of three parts:

a) damage to the North is now to be inflicted because they are violating the 1954 and 1962 accords;

b) we are ready and able to go much further than our initial act of damage;

c) we are ready and able to meet any level of escalation they might mount in response, if they are so minded.

Four points follow.

1. I am convinced that we should not go forward into the next stage without a US ground force commitment of some kind:

a. The withdrawal of those ground forces could be a critically important part of our diplomatic bargaining position. Ground forces can sit during a conference more easily than we can maintain a series of mounting air and naval pressures.

b. We must make clear that counter escalation by the Communists will run directly into US strength on the ground; and, therefore the possibility of radically extending their position on the ground at the cost of air and naval damage alone, is ruled out.

c. There is a marginal possibility that in attacking the airfield they were thinking two moves ahead; namely, they might be planning a pre-emptive ground force response to an expected US retaliation for the Bien Hoa attack.

2. The first critical military action against North Vietnam should be designed merely to install the principle that they will, from the present forward, be vulnerable to retaliatory attack by the north for continued violations for the 1954 and 1962 Accords. In other words, we would signal a shift from the principle sponse. This means that the initial use of force in the north should be as limited and as unsanguinary as possible. It is the installation of the principle that we are initially interested in, not tit for tat.

3. But our force dispositions to accompany an initial retaliatory move against the north should send three further signals lucidly:

a. that we are putting in place a capacity subsequently to step up direct and naval pressure on the north, if that should be required;

b. that we are prepared to face down any form of escalation North Vietnam might mount on the ground; and

c. that we are putting forces into place to exact retaliation directly against Communist China, if Peiping should join in an escalatory response from Hanoi. The latter could take the form of increased aircraft on Formosa plus, perhaps, a carrier force sitting off China distinguished from the force in the South China Sea.

4. The launching of this track, almost certainly, will require the President to explain to our own people and to the world our intentions and objectives. This will also be perhaps the most persuasive form of communication with Ho and Mao. In addition, I am inclined to think the most direct communication we can mount (perhaps via Vientiane and Warsaw) is desirable, as opposed to the use of cut-outs. They should feel they now confront an LBJ who has made up his mind. Contrary to an anxiety expressed at an earlier stage, I believe it quite possible to communicate the limits as well as the seriousness of our intentions without raising seriously the fear in Hanoi that we intend at our initiative to land immediately in the Red River Delta, in China, or seek any other objective than the re-installation of the

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appreciation of the view in Hanoi and Peiping of the Southeast Asia problem. I agree almost completely with SNIE 10-3-64 of October 9. Here are the critical passages:

"While they will seek to exploit and encourage the deteriorating situation in Saigon, they probably will avoid actions that would in their view unduly increase the chances of a major US response against North Vietnam (DRV) or Communist China. We are almost certain that both Hanoi and Peiping are anxious not to become involved in the kind of war in which the great weight of superior US weaponry could be brought against them. Even if Hanoi and Peiping estimated that the US would not use nuclear weapons against them, they could not be sure of this. . . .

"In the face of new US pressures against the DRV, further actions by Hanoi and Peiping would be based to a considerable extent on their estimate of US intentions, i.e., whether the US was actually determined to increase its pressures as necessary. Their estimates on this point are probably uncertain, but we believe that fear of provoking severe measures by the US would lead them to temper their responses with a good deal of caution. . . .

"If despite Communist efforts, the US attacks continued, Hanoi's leaders would have to ask themselves whether it was not better to suspend their support of Viet Cong military action rather than suffer the destruction of their major military facilities and the industrial sector of their economy. In the belief that the tide has set almost irreversibly in their favor in South Vietnam, they might

WASHINGTON STAR

STAT

U.S. to Seek Injunction; LBJ's Decision Revealed

DECISION

President Johnson decided on April 1, 1965, to commit U.S. ground troops to offensive action in South Vietnam, but the decision was withheld from the American public for more than two months, according to Pentagon records.

The records show that the first public indication of the shift in Vietnam policy was on June 8, 1965, and that Johnson did not fully reveal the breadth of his decision until July.

The steps that led to the massive deployment of U.S. forces in South Vietnam and the change in strategy are the themes in the third of a series of articles by the New York Times, based on a massive and secret report by the Pentagon on U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia.

The study was commissioned in 1967 by then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. It covered U.S. policy in Indochina from World War II to the spring of 1968 when the Paris peace talks convened.

The Times says the Pentagon study was obtained from other sources through the investigative reporting of Neil Sheehan. The series was researched and written over three months by Sheehan and other staff members.

The Times' first story Sunday covered events before the Tonkin Gulf incidents of late summer 1964, through planning that lead to full-scale air war. The second installment covered the months between the Tonkin Gulf incident and beginning of the air war in March 1965—a decision reached, but not revealed, during Johnson's presidential campaign.

Johnson's decision to commit ground troops, according to the Pentagon record, was recognized as a "departure from long-held policy" that had "momentous implications." The study alluded to the policy axiom since the Korean war that another land war in Asia should be avoided.

Johnson's Orders

Although the president's decision was a "pivotal" change, the Pentagon analyst wrote, "Mr. Johnson was greatly concerned that the step be given as little prominence as possible."

A National Security Action Memorandum on April 6 spelled out the decision. It instructed council members: "The president desires . . . premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions. The actions themselves should be taken as rapidly as practicable, but in ways that should minimize any appearance of sudden changes in policy. . . ."

In the spring of 1965, the study shows, the administration counted on air assaults to break Hanoi's will and persuade North Vietnam to halt Viet Cong insurgency in the South.

"Once set in motion, however," the study says, "the bombing effort seemed to stiffen rather than soften Hanoi's backbone. . . . After a month of bombing with no response from the North Vietnamese, optimism began to wane."

The U.S. at that point faced essentially two options, the study says—to withdraw unilaterally and leave the South Vietnamese to fight for themselves, or to commit ground forces.

The April 1 Decision

Drastic increases in the scope and scale of hte bombing were rejected initially because of the risk of Chinese intervention.

And so within a month, the account continues, with the administration recognizing that bombing would not work quickly enough to prevent collapse of the South, the crucial decision was made to put the two Marine battalions already in the South—assigned to static defense—on the offense.

Because of Johnson's desire to keep the shift from defense to offense imperceptible to the public, the April 1 decision received no publicity "until it crept out almost by accident in a State Department release on 8 June," the study says.

By July 28, when the president himself announced the increase of troop strength, which had been slowly and inconspicuously bulding in South Vietnam during the spring, 75,000 troops were in South Vietnam.

Two days later, the Joint Chiefs approved additional deployment, involving 193,687 U.S. troops, and subsequently won Johnson's approval. By the end of 1965, 184,000 were actually in South Vietnam.

At a July 28 press conference, Johnson was asked if the additional forces implied any change in the policy of relying mainly on South Vietnamese troops for offense and using American forces to guard installations and for emergency support.

"It does not imply any change in policy whatever," Johnson replied. "It does not imply any change of objective."

continued

NEW-YORK TIMES

KEY TEXTS FI
PENTAGON'S VIETNA

Following are texts of key documents from the Pentagon's history of the Vietnam war, covering events of August, 1964, to February, 1965, the period in which the bombing of North Vietnam was planned. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

Rusk Cable to Embassy in Laos On Search and Rescue Flights

Cablegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the United States Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, Aug. 26, 1964. A copy of this message was sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific.

We agree with your assessment of importance SAR operations that Air America pilots can play critically important role, and SAR efforts should not discriminate between rescuing Americans, Thais and Lao. You are also hereby granted as requested discretionary authority to use AA pilots in T-28's for SAR operations when you consider this indispensable rpt indispensable to success of operation and with understanding that you will seek advance Washington authorization wherever situation permits.

At same time, we believe time has come to review scope and control arrangements for T-28 operations extending into future. Such a review is especially indicated view fact that these operations more or less automatically impose demands for use of US personnel in SAR operations. Moreover, increased AA capability clearly means possibilities of loss somewhat increased, and each loss with accompanying SAR operations involves chance of escalation from one action to another in ways that may not be desirable in wider picture. On other side, we naturally recognize T-28 operations are vital both for their military and psychological effects in Laos and as negotiating card in support of Souvanna's position. Request your view whether balance of above factors would call for some reduction in scale of operations and-or dropping of some of better-defended targets. (Possible extension T-28 operations to Panhandle would be separate issue and will be covered by septel.)

On central problem our understanding is that Thai pilots fly missions strictly controlled by your Air Command Center with [word illegible] in effective control, but that this not true of Lao pilots. We have impression latter not really under any kind of firm control.

Request your evaluation and recommendations as to future scope T-28 operations and your comments as to whether our impressions present control structure correct and whether steps could be taken to tighten this.

Rusk Query to Vientiane Embassy On Desirability of Laos Cease-Fire

Cablegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the United States Embassy in Laos, Aug. 7, 1964. Copies were also sent, with a request for comment, to the American missions in London, Paris, Saigon, Bangkok, Ottawa, New Delhi, Moscow, Pnompenh and Hong Kong, and to the Pacific command and the mission at the United Nations.

1. As pointed out in your 219, our objective in Laos is to stabilize the situation again, if possible within framework of the 1962 Geneva settlement. Essential to stabilization would be establishment of military equilibrium in the country. Moreover, we have some concern that recent RLG successes and reported low PL morale may lead to some escalation from Communist side, which we do not now wish to have to deal with.

2. Until now, Souvanna's and our position has been that equilibrium would require Pathet Lao withdrawal from areas seized in PDJ since May 15 and that su
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it might be used by Souvanna as bargaining counter in obtaining satisfaction on his other condition that he attend conference as head of Laotian Government. Remaining condition would be cease-fire. While under present conditions cease-fire might not be of net advantage to Souvanna—we are thinking primarily of T-28 operations—Pathet Lao would no doubt insist on it. If so, Souvanna could press for effective ICC policing of cease-fire. Latter could be of importance in upcoming period.

3. Above is written with thought in mind that Polish proposals [one word illegible] effectively collapsed and that pressures continue for Geneva [word illegible] conference and will no doubt be intensified by current crisis brought on by DRV naval attacks. Conference on Laos might be useful safety valve for these generalized pressures while at same time providing some deterrent to escalation of hostilities on that part of the "front." We would insist that conference be limited to Laos and believe that it could in fact be so limited, if necessary by our withdrawing from the conference room if any other subject brought up, as we did in 1961-62. Side discussions on other topics could not be avoided but we see no great difficulty with this; venue for informal corridor discussion with PL, DRV, and Chicoms could be valuable at this juncture.

4. In considering this course of action, key initial question is of course whether Souvanna himself is prepared to drop his withdrawal precondition and whether, if he did, he could maintain himself in power in Vientiane. We gather that answer to first question is probably yes but we are much more dubious about

Continued

WASHINGTON POST

14 JUN 1971

STAT

U.S. Planned Before Tonkin For War on North, Files Show

By Murrey Marder
and Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Johnson administration planned for major American military action against North Vietnam nearly five months before the 1964 Tonkin Gulf incident, according to secret government documents made public yesterday by The New York Times.

These plans were made, the documents show, at a time when the United States already was directing clandestine sabotage operations in the North.

Two months before the attack on two American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, the administration sent a Canadian diplomat, J. Blair Seaborn, on a secret mission to Hanoi where he is quoted as telling Premier Pham Van Dong that "in the event of escalation (of the war) the greatest devastation would result for the D.R.V. (North Vietnam) itself."

It was the Tonkin incident—called totally unprovoked by the administration—which led Congress on Aug. 7, 1964, to pass a resolution declaring that the United States was "prepared, as the President directs, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force," to assist South Vietnam. It was on this resolution that President Johnson subsequently leaned heavily to widen the war.

The documents are part of a multi-volumed collection of records and comments assembled under the direction of then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. The bulk of the documents disclosed thus far by the Times are of military origin but include some White House and State Department papers that reached the Pentagon. Other documents were only alluded to or quoted from in the newspaper's story.

A National Security Action Memorandum of March 17 1964, presumably the result of a presidential decision, set out both the administration's political aims and the basis for its military planning. A cable sent three days later by the President to Henry Cabot Lodge, then the American ambassador in Saigon, illuminates his intentions.

The memorandum says that "we seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam" but "do not require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western alliance. South Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside assistance as required to maintain its security."

Repeating language from a McNamara memorandum of March 16 to the President (language in part drawn in turn from a memorandum to McNamara on Jan. 22 from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor) the National Security Council document reflects the prevailing belief in what President Eisenhower had called the "domino effect" of the loss of South Vietnam.

Unless the objective is achieved in South Vietnam, it says, "almost all of Southeast Asia will probably fall under Communist dominance" or accommodate to Communism. The Philippines, it was judged, "would become shaky" and "the threat to India on the west, Australia and New Zealand to the South, and Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to the north would be greatly increased."

The policy decision, then, was to "prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours' notice to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian 'border control actions'" as well as "the 'retaliatory actions' against North Vietnam and to be in a position on 30 days' notice to initiate the program of 'graduated overt military pressure' against North Vietnam . . ."

The President's cable to Lodge says that "our planning for action against the North is on a contingency basis on [illegible] grounds that "overt military action" then was "premature." Mr. Johnson offered as one reason that statement that "we expect a showdown between the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties and action against the North will be more practicable after than before a showdown."

The President also told Lodge that part of his job then was "knocking down the idea of neutralization" of Vietnam, an idea advanced by then French President Charles deGaulle, "wherever it rears its ugly head and on this point I think that nothing is more important than to stop neutralist talk wherever we can by whatever means we can."

The resulting contingency planning is shown in several documents. But other documents also show that as early as Dec. 21, 1963, a memorandum from McNamara to President Johnson referred to "plans for covert action into North Vietnam" that "present a wide variety of sabotage and psychological operations" that should "provide maximum pressure with minimum risk."

This clandestine program became "Operation Plan 34-A," launched on Feb. 1, 1964. It was described in a National Security memorandum the next month as "a modest 'covert' program operated by South Vietnamese (and a few Chinese Nationalist)—a program so limited that it is unlikely to have any significant effect . . ."

One source yesterday said, in retrospect, that these covert operations were in fact "very modest—and highly unsuccessful." But they came to have profound significance in the Tonkin Gulf incident. McNamara, even in 1968 testimony reexamining the 1964 Tonkin affair, professed to know little about the plan 34-A operations. He told Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) that they were carried out by South Vietnamese against the North, "utilizing to some degree U.S. equipment."

"I can't describe the exact [illegible] Mr. McNamara told Fulbright, "although I will be happy to try to obtain the information for you."

It was charged by then Sen. Wayne Morse (D-Ore.) that the South Vietnamese attacks on North Vietnamese forces in the Gulf of Tonkin caused the North Vietnamese to fire upon U.S. destroyers Maddox and C. Turner Joy. McNamara, in 1968, told the Senate committee, however, that it was "monstrous" to insinuate that the United States "induced the incident" as an "excuse" to take retaliatory action. The retaliatory action was the opening rounds of U.S. bombing attacks upon North Vietnam.

According to the information disclosed by the Times, the Plan 34-A operations against the North during 1964 ranged from U-2 spy plane flights to parachuting sabotage and psychological warfare teams into the North Vietnamese citizens, sea-launched commando raids on rail and highway bridges and bombardment of coastal installations by PT boats.

These attacks were described as being under the Saigon control of Gen. Paul D. Harkins, then chief of the U.S. military assistance command, with joint planning by the South Vietnamese who carried out the operations themselves or with "hired personnel."

Even before these covert operations began, however, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were reported recommending "increasingly bolder actions" including "aerial bombing of key North Vietnamese targets" and use of "United States forces as necessary in direct actions against North Vietnam."

After the August, 1964, Gulf of Tonkin breakthrough to more open U.S. involvement in the fighting, the published documentation shows recommendations for considerably expanded covert operations against the North.

A memorandum prepared for Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy shows that part of the clandestine operations against the North were suspended immediately "after the first Tonkin Gulf incident" on Aug. 2, 1964, but that "successful maritime and airborne operations" were carried out in October.

The documents discuss clandestine operations carried out not only from South Vietnam but from Laos, against North Vietnam and against enemy-held areas of Laos. One docu-

continued

NEW YORK TIMES
13 JUN 1971

KEY TEXTS FRO PENTAGON'S VIET STUDY

Following are the texts of key d the Pentagon's study of the Vietna December, 1963, through the Tonkin 1964, and its aftermath. Except wher the documents are printed verbatim, typographical errors corrected.

McNamara Report to Johnson On the Situation in Saigon in '63

Memorandum, "Vietnam Situation," from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Dec. 21, 1963.

In accordance with your request this morning, this is a summary of my conclusions after my visit to Vietnam on December 19-20.

1. Summary. The situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state.

2. The new government is the greatest source of concern. It is indecisive and drifting. Although Minh states that he, rather than the Committee of Generals, is making decisions, it is not clear that this is actually so. In any event, neither he nor the Committee are experienced in political administration and so far they show little talent for it. There is no clear concept on how to re-shape or conduct the strategic hamlet program; the Province Chiefs, most of whom are new and inexperienced, are receiving little or no direction because the generals are so preoccupied with essentially political affairs. A specific example of the present situation is that General [name illegible] is spending little or no time commanding III Corps, which is in the vital zone around Saigon and needs full-time direction. I made these points as strongly as possible to Minh, Don, Kim, and Tho.

3. The Country Team is the second major weakness. It lacks leadership, has been poorly informed, and is not working to a common plan. A recent example of confusion has been conflicting USOM and military recommendations both to the Government of Vietnam and to Washington on the size of the military budget. Above all, Lodge has virtually no official contact with Harkins. Lodge sends in reports with major military implications without showing them to Harkins, and does not show Harkins important incoming traffic. My impression is that Lodge simply does not know how to conduct a coordinated administration. This has of course been pointed out to him both by Dean Rusk and myself (and also by John McCone), and I do not think he is consciously rejecting our advice; he has just operated as a loner all his life and cannot readily change now.

Lodge's newly-designated deputy, David Nes, was with us and seems a highly competent team player. I have stated the situation frankly to him and he has said he would do all he could to constitute what would in effect be an executive committee operating below the level of the Ambassador.

As to the grave reporting weakness, both Defense and CIA must take major steps to improve this. John McCone and I have discussed it and are acting vigorously in our respective spheres.

4. Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup, with my best guess being that the situation has in fact been deteriorating in the countryside since July to a far greater extent than we realized because of our undue dependence on distorted Vietnamese reporting. The Viet Cong now control very high proportions of the people in certain key provinces, particularly those directly south and west of Saigon. The Strategic Hamlet Program was seriously over-extended in those provinces, and the Viet Cong has been able to destroy many hamlets, while others have been abandoned or in some cases betrayed or pillaged by the government's own Self Defense Corps. In these key provinces, the Viet Cong have destroyed almost all major roads, and are collecting taxes at will.

As remedial measures, we must get the government to re-allocate its military forces so that its effective strength in these provinces is essentially doubled. We also need to have major increases in both military and USOM staffs, to sizes that will give us a reliable, independent U.S. appraisal of the status of operations. Thirdly, realistic pacification plans must be prepared, allocating adequate time to secure the remaining government-controlled areas and work out from there.

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tially in recent months. General Harkins still hopes these areas may be made reasonably secure by the latter half of next year.

In the gloomy southern picture, an exception to the trend of Viet Cong success may be provided by the possible adherence to the government of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, which total three million people and control key areas along the Cambodian border. The Hoa Hao have already made some sort of agreement, and the Cao Dai are expected to do so at the end of this month. However, it is not clear that their influence will be more than neutralized by these agreements, or that they will in fact really pitch in on the government's side.

5. Infiltration of men and equipment from North Vietnam continues using (a) land corridors through Laos and Cambodia; (b) the Mekong River waterways from Cambodia; (c) some possible entry from the sea and the tip of the Delta. The best guess is that 1000-1500 Viet Cong cadres entered South Vietnam from Laos in the first nine months of 1963. The Mekong route (and also the possible sea entry) is apparently used for heavier weapons and ammunition and raw materials which have been turning up in increasing numbers in the south and of which we have captured a few shipments.

To counter this infiltration, we reviewed in Saigon various plans providing for cross-border operations into Laos. On the scale proposed, I am quite clear that these would not be politically acceptable or even militarily effective. What is needed would be immediate U-2 mapping of the whole Laos and Cambodian border, and this we are preparing on an urgent basis.

Continued

LOS ANGELES TIMES

31 MAY 1971

Approved For Release 2005/11/28 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600110002-1

EISENHOWERS THREE—David, Mamie and Julie Eisenhower chat with John McCone, former CIA chief, at gala preview opening of the John F. Kennedy Center for Performing Arts in Washington.

Continued

Ranks Closed at Kennedy Center Gala

Earlier in the evening, approximately 100 dinners were held all over the city including one hosted by George Stevens, president of the American Film Institute in Beverly Hills, and Mrs. Stevens in the home they also own in Georgetown, and John McCone, former head of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Mrs. McCone, Southern California chairman for the party in the City Tavern in Georgetown.

Special guests at the McCone dinner included Mamie Eisenhower, David and Julie Eisenhower, Martha Mitchell and Mr. and Mrs. Robert Finch.

WASHINGTON POST
28 MAY 1971

Dinner Parties: Gala Foretastes

Here are some highlights:

Mr. and Mrs. William McCormick Blair Jr. co-hosted a party with New York philanthropist Mary Lasker in the Blairs' white-and-pale-green-Billy-Baldwin-decorated Foxhall Road home.

Waiters were passing hors d'oeuvres that matched the decor: asparagus rolled sandwiches; off-white mushrooms with cream cheese and green parsley.

As haute couture fashion designer Pauline Trigere entered the Blairs' sunken living room, she tripped on the steps and fell on a waiter who fell on the floor, crushing the matching green-and-white asparagus sandwiches into the white cut-out rug.

"Oh my God," screamed the New York designer as she went down.

"Oh my God," said the waiter as he scraped the asparagus with his fingernails from the rug.

"All I've got to say," said Bill Blair, ever optimistic, "is that the Farmer's Almanac is wrong. It was supposed to rain tonight and it didn't."

Guest of honor at the Blair party was Rose Kennedy.

Some other guests were Mrs. Adlai Stevenson III, wife of the Illinois Democrat, jet setters Mr. and Mrs. Pierce Schlumberger, Duchess Peggy D'Uzes, John Mack Carter, editor of the Ladies' Home Journal, cosmetics tycoon Estee Lauder, fashion publicist Eleanor Lambert, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. William C. Westmoreland and Mrs. Westmoreland.

The two top Republican women at last night's gala kept embracing and embracing at a dinner party given by former CIA director John McCone and Mrs. McCone and former Irish Ambassador and Mrs. George Garrett at the City Tavern in Georgetown.

Martha Mitchell, wife of the Attorney General, who has never hidden from photographers, kept grabbing Mamie Eisenhower for their benefit.

Mrs. Eisenhower, in a white crepe dress and white mink stole, then commented:

"When you've been in service for as long as I have been, you don't get too emotional about anything," said Mrs. Eisenhower about the opening of the Kennedy Center. "I don't mean to sound blase, but that's the way it is."

The David Eisenhowers were among guests at Mamie Eisenhower's table at the gala.

Both of the younger Eisenhowers and guests were talking about the flap over Julie's new teaching assignment. "I'm annoyed," said Julie. "I could have traded on my name and taken a job for $20,000, but instead I took one for about $6,000 —I think that's about what I'll earn—that I was qualified for."

"I feel sorry for Julie," said David. "But you get criticized, regardless of what you do."

The 80 members of the Kennedy Center's Special Advisory Committee on the Arts celebrated the fact they've raised more than $1 million since last December, at the dinner party at the Georgetown home of Mr. and Mrs. Roger L. Stevens, co-hosted by Mr. and Mrs. J. Willard Marriott.

Stevens is Kennedy Center board chairman and Marriott heads the Advisory Committee.

The Presidential Box in the Eisenhower Theater, they said, will take $350,000 of that million and another $50,000 is earmarked for a box to be named for Tricia Nixon after she is married to Edward Finch Cox.

Meanwhile, at a dinner given by Smithsonian Secretary and Mrs. S. Dillon Ripley, Rep. Frank T. Bow (R-Ohio) was doing his share of complaining.

"I don't like to talk too much about the Kennedy Center because I opposed it," said Rep. Bow, a member of the House Appropriations Committee and a long-time Smithsonian trustee.

"It made me mad because they originally said if we would just give them the land that they wouldn't ask for any Federal money. I feel that they didn't level with us. I also opposed its location. Every time I drive under that overhang it makes me mad.

'I think instead of going on to the gala I'll go home after the dinner."

This coverage of the Gala preview of the John F. Kennedy Center was provided by staff writers Judith Martin, Sarah Booth Conroy, Margaret Crimmins, Sally Quinn and Dorothy McCardle.

By Tom Allen—The Washington Post

Secretary of Housing and Urban Development George Romney and his wife, Lenore, at the party at the home of Roger Stevens.

STAT

Frank Mankiewicz and Tom Braden

Intelligence Boss Is Needed

THE TROUBLE with the intelligence service of the United States is that it has no commander. This is the point perceived by President Nixon during a recent secret White House briefing at which the President literally threw up his hands in a display of impatience at the vast, expensive and complicated bureaucracy which had been described.

The President had asked for the briefing because of three recent and irritating intelligence failures.

The first was at Sontay, in North Vietnam, where the Army mounted a dangerous operation to recover prisoners who weren't there.

Second was the failure to learn that the North Vietnamese were using the Port of Sihanoukville in Cambodia as a vast supply center—a fact discovered only after we barged into Cambodia thinking the supply center was somewhere else.

Third was the failure of the U.S. command in South Vietnam to forecast the speed with which the North Vietnamese could send reinforcements into Laos, and the Army's failure to estimate how many South Vietnamese ground troops and American airmen would be needed to do the job.

ALL THESE failures caused the President to ask for a clear explanation of how our intelligence system works—and why it sometimes doesn't work. What he received was an accurate account of confusion.

The first point Mr. Nixon learned is that the $2 billion-a-year intelligence effort is not commanded but coordinated. Richard Helms, a careful objective analyst, commands CIA but not the Defense Department's intelligence arm, which is headed by Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett. General Bennett, in turn, doesn't really command his own forces because he is often dealing with intelligence requests from officers who outrank him and whose wishes must be regarded as orders.

Thus compromise frequently substitutes for decision in determining Defense Department intelligence priorities. Bennett must try to satisfy an admiral who insists that developments in submarine detection must come first, a general who is more interested in the thickness of Soviet armor, and an Air Force man who insists on priority for new developments in the Soviet SAM. Helms must balance all this with the importance of finding out what the Russians are putting in their ICBM bases and why.

Nobody is boss. Nominally, Helms is "coordinator" of the intelligence effort, but since most of the money for intelligence comes through the Department of Defense, there is a natural inclination to tell the coordinator how the money should be spent.

PRESIDENT NIXON would like to bring Helms into the White House. That is usually the first thought of the boss who wants a clear picture of what he may have to deal with, and one man to whom he can turn to get it. But if Helms makes this move, he will have to give up running the Central Intelligence Agency, where he first made his mark as a master of spy networks and into which he has brought both order and a healthy sense of restraint. (It was not Helms' wish to involve the CIA in Laos.)

With Helms in the White House, the intelligence effort would soon be dominated by the Defense Department. On the basis of recent performance, this would be a disaster. Former CIA Director John McCone, who was also asked to move to the White House, argued that he would become merely a go-between while the agency he commanded withered into an anachronism, much as the State Department has withered with the advent of resident foreign affairs aides.

One compromise open to the President is to give Lt. Gen. Bennett another star, thus putting him on an equal footing with those who are asking him to make their priorities his own. But if this President—or any other—really wants a better intelligence system, he will eventually have to put somebody in charge.

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NEW YORK TIMES
11 MAY 1971

STAT

Nixon Reported Weighing Revamping of Intelligence Services

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 10 — President Nixon is said to be considering a major reorganization of the nation's foreign intelligence activities to improve output and cut costs.

Those familiar with the plan say that the options range from creating a new Cabinet-level department of intelligence to merely strengthening the now-imprecise authority of Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, over the global intelligence operations of the Pentagon and other federal agencies.

The reorganization plan has recently been presented to President Nixon. It covers 30 to 40 typewritten pages and was prepared primarily by James R. Schlesinger, assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget, and K. Wayne Smith, a former Pentagon systems analyst now on the National Security Council staff.

The informants say the plan grew from instructions Mr. Nixon gave his staff last autumn, to draft various reorganizational and cost-cutting studies.

Complaints Voiced

Both the President and Henry A. Kissinger, his assistant for national security affairs, have frequently expressed dissatisfaction over the erratic quality of the foreign intelligence provided them. Some White House officials estimate that at least $500-million could be cut from the $5-billion spent annually on national intelligence.

Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have said that while occasionally intelligence of extreme usefulness — such as the incredibly detailed information on Soviet and Chinese Communist missile development obtained from spy satellites — has been produced, the service has frequently failed to forecast such sudden developments as the riots that forced a political reshuffle in Poland last December.

Mr. Nixon is particularly dissatisfied, his associates say, by the cost and size of the Government's global intelligence operations when compared with their results. In addition to the Central Intelligence Agency, five federal agencies are involved in intelligence overseas. At least 200,000 people are involved, 150,000 of these uniformed personnel in the Defense Department.

The President was seriously irritated, aides say, by two recent failures of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, which numbers 3,000 and spends an estimated $500-million yearly. One was faulty intelligence prior to the abortive prison-camp raid at Sontay, in North Vietnam, last November. The other was failure to forecast North Vietnamese resistance to the South Vietnamese Army's incursion into Laos Feb. 5 to March 25.

'Their Estimates Were Better'

"Hanoi threw 35,000 men or four divisions against the 17,000 in ARVN," said one qualified source. "They stripped North Vietnam of troops, gambling that the United States wouldn't invade the North — and they were right. Their estimates were better than ours."

The most drastic option open to Mr. Nixon would be the creation of a new department of intelligence to be headed by an official of Cabinet rank. It would combine the Central Intelligence Agency with 15,000 civilian employes; the Defense Department's code-cracking National Security Agency with 100,000 uniformed personnel and tis Defense Intelligence Agency with 3,000. The C.I.A. spends about $500-million yearly; the National Security Agency $1-billion and the Defense Intelligence Agency $500-million.

The merit, some experts say, would be to concentrate in one department the collection of foreign intelligence now performed not only by the C.I.A. but also by the Army, Navy, and Air Force separately around the world. However, opposition would be forthcoming from vested interests in the armed services and in Congress. They say, therefore, that Mr. Nixon is unlikely to adopt it.

At the other end of the scale, informants report, Mr. Nixon could merely issue an executive order defining — thus strengthening — the authority of Mr. Helms over the intelligence operations of such powerful federal agencies as the Pentagon, the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Officers Meet Weekly

Their principal intelligence officers meet weekly as members of the United States Intelligence Board. Mr. Helms, as the President's chief intelligence adviser and head of the C.I.A., presides, but his authority is unclear. It derives from a letter written by President Kennedy in 1963 to John A. McCone, one of Mr. Helms,s predecessors, and has never been updated.

While Mr. Helms has full control over the C.I.A., the Pentagon's worldwide intelligence [illegible] which Robert F. Froehlke, an Assistant Secretary of Defense has estimated costs $2.9-billion yearly.

"When you have the authority but don't control the resources," a Defense Department official observed, "you tend to walk very softly."

The President is said to regard Mr. Helms as the nation's most competent professional intelligence officer. Last month, informants disclose, Mr. Nixon wrote Mr. Helms congratulating the C.I.A. on its recent annual estimate of Soviet defense capabilities.

To provide control over the huge intelligence system and make it responsive to his needs, Mr. Nixon is likely, his staff associates say, to choose one — or a combination of — the middle options before him that do not require Congressional approval.

Closer Ties Possible

It is likely, officials say, that Mr. Nixon will eventually bring Mr. Helms and a top-level staff of evaluators from C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va., closer to the White House, possibly into the National Security Council staff.

Officials concede that under a reorganization Mr. Helms might relinquish to his deputy, Lieut. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, of the Marine Corps, some of his responsibility for the C.I.A.'s day-to-day collection operations and concentrate, instead, on intelligence evaluation for the President. One possibility envisaged under the reorganization would be the creation by Mr. Helms of an evaluation staff in the White House drawn from the C.I.A.'s Office of Current Intelligence and its Office of National Estimates. The latter prepares long - range studies in depth of potential trouble spots.

Another would be the creation by Mr. Nixon of a White House intelligence evaluations staff made up of Mr. Helms, General Cushman, Lieut. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Ray S. Cline, director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

TUCSON, ARIZ.
STAR

M - 42,069
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Credibility Gap's Birth Traced To U-2 Incident

'Official Lies' Now Expected

By WALLACE BEENE
Special To The Star

Eleven years ago this week, the credibility gap was born.

Today it is a fact of life — no thinking person can still believe the United States Government doesn't lie.

This turning point in the ethics of American history began on May 2, 1960, when the information office at Incirlik AFB, Adana, Turkey, issued a brief release: A weather recon plane of the U-2 type had vanished the day before on a routine flight over the Lake Van area of Turkey.

The release added that a search had been launched, and the radio contact with the pilot — identified only as a civilian employee of Lockheed Aircraft — indicated he was having problems with his oxygen equipment.

As a newsman working in Germany at the time, this correspondent gave the release only cursory attention. Having visited the air base at Adana several times, I was aware that U-2 "weather planes" were stationed there, so there was no reason for questioning the story.

No doubt the release was read with considerably more interest by the editors of Pravada and Izvestia.

A day or so later, the Air Force issued a second release: Because of the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the plane, NASA was grounding all U-2 aircraft to check the oxygen equipment.

Summit In Paris

But there was no cloud on the political horizon. Everyone was looking forward to the May 15 summit conference between President Eisenhower and Khrushchev in Paris. My assignment was to spend the week in Moscow covering the reaction to the talks, and my visa was approved without hesitation.

Then came the bomb: Speaking to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow on May 5, Khrushchev suddenly departed from his routine report and thundered "Comrade Deputies! Upon the instructions of the Soviet government, I must report to you on aggressive actions against the Soviet Union in the past few weeks on the part of the United States of America.

"What were these aggressive actions? The United States of America has been sending aircraft that have been crossing our state frontiers and intruding into the airspace of the Soviet Union . . . Therefore we must act — shoot down the planes! This assignment was fulfilled — the plane was shot down!"

(Stormy, prolonged applause. Shouts "Correct!" and "Shame to the Aggressor!")

As the shock wave ripped across the news wires of the world, in Washington a NASA spokesman conceded that the missing U-2 might have strayed across the Soviet border while the pilot — listed as Francis Gary Powers — was unconscious.

An Accident

On May 6, the State Department reported, "An unarmed U-2 weather reconnaissance craft of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration might have crossed the Soviet frontier by accident.

Lincoln White, the State Department spokesman, stated, "There was absolutely no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet air space, and there never has been."

The statement was duly published in the American press, along with irate statements from certain congressmen castigating the Soviets for shooting down an unarmed plane.

One British journalist called a top State Department official for an off-the-record statement and was told "Utterly fantastic! Take one technical point alone: the single-engine U-2 has a range of only 2,500 miles — not 4,000 as Khrushchev's fantastic tale implies."

And the State Department even went so far as to send the Russians a formal note of protest and inquiry regarding the fate of the pilot — the pilot presumed dead.

Then on May 7, Khrushchev dropped the other shoe.

Addressing the Supreme Soviet again, Khrushchev explained, "I did not say the pilot was alive and in good health, and that we have parts of the plane. We did so deliberately, because had we told everything at once, the Americans would have invented another version."

Sharing In A Lie

It was only then, the newsmen discovered, to their horror and indignation, that they had been participating in a lie. They had believed what they had been told, and so, presumably, had President Eisenhower.

Secretary of State Christian Herter insisted the President was blameless. It was admitted the U-2 had probably made an "information-gathering" flight over Russia, but "there was no authorization for any such flight."

Again the press accepted the word of the government, although it was now obvious that someone had sent Powers aloft, quite willing if he were downed (after he had demolished the plane and killed himself with his poison needle) to let America believe that Moscow was the real aggressor.

James Reston of the New York Times noted, "As to who might have authorized the flight, officials refused to comment. If this particular flight of the U-2 was not authorized here, it could only be assumed that someone in the chain of command in the Middle East or Europe had given the order."

Behind the scenes, CIA chief Allen Dulles met with President Eisenhower and offered to resign on May 9 to save the government further embarrassment.

Khrushchev had left President Eisenhower an opening by indicating the deed may have been done without the President's knowledge, and Press Secretary James Haggerty was quoted as saying "in his opinion" he didn't think President Eisenhower had been aware of the mission.

Hopeless Situation

But the situation was hopeless. On May 11 President Eisenhower admitted that he had personally approved the flights because espionage was "a distasteful but vital necessity."

And amid the shambles, both Herter and Vice Presi-

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BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
18 APRIL 1971

Editor's Report:

Still a Free, Critical Press

By WILLIAM RANDOLPH HEARST JR.
Editor-in-Chief, The Hearst Newspapers

WASHINGTON — Of all the balls, picnics and banquets newspapermen go to or have to go to throughout each year, by far the most interesting is the spring gathering of the ASNE. This translates into the American Society of Newspaper Editors and results in their meeting and discussing the future of our business and listening to panel discussions and speeches by high government officials.



W. R. HEARST JR.

The get-together is held four out of every five years in Washington. On the fifth year, the editors journey to some other city as they did last year to San Francisco and a few years ago to Montreal.

I always find the ASNE get-together fun and productive—and this year's meeting was no exception. In fact it was one of the best because the president of the ASNE was Newbold Noyes, editor of The Washington Star, which has for many years been owned by his family and been regarded as the family newspaper of the Washington area.

Since Newbold is a Washingtonian through and through, he knew exactly the kind of program to put together to enlighten and entertain the editors and their wives. For example, instead of following the traditional custom of getting the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense for a luncheon session, he pulled a real coup and got CIA Director Richard Helms to deliver his first public speech.

The next day he produced Sen. Henry (Scoop) Jackson of Washington, who, in my book, is one of the most responsible and dedicated public servants we have in government today.

In fact, I regard Scoop Jackson as the most qualified of all the possible Democratic contenders for next year's presidential nomination. He is a warm human being and has been a friend of mine for years. More to the point and the subject of his speech is a staunch advocacy of the kind of nuclear defense policy that would keep us ahead of the Soviets and prevent us ever having to bow to their blackmail.

Should next year's election develop into a contest between Scoop Jackson and Dick Nixon, I think the American people would be well served whichever way they turned.

This theory was confirmed not only by hearing Scoop at the luncheon but also by President Nixon's appearance at the final ASNE banquet, where he was interrogated by a panel of tough, perceptive editors.

It was a special treat to hear and meet Dick Helms. I had known most of his predecessors at the CIA—Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, Allen W. Dulles and John McCone. But I had never had the chance to even talk with Helms. He is just not the kind of fellow who circulates on the banquet circuit or gets into the public eye.

Helms advanced the very sound view that he and his agency should be anonymous, because they deal in highly secret security matters that should come to the attention only of the President and the National Security Council.

Anyone with an ounce of patriotism and concern for this nation should realize that men like Helms and his CIA associates are performing a vital service to the United States. So he took the opportunity to talk to America's editors about the place of an intelligence service in a democratic government, saying:

"In doing so, I recognize that there is a paradox which I hope can be dispelled.

"On the one hand, I can assure you that the quality of foreign intelligence available to the United States government in 1971 is better than it ever has been before.

"On the other hand, at a time when it seems to me to be self-evident that our government must be kept fully informed on foreign developments, there is a persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the possibility for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency."

Helms dispelled the thought some editors might have had that the CIA was some sort of "big brother" police operation. It is wrong for liberal critics of our government to make such assertions—including the recent attempt to smear the aging J. Edgar Hoover as some sort of mean, senile Gestapo chieftain. I don't think the American people are about to turn their back on men like Hoover, who has served more than 40 years as chief of the FBI, or Helms, who has been with the CIA for more than 20 years. Both are Americans of whom we should be proud.

As the richest, most influential and most benevolent country in the world, we cannot afford to let our defenses down. We need every ounce of evidence we can lay our hands on about internal developments in various countries—both friends and foes—around this globe.

In a sense, the CIA does for the federal government what newspapers are supposed to do for the general public: Gather information and lay it out honestly and objectively for others to study.

The ASNE had on its agenda the question of whether reporting should be subjective or objective. In other words, the editors felt they had to debate the issue of whether reporters should fill the news columns with propaganda born of their own advocacy or whether they should report only the news, honestly and fairly—and as it happened.

To me, this is not a question worth debating. I learned from my father years ago there is no place in the news columns for subjective reporting. The place for newsmen to express their own prejudices is [illegible] columns.

Continued

NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
16 APRIL 1972

[illegible] of the C[illegible]

By [illegible]

WASHINGTON.

"I CAN tell when he walks in the door what sort of a day it's been," says his wife, Cynthia. "Some days he has on what I call his 'Oriental look'—totally inscrutible. I know better than to ask what's happened. He'll talk when he's ready, not before, but even when he talks he's terribly discreet."

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, apparently brings his problems home from the office like any other husband—at least to hear Cynthia Helms tell it. And these days Helms's job is definitely one of the most problem-ridden in Washington.

Successive budget cuts, balance of payments restrictions, bureaucratic rivalries and press disclosures that have hurt the C.I.A.'s public image have all reduced its operations considerably. President Nixon has recently ordered a fiscal and management investigation into the intelligence "community," a task which may take longer and prove more difficult than even Nixon suspects because of the capacity of the intelligence agencies to hide in the bureaucratic thickets. Both Nixon and his principal foreign affairs adviser, Henry Kissinger, are said to regard the community as a mixed blessing: intrinsically important to the United States but far too big and too prone to obscure differences of opinion—or, sometimes, no opinion—behind a screen of words.

BENJAMIN WELLES covers national security affairs as a correspondent in the Washington bureau of The Times.

Considered a cold-blooded necessity in the Cold War days, the agency now seems to many students, liberal intellectuals and Congressmen, to be undemocratic, conspiratorial, sinister. The revelations in recent years that have made the agency suspect include its activities in Southeast Asia, the Congo, Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs; the U-2 flights; its secret funding through "front" foundations of the National Student Association plus private cultural, women's and lawyers' groups, and, finally, two years ago, the Green Beret affair.

The 58-year-old Helms knows all this, better than most. As the first career intelligence officer to reach the top since the C.I.A. was created in 1947, his goal has been to professionalize the agency and restore it to respectability. In fact, one of his chief preoccupations has been to erase the image of the Director as a man who moves in lavish mystery, jetting secretively around the world to make policy with prime ministers, generals and kings, and brushing aside, on the pretext of "security," the public's vague fears and Congress's probing questions. If Helms rules an "invisible empire," as the C.I.A. has sometimes been called, he is a very visible emperor.

While he tries to keep his lunches free for work, for example, he occasionally shows up at a restaurant with a friend for lunch: a light beer, a cold plate, one eye always on the clock. He prefers the Occidental, a tourist-frequented restaurant near the White House where, if he happens to be seen, there is likely to be less gossip than if he were observed entering a private home.

He likes the company of attractive women—young or old—and they find him a charming dinner partner and a good dancer.

"He's interesting—and interested in what you're saying," said Lydia Katzenbach, wife of the former Democratic Attorney General. "He's well-read and he doesn't try to substitute flirting for conversation, that old Princeton '43 routine that some of the columnists around town use."

Some of his critics complain that he is too close to the press—even though most agree that he uses it, with rare finesse, for his own and his agency's ends. Some dislike the frequent mention of Helms and his handsome wife in the gossip columns and society pages of the nation's capital.

Yet, if he gives the appearance of insouciance—he is witty, gregarious, friendly—the reserve is there, like a high-voltage electric barrier, just beneath the surface. Helms is a mass of apparent contradictions: inwardly self-disciplined and outwardly relaxed, absorbed in the essential yet fascinated by the trivial. A former foreign correspondent, he observes much and can recall [illegible] what [illegible] can husbands ever note in the first place—what gown each woman wore to a dinner and whose shoulder strap

STAT

15 APR 1971

Helms Defends the C.I.A. As Vital to a Free Society

Rare Speech Discloses Some Russians Aided U.S. in Cuban Crisis

Excerpts from Helms address will be found on Page 30.



Associated Press

Richard Helms addresses editors in Washington.

By RICHARD HALLORAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 14 — The Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, vigorously defended his agency today as necessary to the survival of a democratic society and asked the nation to "take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service."

Mr. Helms asserted, in his first public address since becoming head of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1966, that "we propose to adapt intelligence work to American society, not vice versa."

He spoke with the specific approval of President Nixon before a luncheon meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

In a footnote to history, Mr. Helms revealed that American intelligence in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis was aided by "a number of well-placed and courageous Russians."

He told reporters later that he was alluding not only to Col. Oleg V. Penkovsky, who was identified previously, but also to others who provided information on Soviet missile systems. When asked for their names, Mr. Helms laughed.

Colonel Penkovsky was a Soviet intelligence officer secretly working for the Americans in 1961 and 1962. He was detected in October, 1962, and executed in May, 1963. The publication of his alleged memoirs in the West in 1965 aroused considerable controversy over their authenticity.

Mr. Helms asserted today that United States intelligence would have "a major and vital role in any international agreement to limit strategic arms."

Noting that the Soviet Union had rejected proposals for inspection within its territory, Mr. Helms said the United States could undertake an agreement to limit such arms "only if it has adequate intelligence to assure itself that the Soviets are living up to their part."

China Held Police State

At a time when the visit of an American table tennis team to mainland China has generated official hopes for better relations with Peking, Mr. Helms told his audience that "some of our most important intelligence targets lie in totalitarian countries where collection is impeded by the security defenses of a police state—for example, Communist China."

Mr. Helms's rare public appearance today was initiated by Newbold Noyes, editor of The Washington Star and president of the society of editors. When Mr. Helms said he could speak only with the approval of the White House, Mr. Noyes wrote to Herbert G. Klein, the President's director of communications.

Mr. Klein said today that President Nixon had readily approved Mr. Helms's appearance. He said the Administration thought it a good time for the American public to have Mr. Helms explain the role of the C.I.A., since the agency was not under the kind of fire that had been directed toward it in the past.

Mr. Helms noted in his address that in Britain and other European democracies, "it would be unheard of for the head of intelligence services to talk to a nongovernmental group as I am talking to you today."

Dulles Talks Recalled

A spokesman for the C.I.A., in response to an inquiry, said later that Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence from 1953 to 1961, spoke publicly about twice a year. But he could not recall an instance in which Mr. Dulles's successors, John A. McCone and Adm. William F. Raborn, delivered public addresses. Thus, Mr. Helms's speech was probably the first from an intelligence director in 10 years.

Mr. Helms, who has a reputation as a skilled administrator, said, "There is a persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency.

"It is difficult for me to agree with this view," he said, "but I respect it. It is quite another matter when some of our critics, taking advantage of the traditional secrecy of those engaged in intelligence, say things that are either vicious or just plain silly."

No Domestic Functions

Mr. Helms emphasized that the agency had no domestic security functions and had never sought any.

"In short," he said, "we do not target on American citizens."

The agency was discovered in 1967 to have financed several international activities of the National Student Association and to have given subsidies to unions, foundations and publications.

More recently, the agency was implicated in the Government's surveillance of political dissidents in the United States by the testimony of former military intelligence agents given before a Senate subcommittee.

Mr. Helms asserted that the agency had no stake in policy debates.

'Must Not Take Sides'

"We can not and must not take sides," he said. "When there is debate over alternative policy options in the National Security Council, to which he is an adviser, "I do not and must not line up with either side."

If he recommended one solution to a problem, those recommending another would suspect "that the intelligence presentation has been stacked to support my position, and the credibility of C.I.A. goes out the window," he said.

Mr. Helms, after asking that the nation believe that the agency's operations were compatible with democratic principles, said "I can assure you that what I have asked you to take on faith, the elected officials of the United States Government watch over extensively, intensively, and continuously."

He said the National Security Council, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Office of Management and Budget and four committees of Congress regularly reviewed the agency's operations, plans and organization.

STAT

His Mission Is Facts

Richard McGarrah Helms

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 14—In early 1969, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the Soviet Union was "going for a first-strike capability" in building new intercontinental missiles. At about the same time, the committee heard Richard McGarrah Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, give a professional estimate that the Soviet Union was concentrating on defensive missiles. Later, on June 23, shortly before the Senate began a debate on an antiballistic-missile system, both men appeared at the same closed session of the committee to resolve the apparent difference.

Man in the News

According to reports from some of those who attended the session, Mr. Laird retreated partly from his original position, while Mr. Helms deferred to the Administration's view without changing his earlier testimony.

Respected Figure

This ability to keep intact his reputation as a speaker of facts, while avoiding the political fights that emerge around them, makes the 58-year-old, tall and dark Mr. Helms one of the most respected men in Washington.

"Helms is great with Congress," a Senate staff official said recently. "He admits when he doesn't know something. He never lies."

President Nixon went out of his way last May in a television news conference to emphasize that "Director Helms" played a key role in the Administration as one of his advisers.

And today, many members of the American Societ of Newspaper Editors appeared to consider it a greater coup that Mr. Helms gave at their convention his first public speech since becoming intelligence director in 1966 than that Mr. Nixon is scheduled to address the meeting later this week.

Reared in Jersey

Mr. Helms was born March 30, 1913, in St. David's, Pa., and reared in South Orange, N.J. He spent two high school years in Switzerland and Germany, learning French and German as well as social graces.

He graduated from Williams College in 1935 with an outstanding record in Phi Beta Kappa, class president, school newspaper editor and yearbook editor. His classmates voted him "most likely to succeed," "most respected," "the one who had done the most for Williams" and "class politician."

He went to Europe as a cub reporter with United Press and soon made a name for himself by getting an exclusive interview with Hitler.

Financial and personal problems cut short his career as a foreign correspondent, however, and he returned to the United States in 1937 as national advertising manager of The Indianapolis Times.

War a Turning Point

World War II was a turning point for Mr. Helms. He was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services because of his linguistic and other talents and has done nothing but intelligence work since.

After the war, he began to move up the ranks of the newly created Central Intelligence Agency. Associates say it was his capacity for work, his patience, his knowledge and understanding of government and his "professionalism"—traits they say they still admire in him—that brought him quickly to a top position in the agency in the early nineteen-fifties.

He stayed near the top for nearly 15 years under such men as Allen Dulles, Richard M. Bissell, John A. McCone and Vice Adm. William F. Raborn.

Then, in 1966, President Johnson named Richard Helms—he prefers his middle name not be used—as Director of Central Intelligence. Besides the role of senior intelligence adviser to the President and Congress, the job entails being chairman of the United States Intelligence Board and head of the C.I.A.

Mr. Helms was married several years ago to Cynthia McKelvie, 47. It is the second marriage for both. Mr. Helms has a son, Dennis, who is a Washington lawyer, and Mrs. Helms has four children by her previous marriage.

The Helmses are frequently seen on the Washington social scene, at small embassy dinners and on the tennis courts.

Mrs. Helms once told a reporter that she and her husband liked to relax by reading [illegible] for entertainment.

"They often are a bit far out, aren't they," she said

WASHINGTON POST
19 JAN 1971

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Castro Plot Raises Ugly Questions

By Jack Anderson

The plot to kill Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, hidden for 10 years from the public, raises some ugly questions that high officials would rather keep buried deep inside the Central Intelligence Agency.

1. Has the CIA tried to assassinate any other leaders? John McCone, who headed the CIA during the six attempts to knock off Castro, denied emphatically that the CIA has tried to kill anyone. But ex-Sen. George Smathers, one of John F. Kennedy's closest friends, told us the late President suspected that the CIA had arranged the shootings of the Dominican Republic's Rafael Trujillo in 1961 and South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963.

2. Did President Kennedy personally sanction the plot against Castro? The preparations to assassinate the Cuban dictator began during the last months of the Eisenhower administration as part of the Bay of Pigs scheme. All six attempts, however, were made during 1961-63 when Mr. Kennedy occupied the White House. Smathers told us he once spoke to the late President about assassinating Castro. Mr. Kennedy merely rolled back his eyes, recalled Smathers, as if to indicate the idea was too wild to discuss. Subsequently, Mr. Kennedy told Smathers of his suspicion that the CIA may have been behind the Trujillo and Diem assassinations.

3. Did the late Robert Kennedy know about the assassination attempts? After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, President Kennedy swore to friends he would like "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds." He put his brother, Robert, in charge of the CIA with instructions to shake it up. The CIA made five attempts on Castro's life after the Bay of Pigs while Robert Kennedy was riding herd on the agency.

4. Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy? The late President was murdered nine months after the last assassination team was caught on a Havana rooftop with high-powered rifles. Presumably, they were subjected to fiendish tortures until they told all they knew. None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings.

PLOT BACKFIRE?

Former associates recall that Robert Kennedy, deeply despondent, went into semi-seclusion after his brother's assassination. Could he have been tormented by more than natural grief? He certainly learned that the assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had been active in the pro-Castro movement and had traveled to Mexico to visit the Cuban Embassy a few weeks before the dreadful day in Dallas. Could Bob Kennedy have been plagued by the terrible thought that the CIA plot, which he must at least have condoned, put into motion forces that may have brought about his brother's martyrdom?

The last surviving brother, Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass), could give us no insight. His brothers had never spoken to him about any assassination attempts against Castro, he said. He was aware, he volunteered, only that Sen. Smathers had talked to the late President about eliminating Castro.

Smathers told us that President Kennedy seemed "horrified" at the idea of political assassinations. "I remember him saying," recalled Smathers, "that the CIA frequently did things he didn't know about, and he was unhappy about it. He complained that the CIA was almost autonomous.

"He told me he believed the CIA had arranged to have Diem and Trujillo bumped off. He was pretty well shocked about that. He thought it was a stupid thing to do, and he wanted to get control of what the CIA was doing."

But McCone, disagreeing vigorously, told us that "no plot was authorized or implemented" to assassinate Castro, Trujillo, Diem or anyone else.

"During those days of tension, there was a wide spectrum of plans ranging from one extreme to another," McCone admitted. "Whenever this subject (assassinating Castro) was brought up—and it was — it was rejected immediately on two grounds. First, it would not be condoned by anybody. Second, it wouldn't have achieved anything."

There was also talk in high places, McCone acknowledged, of supporting a coup to oust Diem. The former CIA director said he had argued against this at a secret session with both Kennedy brothers. He had contended that there was no one strong enough to take Diem's place and that a coup, therefore, would bring "political upheaval."

"I told the President and Bobby together," recalled McCone, "that if I were running a baseball team and had only one pitcher, I wouldn't take him out of the game."

The November, 1963, coup caught the United States completely by surprise, he said. While the plotters were moving on the palace, he said, then-Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was visiting Diem. Adm. Ulysses Sharp, then our Pacific commander, had also been present, but had left early to go to the airport.

McCone said President Diem escaped through a tunnel but was caught in nearby Cholon and "shot in a station wagon."

WASHINGTON POST
1 8 JAN 1971

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

6 Attempts to Kill Castro Laid to CIA

By Jack Anderson

Locked in the darkest recesses of the Central Intelligence Agency is the story of six assassination attempts against Cuba's Fidel Castro.

For 10 years, only a few key people have known the terrible secret. They have sworn never to talk. Yet we have learned the details from sources whose credentials are beyond question.

We spoke to John McCone, who headed the CIA at the time of the assassination attempts. He acknowledged the idea had been discussed inside the CIA but insisted it had been "rejected immediately." He vigorously denied that the CIA had ever participated in any plot on Castro's life. Asked whether the attempts could have been made with his knowledge, he replied: "It could not have happened."

We have complete confidence, however, in our sources.

The plot to knock off Castro began as part of the Bay of Pigs operation. The intent was to eliminate the Cuban dictator before the motley invaders landed on the island. Their arrival was expected to touch off a general uprising, which the Communist militia would have had more trouble putting down without the charismatic Castro to lead them.

After the first attempt failed, five more assassination teams were sent to Cuba. The last team reportedly made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before they were apprehended. This happened around the last of February or first of March, 1963.

Nine months later, President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who previously had agitated for Castro in New Orleans and had made a mysterious trip to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy.

To set up the Castro assassination, the CIA enlisted Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent with shadowy contacts, who had handled other undercover assignments for the CIA out of his Washington public relations office. He later moved to Las Vegas to head up billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a ruggedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban underworlds, to arrange the assassination. The dapper, hawk-faced Roselli, formerly married to movie actress June Lang, was a power in the movie industry until his conviction with racketeer Willie Bioff in a million-dollar Hollywood labor shakedown. The CIA assigned two of its most trusted operatives, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell, to the hush-hush murder mission. Using phony names, they accompanied Roselli on trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams.

The full story reads like the script of a James Bond movie, complete with secret trysts at glittering Miami Beach hotels and midnight powerboat dashes to secret landing spots on the Cuban coast. Once, Roselli's boat was shot out from under him.

For the first try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food. The poison was supposed to take three days to act. By the time Castro died, his system would throw off all traces of the poison, so he would appear to be the victim of a natural if mysterious ailment.

Roselli arranged with a Cuban, related to one of Castro's chefs, to plant the deadly pellets in the dictator's food. On March 13, 1961, Roselli delivered the capsules to his contact at Miami Beach's glamorous Fontainebleau Hotel.

A couple of weeks later, just about the right time for the plot to have been carried out, a report out of Havana said Castro was ill. But he recovered before the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961.

Four more attempts were made on Castro's life.

THE NEW STATESMAN
8 Jan 1970

I Spy

GEOFFREY McDERMOTT

Men of Intelligence *by* KENNETH STRONG
Cassell 50s

I worked closely with Kenneth Strong in the Anglo-American Intelligence community during the 1950s, and it was clear that he and one other man were our most professional and dedicated Intelligence officers. This book reflects Strong's character and modus operandi: much common sense, a constant preoccupation with the proper functioning of the Intelligence machine, insistence on as objective and cool assessment of the available information as is humanly possible. He had the singular distinction, for a limey, both of being Eisenhower's wartime Chief of Intelligence and of being invited to join the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency as a senior member a few years later, which he declined. The photograph opposite page 115 is a striking testimony: there is the single British lamb amongst all the lions of the US Intelligence Board. It is not surprising, though it will alarm some people, that he advocates a CIA type organisation for Britain. He, and eerily enough Kim Philby, did much to help CIA set itself up.

Strong defines with clarity what Intelligence is and is not. It comprises 'the collection of information, its collation and evaluation, and the communication of the end-product to the appropriate user at the right time'. It cannot be expected to foretell the timing of actions by the other side when they have not made up their own minds. He allocates one short chapter to spies, and comments baldly: 'I have always had doubts about the usefulness of secret services and secret agents.' So much for J. Bond. He estimates that perhaps 5 per cent of an Intelligence agency's information comes from agents' reports, some 30 per cent from those of service attachés and diplomats, and most of the rest from published material. Quantitatively of course he is right. But personally I think he underestimates the importance of people like Philby and Blake, whom he waves aside in a few words and who are denied admittance to the index. The Soviet Government does not award one of its highest decorations to such people for no reason. Nor does the Lord Chief Justice of England make a habit of judging that one man has 'rendered most of Britain's efforts completely useless', as he did of Blake.

Strong's first four chapters deal with various Intelligence chiefs in Germany, France and Britain from 1914 to 1945, and their varying influence on operations and policy. A recurrent theme is the Intelligence officer's dilemma: he should by rights take a hand in policy so that he may know for what purposes he is supplying Intelligence; yet he must scrupulously avoid providing only such Intelligence as will please the policy makers, or indeed fit in with ideas of his own. Under Hitler, for instance, the plans for Overlord which Cicero had purloined in our embassy in Ankara went for nothing because they did not fit in with some preconceived Intelligence views in Berlin. Strong plays down the CIA's policy-making role; but in practice it is very powerful and its head has a permanent seat in the president's inner cabinet. To the list of its operations which he quotes, such as the overthrow of hostile governments in Iran and Guatemala, I have little doubt that we can now add Cambodia.

For myself the heart of the matter is in the last three chapters. Strong rightly emphasises the point that the Intelligence set-up in Britain could only profit from less secrecy over the wide area of its activities where secrecy is convenient but not essential. Those quaint old instruments the Official Secrets Acts ensure amongst other things that, while the names of the senior members of the SIS are known to our allies and potential enemies, the great British public is kept in ignorance. The US have never seen the need for similar gagging. He is not altogether exempt himself: neither the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) nor the Security Services (MI5) are so much as mentioned; nor are the names of any of their chiefs, past or present. On the other hand there is much about the great men of the CIA, such as Allen Dulles and John McCone. While Strong's admiration of the CIA is well justified, I believe he underrates the KGB. On the invasion of Czechoslovakia, for instance, I do not agree that they miscalculated world reactions; the important point surely was that the US government had intimated that they would let it pass, and so would their allies.

Strong ends with all kinds of constructive and stimulating suggestions. The chief of the centralised British Intelligence agency which he proposes would have to cover politics, economics, military affairs, science, technology etc as a connected whole; he would have personal access to the prime minister, and say his say in policy making. In Britain's situation commercial Intelligence is of importance, and the staffs of embassies should be strengthened in this area. Apart from this he has little to say about the connection betwen diplomacy and Intelligence. He considers that computers will play an increasing part in storing and sifting information; the CIA already use them extensively. He refers only glancingly to the developing significance of electronic intelligence devices, for while Britain can afford those bugged olives in the dry martinis, the hundreds of tons of hardware circling aloft are beyond our capacity.

The style is readable throughout, generally matter-of-fact but with sparkles of a nice dry wit. Let us hope for more of the same; for if the author is, incredibly, 70 years old, he most certainly is still very strong.

STAT

AMERICAN OPINION
Jan 1971

NO INTELLIGENCE

A Worried Look At The C.I.A.

Frank A. Capell *is a professional intelligence specialist of almost thirty years' standing. He is Editor and Publisher of the fortnightly newsletter,* The Herald Of Freedom, *has contributed to such important national magazines as* The Review Of The News, *and is author of* Robert F. Kennedy — A Political Biography, The Untouchables, *and other books of interest to Conservatives. Mr. Capell appears frequently on radio and television, lectures widely, and never fears controversy. He lives in New Jersey, is an active Catholic layman, and father of seven sons.*

THE Central Intelligence Agency was established in 1947 after its wartime predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.), was exposed as thoroughly infiltrated by the Communists. Let us examine some of that O.S.S. personnel.

In 1948, former Communist spy Elizabeth Bentley appeared as a witness before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. On Page 529 of the formal report of those Hearings is the record of Miss Bentley's testimony about intelligence she received from Comrades inside O.S.S. while she was operating as a Soviet courier:

> *All types of information were given, highly secret information on what the OSS was doing, such as, for example, that they were trying to make secret negotiations with governments in the Balkan bloc in case the war ended, that they were parachuting people into Hungary, that they were sending OSS people into Turkey to operate in the Balkans, and so on. The fact that General Donovan* [head of O.S.S.] *was interested in having an exchange between the NKVD* [the Soviet secret police] *and the OSS.*

That's right, O.S.S. and the N.K.V.D. were working very close indeed.

When asked what kind of information Communist O.S.S. operative Maurice Halperin gave her to be forwarded to the Soviet Union, Miss Bentley testified: "Well, in addition to all the information which OSS was getting on Latin America he had access to the cables which the OSS was getting in from its agents abroad worldwide information of various sorts and also the OSS had an agreement with the State Department whereby he also could see State Department cables on vital issues." Halperin was Chief of the O.S.S. Latin American Division at the time when, as Miss Bentley has sworn, he was one of her contacts in a Soviet espionage ring.

Carl Aldo Marzani was Chief of the Editorial Section of the O.S.S. Marzani has been several times identified under oath as a member of the Communist Party. Using the most highly classified information, he supervised the making of charts on technical reports for higher echelons of the Army, the Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the O.S.S. Comrade Marzani made policy decisions and was liaison officer between the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army and the Office of the Undersecretary of War.

When questioned before a Congressional Committee, Irving Fajans of O.S.S. took the Fifth Amendment rather than admit to his Communist Party membership and long history of activities in behalf of the Soviets. Comrade Fajans was a key O.S.S. operative despite the fact that he was known to have been a member of the Communist Party and to have served in the Communists' Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain during the years 1937-1938.

Robert Talbott Miller III was another contact of Soviet courier Elizabeth Bentley. An O.S.S. employee assigned to the State Department, he was Assistant Chief in the Division of Research. On a trip to Moscow, Comrade Miller married a member of the staff of the *Moscow News.*

Leonard E. Mins, a writer who had worked for the International Union of Revolutionary Writers in Moscow and written for *New Masses,* was also on the staff of the top secret O.S.S. Comrade Mins took the Fifth Amendment rather than admit membership in the Communist Party. He refused to deny that he was a Soviet agent even

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HONORING THE PATRONS—Lawrence E Deutsch, left, Mrs Judith Navia and John A. McCone were among 400 opera patrons honored at a supper ball given by The Music Center Opera Assn.
Times photo by Judd Gunderson

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STAT

INTELLIGENCE IN ACTION

By Donald McLachlan

Men of Intelligence: a Study of the Roles and Decisions of Chiefs of Intelligence from World War I to the Present Day. By Major Gen. Sir Kenneth Strong. (Cassell. 50s.)

DO you still believe that it was possible to turn Hitler's troops out of the re-occupied Rhineland in 1936? If so Gen. Sir Kenneth Strong's chapter on French Intelligence at that time, when Col Gauché was in charge of German affairs, should be read at once. The author knew the Colonel as well as the methods of his office, and can therefore judge the value of his work.

Do you think that the Germans had a magnificent intelligence service at work against their chosen enemies in the 1930s? Then read the chapter on Gen. Liss, who was an expert on French mobilisation problems and so was able to advise Hitler on the significance of every reaction from Paris to his moves. Liss has obviously talked to Strong: he must enjoy telling the story of how he showed the French order of battle in November 1939 to Halder, who immediately pointed to the weak spot—the Ninth Army sector before the Ardennes, in which the 1940 campaign was won. Tippelskirch, working against the Russians, did less well.

Have you been brought up to believe that Haig lost the Battle of Cambrai by bad luck? If so it is worth considering this book's study of the brilliant and affable Charteris, who became in 1914 without any training at all the future Field Marshal's chief of intelligence. Was he right to put maintenance of his master's morale before objective judgment?

Where historians of two world wars have almost feared to tread, the former Director General of Intelligence in the Ministry of Defence trudges in a straight line from the Battle of the Marne. Col Hentsch, an intelligence man, gave in 1914 advice which led to the withdrawals of the German First and Second Armies—which we call the victory of the Marne.

The author's friend, John McCone, head of the CIA, took a pessimistic view in 1967 of the Vietcong's capacities. Gen. Westmoreland on the spot rejected this expert advice, was surprised by the Tet offensive and then said "it did not occur to us that the enemy would undertake suicidal attacks in the face of our power." Both on McCone and Allen Dulles the book is personal, interesting and reassuring. Gen. Strong is convinced the CIA is good.

Not unnaturally, most of the personalities and episodes examined in this admirably concise and short book are military. Bill Cavendish-Bentinck of the Foreign Office, however, is rightly singled out for his chairmanship in the second war of the Joint Intelligence Committee. This central assessment of information and opinions about the enemy was something quite new to Whitehall, and Service rivalries made it difficult. Strong is not quite fair to the naval role in this committee: it was to insist again and again, in the teeth of War Office and Air Ministry resistance, on the need for joint Service activity over the whole field.

The author has so much of interest and importance to tell that he could have spared us his lengthy strictures on spies. Let the fiction-writers have their fun! His valuable and readable book might have the effect of persuading our own Service chiefs that Intelligence is a branch of defence which should not be closed to ambitious men and should not be left in the hands of officers for periods of two to three years only.